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The University of Kentucky, College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education, was organized in Fall of 1973, as the first permanently
staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose of assisting
Kentucky lawyers: to keep abreast of changes in the law resulting from statutory enactments, court decisions and administrative rulings;
to develop and sustain practical lawyering and litigation skills; and to maintain a high degree of professional competence in the various
areas of the practice of law.
An enormous debt of gratitude is owed to those who contribute their time, expertise and practical insight for the advance planning,
the instructional presentations, and the written materials that make our seminars possible.
The Office of Continuing Legal Education welcomes correspondence and comment regarding our overall curriculum, as well as our in-
dividual seminars and publications. We hope the seminars and the materials distributed in conjunction with them provide attorneys with
the invaluable substantive and practical information necessary to resolve society's increasingly complex legal problems in an efficient
and effective manner. To the extent that we accomplish this, we accomplish our goal.
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In the coverage of this topic, it is my intention to call to
your attention recent United states Supreme court decisions upon
a variety of topics which are usually covered in law school
classes in Federal Courts, Federal Jurisdiction, Federal civil
Procedure or Conflicts. Given the relatively short duration of
the presentation scheduled for this seminar, descriptions in
these written materials will be more detailed than the discussion
offered during the seminar.
ERIE RAILROAD
During the fairly recent past, there have been two cases
before the United states Supreme Court which illuminated the
process of choosing between state and federal law in a federal
forum - that area of Federal Jurisdiction recognized generally
under the leading case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) •
APPEAL PENALTIES
Burlingj:on-!!orther!LRailroad~.Q!!!~ny v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1,
94 L.Ed.2d 1, 107 S.ct. 967 (1987). Plaintiffs brought a tort
action against Burlington Railroad in an Alabama state court;
Burlington removed to federal court based on diversity of citi-
zenship. Plaintiffs recovered a jUdgment, Burlington appealed
and the jUdgment was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiffs then moved the Court of Appeals to assess against
Burlington a penalty of 10% of the jUdgment for the unsuccessful
appeal, a penalty required by Alabama statute. All prerequisites
of Alabama law were met so that application of the statute by an
A-l
Alabama appellate court would have been mandatory. The Court of
Appeals applied state law, assessing the penalty. The united
states Supreme Court reversed upon the grounds that the Alabama
statute conflicted with F.R.A.P. 38, which gave Federal appellate
courts discretion to assess single or double costs for frivolous
appeals.
In reaching the conclusion that federal law prevailed, the
Court followed the approach previously applied to conflicts
involving the Federal Rules of civil Procedure in ~~~na~
~!~m~~, 380 u.s. 460 (1965). Under that approach, it is
necessary to make three determinations: (1) is the federal rule
on point to the facts at hand; (2) if the rule is on point, then
it must be determined if the rule is within the scope of the
rUle-making authority of the Rules Enabling Act; and (3) if on
point and within the scope of the Act, it must be determined if
the rule is within the constitutional scope of the federal power.
In Burlington, the Court found the issue presented a direct
conflict between state and federal law. Application of the
mandatory state penalty would take away the discretion left to
the courts by F.R.A.P. 38. The Court further found that the
ability to assess costs on a discretionary basis was capable of
being reasonably classified as procedural and thus within the
scope of the Act. Finally, the Court found that the federal rule
was constitutionally valid because reasonably related to practice
and procedure in the federal courts. Thus, the effect of
F.R.A.P. 38 was to preempt application of the Alabama pe~~lty
statute in the federal court system.
A-2
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N.B. - Kentucky has a statute providing for mandatory
assessment of a 10% penalty for a second unsuccessful appeal in
some circumstances. K.R.S. 26A.300 (2). The ruling in Burlington
should mean that this Kentucky statute is inapplicable to appeals
from Kentucky federal courts.
TRANSFER AND CHOICE OF FORUM
st~~~.!::!:_Org~ni~~ti~Inc. v. Ricoh CO!:Eor~:!:io!!, u.S.
__, 101 L.Ed.2d 22, 108 S.ct. 2239 (1988). Stewart, an Alabama
corporation, sued Ricoh, with a New Jersey principal place of
business, in Alabama upon claims of breach of a dealership agree-
ment, including claims based on federal statutes. The contract
between Stewart and Ricoh had a choice of forum clause in favor
of Manhattan. Ricoh moved to transfer the action to the Southern
District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) based upon the
choice of forum clause. Stewart contended that the applicablity
of the choice of forum clause was governed by Alabama law, which
was hostile to such clauses and probably would not have enforced
the clause. The district court found the matter governed by
Alabama law and refused the transfer: the Court of Appeals found
the choice of forum clause enforcible under federal law and
ordered the transfer. The united states Supreme Court upheld the
transfer order but was very cautious in setting forth its
reasoning so as not to leave the impression that federal law
automatically made such clauses enforcible.
On the issue of whether state or federal law controlled, the
Court noted that the question was considerably easier than that
encountered in ~ri~ cases such as Ha!1!!~. In this instance, the
A-3
federal law on point was a statute rather than a rule formulated
by the courts. Thus, the question was simply twofold: . (1) was
the federal statute on point; and (2) if the statute was on
point, was the statute within the constitutional authority of
Congress.
The Court easily found that application of the Alabama rule
disallowing such clauses would conflict with the mUltiple factors
of convenience which Congress has directed in 1404 (a) should be
considered in controlling transfer options. Such single factor
control by state law would negate the mUltiple factors required
by the statute to be considered. with federal law controlling,
the Court further easily found such statute constitutionally
valid. 1404(a) seems readily to apply to venue, an obviously
procedural point which Congress could control under the
provisions of Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
What should be noted, however, is that the Court was
explicit in stating that the choice of forum clause did not, in
and of itself, determine whether transfer was appropriate. While
approving of such clauses generally, as it had in Th.!-Br!.!!!en~
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court noted that the
choice of forum clause was only one of a multitude of factors
which the transferor court had to consider under 1404(a) in
determining whether to order the requested transfer. Thus, the
choice of forum clause was not, at least in the context of a
1404(a) transfer, specifically enforcible. While valid, it was
merely relevant to, not controlling of, the transfer decision.
A-4
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"ARISING UNDER"
Christianson-y':"-Colt-!ndustrieLQEerating Co~, U.S.
__, 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 108 S.ct. 2166 (1988). Plaintiffs, one of
whom was a former Colt employee, were competitors of Colt in
certain respects. They brought suit against Colt for alleged
violations of the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act, seeking
damages and injunctive relief. Colt defended and counterclaimed.
In the process of the litigation, which ended in summary jUdgment
for the Plaintiffs, the District Court held nine Colt patents
relating to the M16 rifle invalid and not protected by state law
relating to trade secrets.
After the granting of summary jUdgment by the District
Court, Colt appealed to the united States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Under 28 U.S.C. l295(a)(1), the Federal
Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction if the case appealed
from was one "arising under" federal patent law. In the event
that the case in the district court was not one arising under
federal patent law, jurisdiction on appeal was appropriate in the
Seventh Circuit. The question before the united States Supreme
Court required interpretation of the meaning of the "arising
under" requirement for jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.
The Court adhered to prior law indicating that a case was
one arising under federal law only if a well-pleaded complaint
established tht the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily
depended upon resolution of a substantial question of federal
law. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers
vacation-!rust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). While Christianson itself
A-5
- ---------------~
obviously met that general test (claims of plaintiffs under two
federal statutes), the appellate jurisdictional question turned
on whether the complaint of plaintiffs arose under ~tent law,
thus activating exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.
with the District Court having invalidated nine patents in its
summary jUdgment, it is tempting to say that obviously this was a
patent case.
Nevertheless, the Court held that involvement of and
reaching of patents in litigation did not necessarily mean that
the litigation at the outset arose from patent law. Thus,
appellate jurisdiction was to be determined from the face of the
well pleaded complaint rather than from the outcome of the
litigation in the trial court itself.
Looking at the complaint in the action, patent law did not
create the claims of plaintiffs - those came from other federal
statutes. Further, Colt's reliance upon its patents by way of
defense did not make the complaint one arising under federal
patent law and would not have done so even had plaintiffs drafted
the complaint so as to anticipate the defense.
Of most significance is that plaintiffs had, on each of
their federal claims, various theories of what factually had been
done to violate federal law. On each federal claim, one of their
theories was that Colt was utilizing invalid patents as a means
of restraining competition. Nevertheless, the Court found that
the existence of a patent basis as one theory for each federal
law violation did not make the case one arising under the ~~tent
laws. As to each federal claim, there were alternative theories
A-6
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supporting plaintiffs' position without reference to patent law.
For purposes of arising under jurisdiction, the court held that
it was necessary that a claim arise under patent law, not that a
---
theo!:y sUEEorti!}g ~ £la.!~ arise under patent law. Thus, the
Court concluded that claims supported by alternative theories
only arose under patent law only if patent law was essential to
each of the theories.
In reaching this result, the Court has applied (to the
question of appellate sUbject matter jurisdiction) a test which
was derived for determining trial court sUbject matter
jurisdiction. The reason for that result is the wording of
Congress in the statute granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction
in cases arising under patent law to the Federal Circuit. If
Congress desires, as Colt argues, to have uniformity in patent
litigation results at the appellate level, it will have to revise
the statute to focus not upon the jurisdictional basis of the
trial court but upon the issues actually adjudicated in the trial
court. Pending that change, the technicalities of "arising
under" which have emerged in almost two hundred years of federal
cases determining trial court sUbject matter jurisdiction are
applicable to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit
over cases arising under patent law as well.
SERVICE ON CITIZENS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Vo1k.!!!~~!!!.rk~ktie!}gese11schaft v. Sch1unk, U.S. __,
100 L.Ed.2d 722, 108 s.ct. 2104 (1988). Plaintiff brought a
wrongful death action in state court in Illinois against Volks-
wagen of America (VWoA), an American corporation licensed to do
A-7
business in Illinois and with an agent appointed for service of
process in Illinois. Plaintiff then amended his complaint to add
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG) as a defendant. VWAG is
a foreign corporation, not licensed to do business in Illnois nor
having any agent officially designated in Illinois to accept
service of process. VWoA is a wholly owned sUbsidiary of VWAG,
the two entities have a majority of directors which overlap and
VWoA is by contract the exclusive importer and distributor in
America of products of VWAG.
Service of the amended complaint upon VWAG was attempted by
service upon VWoA, through its duly appointed agent. VWAG sought
to have the action dismissed upon the theory that the Hague
Service convention furnishes the exclusive method of serving
process upon foreign nationals. Under the law of Illinois,
service upon VWAG was effective when VWoA was served. Illinois
state law reaches this conclusion because of the substantial
identity between the two corporations.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the
Illinois state court system and upheld service upon VWoA as
effective upon VWAG. In so doing, the Court focused upon the
Hague Service provision that its terms apply "where there is
occasion to transmit a jUdicial or extrajudicial document for
service abroad". The Court reasoned that the law of the forum
would determine whether, in a particular action, it was necessary
to transmit a document for service abroad. Since Illinois .
regarded service as complete when effected upon the VWoA a~ent in
Illinois, it was not necessary to transmit the complaint abroad
A-8
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for service. While it would undoubtedly be forwarded abroad to
VWAG and acted upon by VWAG abroad, such transmission by its
wholly owned sUbsidiary was not "service" within the meaning of
the treaty and so the Hague Service provisions were not
activated. To put matters differently, the formal act we know as
"service" had taken place when the agent was served in Illinois
and what took place thereafter was not "service" as that term is
meant in the treaty.
The Court expressly rejected the argument of VWAG that the
Hague Service provisions were the exclusive methods for serving
foreign nationals. While cautioning that use of methods
sufficient under forum law but not acceptable under the
Convention might lead to difficulty in enforcing jUdgments in
foreign countries, the Court focused tightly upon "service" to
conclude that it meant the ritual act known in American law
rather than a broader concept such as "delivery".
The forum provisions for determining the occasion upon which
it is necessary to resort to Hague Service could arise either in
federal court or in state court. The united States Supreme Court
interpretation of the treaty is obviously binding in each.
The most interesting question about this concerns service
under typical long arm statutes. The Kentucky statute, like that
of most other states, provides for service upon non-residents by
service upon the Secretary of State, building in a requirement
that the Secretary then forward the complaint and summons by
certified mail to the last known address of the defendant.-· Such
notice provision has been held sufficient in the united States
A- 9
since the 1920's and it is clear under Kentucky law that service
is effective upon receipt by the Secretary, not depending in the
least upon actual receipt of the summons and complaint by the
defendant. Given such to be the case, would the result in
Schlunk not seem to indicate service under our long arm statute
would ~~ve~ have to resort to the Hague Convention? To put it
another way, service is effective (under Kentucky law) upon the
Secretary, thus the sending of the letter abroad is not "service"
but simply "notification" or "delivery". While making such an
argument about "service" through a pUblic official seems far from
service upon a wholly owned sUbsidiary, the reasoning seems
susceptible to that conclusion. For myself, I would heed the
Court's caution that deviations from Hague Service in favor of
forum-authorized service may result in difficulties with
enforcement of jUdgments abroad. A default jUdgment would be
particularly vulnerable, it seems to me.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
CHOICE OF LAW
Su~_OiLCo!!!Eany_~!:!or~!!!an, __u.S. __, 100 L.Ed.2d 743,
108 S.ct. 2117 (1988). This case is part of the continuing saga
of class action litigation in Kansas to recover interest on
royalty payments withheld by gas producers, primarily in states
o the r t han Ka n s as, d uri n g the 19 6 0 ' sand 19 7 0 ' s . §.~~,
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Although
it was admitted that the substance of the claims underlyin~.the
litigation would be governed by the laws of Texas, Oklahoma and
A-10
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Louisiana, Kansas had chosen to apply its own statute of limita-
tions to the litigation despite it being longer than that of the
states whose law controlled the merits of the litigation. Thus,
the Court was faced with the issue of whether a forum which had
no interest in litigation other than its own service as forum
could extend the time period for the bringing of an action.
All members of the Court concurred in the conclusion that
such application of a forum's longer statute of limitations was
violative of neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor the Due
Process Clause. While the opinion of Justice Scalia for the
majority was not as sophisticated as Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion on this point, the two reached clear agreement that the
forum was always free to apply its own statute of limitations,
whether longer or shorter than that of a sister state. It should
be noted, however, that states with borrowing statutes like that
in Kentucky will not, by their own legislative choice, apply a
longer forum statute where the claim arose in another
jurisdiction. It is unclear whether that "arises under"
limitation means that the claim physically arose elsewhere or
that the merits of the claim are governed by the law of another
state. In the era in which the borrowing statute was written,
there would be virtually no difference between the two. In this
modern era of choice of law, I suspect that, in Kentucky at
least, it should refer to the situation where another state's law
controls the merits of the litigation.
Sun Oil also continues the internal debate on the Court
----
regarding constitutional choice of law on the merits of the
A-II
li tigation. The Court had held that, upon the record that then
existed, Kansas could not apply its law to control the interest
rate issue in Shutts. In Sun Oil, Kansas had essentially applied
its own law by concluding that the laws of Texas, Oklahoma and
Louisiana would reach the same conclusion. While the Court
upheld that decision as not violative of Due Process or Full
Faith, Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist (the author
of Shutts) dissented, saying that insufficient deference had been
shown to the laws of those other states. The case contains very
little analysis on the issue of when forum law may
constitutionally be applied on the merits, but the result does
suggest a return to the position that a forum with jUdicial
jurisdiction may always apply its own law to the merits.
TOLLING AS TO NONRESIDENTS
Bendix Autolight Corporation v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.,
__U.S. , 100 L.Ed.2d 896, 108 S.ct. 2218 (1988). Bendix
brought a contract claim against Midwesco some six years after
the claim accrued from work done for Bendix by Midwesco in Ohio.
Midwesco was a nonresident corporation and had not appointed an
agent in Ohio for service of process. Midwesco defended the suit
on the basis that the Ohio statute of limitations applicable to
such claims was four years.
Bendix argued that the four year statute had been tolled due
to the fact that Ohio has a tolling provision which prevents the
starting of a limitation period until the potential defendant is
"present" in the state. At least a corporate defendant !~uld
have been present, under Ohio law, only if it had appointed an
A -12
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agent for service of process in Ohio. Midwesco had made no such
appointment, and thus the four year Ohio statute had actually not
even begun to run when the action was commenced six years after
its accrual. Midwesco argued that the tolling statute, with its
discrimination against nonresidents, was violative of the
Commerce Clause as an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce. The United states Supreme Court affirmed the sixth
Circuit decision which had held the Ohio tolling statute to be
unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds.
It should be noted that Midwesco was, at all times after the
accrual of the claim, clearly sUbject to an exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction under the Ohio long arm statute. Since the
claim arose from Midwesco's conduct in Ohio, the statute made
jurisdiction available and such an exercise of specific
jurisdiction would easily be constitutional. Thus, the Ohio
focus on appointment of an agent to set the time running was
unnecessary. Such tolling provisions were originally adopted to
prevent a statute from running during a time when a defendant was
not sUbject to the jurisdiction of the forum. Here, Midwesco was
at all times subject to specific personal jurisdiction; what was
not present, due to the failure to appoint an agent for service
of process, was amenability to general personal jurisdiction.
with the requirement of appointment of an agent and an
attendant submission to general jurisdiction, Midwesco was faced
with a dilemma: either it could not appoint an agent and remain
indefinitely sUbject to suit so far as statute of limita~ions
went .2!: it could appoint an agent, which would set the statutes
A-l3
running on accrual dates but which would subject it to personal
jurisdiction on claims arising not just from Ohio activities but
any activities anywhere.
The Court found that there was no sufficient state interest
on the part of Ohio to be served by the tolling statute. The
state already had statutory long-arm jurisdiction over Midwesco,
thus the tolling statute did not implement any long arm
jurisdictional interest. All that Ohio could gain from the
coerced appointment of an agent would be jurisdiction over claims
not arising from Ohio conduct, an interest that appears minimal
if it exists at all. On the other hand, Midwesco (engaged in
interstate commerce) had to give up its protection against
assertion of jurisdiction over non-Ohio claims in order to get
the protection of Ohio statutes of limitations. This was thought
by the Court to be an impermissible price to extract from a
business engaged in interstate commerce.
To the extent that the result in the case forbids a state to
treat a nonresident corporation differently from a resident
corporation, it may indicate further problems ahead. Kentucky by
statute, for instance, provides a longer period for enforcement
of jUdgments by Kentucky residents than it makes available to
nonresidents. Although Bendix has no equal protection analysis
(Midwesco made the argument but it was not reached by the Court),
the result at least suggests a desire of equality of treatment
for residents and nonresidents in regard to statutes of
limitations. I would expect further developments in the future.
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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: AN UPDATE
WILLIAM M. LEAR, JR.
SEPTEMBER 23, 1988
Relevancy
A. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice
- F.R.E. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F. 2d 970 (6th Ci r. 1987)
Plaintiff in this action was a prisoner in an Ohio
correctional facility who brought a S1983 action alleg-
ing he had been beaten by a guard. During trial,
evidence was introduced that the plaintiff had been
willing to submit to a polygraph examination and the
prison guard had refused. Noting that there had been
no stipulation by the parties, the Sixth Circuit
reversed a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor. Evidence
of a party's willingness or refusal to take a polygraph
is inadmissible to either support or attack his credi-
bility. Under F.R.E. 403 the probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
B. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct;
Similar Acts - F.R.E. 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admis-
sible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, how-
ever, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(1) Huddleston v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 1496 (1988)
-- Defendant in this case was convicted of possession
of stolen videotapes. The primary issue at trial
was whether he knew the tapes had been stolen. At
trial, evidence was introduced that shortly before
selling the videotapes the defendant had offered to
sell 38 televisions at below market value and after
the sale of the videotapes the defendant offered to
sell other appliances. The evidence was admitted
under F.R.E. 404(b) to show knowledge. In the appeal
B-1
defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
by which the government had proved the bad acts.
The Supreme Court held that "similar acts" under F.R.E.
404 (b) do not have to be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence prior to submission to the jury.
The "similar act" evidence should be admitted if it
is sufficient for a jury to find that the act has
been committed.
(2) Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988)
-- This action was brought by a four-year old child
and her mother alleging damages arising out of alleged
sexual abuse by the father and his parents. Judgment
was entered for the defendants and plaintiffs appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and held that exclusion
of evidence of abuse of an older sister of the plaintiff
was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. The
evidence was admissible to show identity, as the defen-
dants were the only people who had the opportunity
to assault both of the girls. Addi tionally, child's
statements to her mother and her psychiatrist were
admissible. The court's analysis of the requirements
of F.R.E. 404(b) mirrored that of the Supreme Court
in Huddleston. The rule does not require establishing
the evidence of other crimes by a "clear and convincing"
standard. The court held the standard to be whether
the evidence was relevant to an issue other than charac-
ter and whether its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
(3) Compare Foretich to Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726
(Del. 1988), a Delaware case that used the same analysis
on similar evidence and reached the opposit result
-- This case dealt with bad act evidence introduced
in a rape tr ial. Delaware Rule of Evidence 404 (b)
dealing with bad acts is identical to the Federal
Rule. The Delaware Supreme Court held that evidence
of pr ior contact with the victim, his daughter, was
not admissible as evidence of a common plan scheme
or to show intent. Evidence of the defendant's physical
abuse of his wife was similarly subject to exclusion.
The state had relied primarily upon a proposed "sexual
propensity exception" to the general guidelines of
Rule 404(b). The court totally rejected this approach
and held that evidence of this nature would be judged
by the same standards as any other bad act evidence.
(4) Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, F.Supp 950
(E.D. Tex. 1987) -- This case was brought by an insur-
ance company for a declaratory judgment that defendant's
home had burned as a result of arson and plaintiff
was not liable. Evidence was introduced concerning
past insurance claims filed by defendant and threats
he had made against his ex-wife in the event that
B-2
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she testified. After a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff, defendant moved for a new tr ial. The evidence
of past claims was admissible under F.R.E. 404(b)
to show motive, opportunity, intent and preparation.
The evidence concerning defendant 's threats was admis-
sible under F.R.E. 405(a) as a specific instance of
conduct relevant to reputation since it was brought
out on cross-examination.
Habit or Routine - F.R.E. 406:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine
practice of an organization, whether corroborated
or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses,
is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person
or organization on a particular occasion was in confor-
mity with the habit or routine practice.
Maynard v. Sayles, 817 F.2d 50, vacated, 831 F.2d
173 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) This civil rights
action alleged physical abuse by arresting police
officers against the plaintiff. After a judgment
dismissing the action, plaintiff appealed. The district
court had excluded testimony that officers who observe
excessive force will follow a "code of silence."
The Eighth Circuit reversed holding that this evidence
was admissible under F. R. E. 406 as evidence of habit
or custom. The evidence was also admissible as relevant
to the issue of the credibility of the officers who
testified the force used had been required to prevent
plaintiff from escaping. Note: An evenly divided
en banc court of the Eighth Circuit vacated the panel
opinion and thereby affirmed the district court without
opinion.
Evidence of Compromise and Offers to Compromise F.R.E.
408:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising
to furnish, or (2) accepting or offer ing or promising
to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising
or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed
as to either validity or amount, is not admissible
to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admis-
sible. This rule also does not require exclusion
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because
it is presented in the course of compromise negoti-
ations. This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose,
such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativ-
ing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
B-3
II.
Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356
(10th Cir. 1987) -- Plaintiff in this action brought
sui t alleging trespass and outrageous conduct on the
part of defendant. The action stemmed from drilling
operation conducted on plaintiff's property without
his permission. Evidence was introduced of six previous
incidents of unauthorized drilling on the property
of persons living in the same area as plaintiff, four
of which had resulted in compensation being paid by
defendant. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the
previous incidents were compromises wi thin the literal
meaning of F.R.E. 408. The rule comes into play
only if the prior compromises are related to the claim
being litigated. Thus in this case the incidents
were admissible as they were offered to show lack
of mistake, not liability or the invalidity of the
claim.
WITNESSES
A. Impeachment of a witness by Evidence of Conviction
of a Crime - F.R.E. 609:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking
the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from the witness or established
by public record during cross-examination but only
if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regard-
less of the punishment.
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under
this rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction or of the release of the witness from
the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever
is the later date, unless the court determines,
in the interests of justice, that the probative
value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is
not admissible unless the proponent gives to the
adverse party sufficient advance written notice
of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use
of such evidence.
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(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile
adjudications .lS generally not admissible under
this rule. The court may, however, in a cr iminal
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of
a witness other than the accused if conviction of
the offense would be admissible to attack the credi-
bility of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair deter-
mination of the issue of built or innocence.
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate
of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is
not admissible. under this rule if (1) the conviction
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certifi-
cate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure
based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the
person convicted, and that person has not been con-
victed of a .subsequent crime which was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year,
or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure
based on a finding of innocence.
(1) U.S. v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1987)
-Defendant was charged with conspiracy to arrange
a fraudulent marriage in order to obtain permanent
resident status. At trial the government cross-examined
the defendant extensively concerning prior felony
convictions and read from the indictments despite
receiving affirmative answers to their questions.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the felony convic-
tions admissible under F.R.E. 609(a). Once the defen-
dant tr ied to minimize the effect of the conviction
it was wi thin the discretion of the trial court to
allow the government to inquire extensively about
the details. The analysis also applied to an uncharged
incident of insurance fraud that was admissible under
F.R.E. 608(b).
(2) Cambell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1987)
-- In this civil rights action brought by an inmate
against prison officials and guards, the plaintiff
challenged the use of a criminal conviction to impeach
his credibility as a witness. The plaintiff argued
that under F.R.E. 609(a) the prejudicial effect of
the rape conviction must be balanced against its proba-
tive value. The Seventh Circui t disagreed. Noting
the word "defendant" in the rule, the court held that
The pendency of an appeal
evidence of a conviction
the pendency of an appeal
(e) Pendency of Appeal.
therefrom does not render
inadmissible. Evidence of
is admissible.
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the balancing test only applies to criminal defendants
and has no applicability in a civil trial.
Note: The Circuits are split on whether F.R.E. 609(a)
requires a balancing test in the civil context. Petty
v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) holds that
is does. Campbell and Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d
1191 (6th Cir. 1988) take the contrary view. See
also Brown v. Flurry, 848 F. 2d 158 (11th Cir. 1988) ~
Jones v. Bd. of Police Corom., 844 F.2d 500 (8th Cir.)
Scope of Cross-Examination - F.R.E. 6ll(b):
Cross-examination should be limited to the subject
matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
the credibility of the witness. The court may, in
the exercise of discretion, may permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination.
Jeffries v. Potomac Development Corp., 822 F.2d 87
(D.C. Cir. 1987) -- In this case an employment applicant
who was injured on the job site sued the general con-
tractor. The general contractor in turn sued the
subcontractors. During cross examination of plaintiff's
expert, the general contractor was not allowed to
inquire about duties imposed on subcontractors by
federal and local regulations. F.R.E. 6ll(b) limits
cross examination to matters raised on direct examina-
tion with additional matters in the discretion of
the court. Since the plaintiff had not sued the subcon-
tractors and the general contractor had not qualified
the wi tness as his own witness, the tr ial court was
correct in so limiting the scope of cross examination.
Exclusion of Witnesses - F.R.E. 615:
At the request of a party the court shall order wi t-
nesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testi-
mony of other witnesses, and it may make the order
of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclus-
ion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2)
an officer or employee of party which is not a natural
person designated as its representative by its attorney,
or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party
to be essential to the presentation of the party's
cause.
Lapenna v. Upjohn Co., 665 F.Supp. 412 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
-- Under F.R.E. 615 witnesses in this strict liability
action against a pharmaceutical company were excluded.
The jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff
made a post-trial motion that defendant's expert testi-
mony should be stricken since he had been shown a
B-6
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transcript of the trial testimony of one of plaintiff's
experts. The district court denied the motion. F.R.E.
615 had not been literally violated and plaintiff
had not sought an order to specifically bar review
of transcripts. Furthermore, no prejudicial result
had been shown.
III. Opinions and Expert Testimony
Testimony by Experts - F.R.E. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the tr ier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualifed as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise.
A. Robertson v. McCloskey, 680 F.Supp. 408 (D.D.C. 1988)
In this defamation case the plaintiff sought to
introduce an expert in the field of psychodynamics
of memory and perception who would testify that memory
diminishes with time. Relying upon F.R.E. 702 the
court excluded the testimony. The rule allows an
expert who would assist the trier of fact. The court
found that the science was not sufficiently established
within the scientific community. Thus the expert
did not meet the Frye v. Uni ted States tes t . The
Frye test focuses on whether a scientific technique
enjoys acceptance in the relevant field. Note: Both
state and federal courts have allowed expert testimony
on the reliability of eyewitness identification in
a criminal trial. Robertson shows the difficulty
of getting a novel expert admitted in a civil trial.
B. Compare Robertson to a state case that rejected the
Frye test. People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Col.
1988) -- The Colorado Supreme Court in a rape case
refused to apply the Frye v. United States test to
exclude expert testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome.
The state had introduced the evidence to explain the
victim's delay in reporting the assault. Colorado
had earlier applied Frye with regard to admission
of polygraphs. The court rejected Frye in this instance
and instead relied upon the text of Colorado Rule
of Evidence 702 (identical to F.R.E. 702) which asks
if the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact.
B-7
IV. Hearsay.
A. Non-Hearsay
(1) Prior Consistent Statements - F.R.E. 80l(d)(1)(B):
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examina-
tion concerning the statement and the statement is
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered
to rebut an express or implied charge against the
declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive.
Uni ted States v. Vest, 842 F. 2d 1319 (1st Cir. 1988)
-- Prior consistent statements are admissible non-hear-
say under F.R.E. 80l(d) (1) (B) when they are consistent
wi th the declarant's testimony, were made at a time
the declarant had no motive to fabricate them and
the declarant is available for cross-examination.
In this case the statements were sufficiently consistent
to qualify under the rule even though the statements
were not exactly the same. The testimony at trial
was given by the government's chief witness and con-
cerned payoffs made by the defendant. The prior consis-
tent statements were offered by a second witness who
had overheard the conversation.
(2) Prior Identifications - F.R.E. 80l(d)(1)(C)
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examina-
tion concerning the statement and the statement is
one of identification of a person made after perceiving
the person.
united States v. Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838 (1988) Under
-- F.R.E. 80l(d)(1)(C) a prior out of court identifica-
tion is admissible non-hearsay. In this case involving
an assault upon a prison guard, the Supreme Court
analyzed the relationship of the rule to the defendant's
rights under the confrontation clause. The guard
had identified the defendant as his assailant while
in the hospital. At trial, however, his amnesia pre-
vented him from reidentifying the defendant or from
any testimony about the prior identification. The
FBI agent who had interviewed the guard testified
about the prior identification. The defendant sought
to have this testimony excluded on the grounds that
the guard's amnesia prevented him from meaningful
cross-examination in violation of the confrontation
clause. The -Supreme Court rejected this argument.
The defendant's confrontation clause rights are satis-
fied by fact to face cross examination. The witness's
B-8
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lack of memory did not bar cross-examination on issues
such as bias and lack of care and attentiveness.
This literal approach to the confrontation clause
is reflected Coy v. Iowa, 56 U.S.L.W. 4931
(U. S. Jun. 29, 1988) as well. In that case the Court
held that the placing of a protective· screen between
the witness, a thirteen year old girl whom the defendant
was charged with sexually assaulting, and the defendant,
did violate the confrontation clause. The actual
face to face confrontation is essential to the general
perception the clause provides of fairness and integrity
in the judicial process. Any exception to this core
right cannot be based upon a general perception that
the confrontation will traumatize the witness.
(3) Admissions by Party Opponents - F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A):
A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered
against a party and is the party's own statement in
either an individual or representative capacity.
Onujiogu v. United States, 817 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1987)
An admission by a party opponent is admissible
non-hearsay under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). In this products
liability action the defendant introduced a notation
on a hospital record that indicated the personal injury
was the result of plaintiff's negligence not a manufac-
turing defect. The court reasoned that the information
on the hospital record could only have come from the
plaintiff although it was not annotated as such.
(4) Statements by Co-Conspirators - F.R.E. 801(d)
(2)(E):
A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered
against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator
of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987)
-- Onder F.R.E. 80l(d)(2)(E) a statement made by a
co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is
admissible non-hearsay. The Supreme Court ~n this
drug conspiracy case delineated the contours of this
rule. For admission of the evidence, the existence
of the conspiracy need only be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence. Additionally the court may consider
hearsay in determining the existence of the conspiracy
and defendant's participation in it. Finally the
court is not required by the confrontation clause
to make an inquiry into the independent indicia of
reliability of the statement by the co-conspirator.
B-9
B. Hearsay Exceptions
(1) Business Record Exception - F.R.E. 803(6):
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions,
or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testi-
mony of the custodian or other qualified witness,
unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trust-
worthiness. The term "business" as used in this para-
graph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.
Saks Intern., Inc. v. M!V Export Champion, 817 F.2d
1011 (2nd Cir. 1987) In this action for non-delivery
of a shipment of coffee, defendant shipowner sought
indemni ty from the stevedore. As part of its case,
the shipowner introduced the loading tally sheets.
On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision that these tallies were admissible
under the business record exception to the hearsay
rule, F.R.E. 803(6). The fact that the preparer of
the tally could not be identified was irrelevant,
so long as it was the business entity's regular practice
to get information from that person. No employee
of the stevedore company that prepared the tally testi-
fied, but the mate of the ship testified that it was
customary for the shore-side stevedore to prepare
the tallys and then for the ship to retain them and
they were customarily not signed.
(2) Public Records and Reports - F.R.E. 803(8)(C)
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations,
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting
forth (A) the activities of the office or agency,
or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by
law as to which matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in cr iminal cases matters observed
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel,
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to author-
i ty granted by law, unless the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
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Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498 (11th;
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1073 (1988)
At issue in this case was the admissibility of con-
clusions and opinions in a public investigative report
prepared by the United States Navy concerning an air-
plane class. An en banc. court of the 11th Circui t
evenly. spli t on the issue of whether conclusions and
opinions were admissible. Thus the court's earlier
holding that conclusions and opinions are not admissible
under F.R.E. 803(8) (C) was upheld. The 11th Circuit
remains the only circuit to have so held.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A. Administrative Law - Black Lung Benefits Claims
Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, 108 S.Ct. 427 (1987)
-- This case dealt with the quantum of evidence neces-
sary to invoke a presumption of eligibility for black
lung benefits under the interim regulations. Once
this presumption is invoked the burden shifts away
form the claimant. The Supreme Court reversed a Fourth
Circuit opinion that had held a single item of qualify-
ing evidence was sufficient to invoke the presumption.
Instead the claimant must establish one of the qualify-
ing criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.
B. Due Process in Paternity Proceedings
Rivera v. Minnich, 108 S.Ct. 3001 (1987) -- This action
was brought by an unmarried mother seeking child support
from the putative father. Under Pennsylvania law,
paternity can be established by a preponderance of
the evidence. Relying upon an earlier Supreme Court
opinion that had held a higher standard of proof was
necessary to extinguish a parent child relationship,
the father appealed and attacked the constitutional
validity of the Pennsylvania statute. The Supreme
Court distinguished its previous holding and upheld
the Pennsylvania law. The preponderance of the evidence
standard in paternity proceedings does not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Civil Forfeiture Proceedings - 21 U.S.C. S88l
Civil forfeiture proceedings brought by the government
to recover the proceeds from the sale of illegal nar-
cotics and other contraband have generated an enormous
amount of litigation in the last year. Of particular
note is the efforts of the Justice Department to trace
the proceeds to attorneys in the form of fees paid
by their clients who were involved in illegal activity.
The constitutional aspects of attaching and recovering
B-11
attorneys fees has been the subject ot two en banc
hearings by United States Courts of Appeal.
The Fourth Circuit in In re Caplin & Drysdale, 837
F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), held that the Sixth Amendment
did not prevent the government from recovering attor-
ney's fees that were traceable to drug proceeds.
The Second Circuit reached the opposite result in
United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 2030 (2nd Cir.
Jul. 10, 1988). A full discussion of civil forfeiture
is beyond the scope of this topic, however there are
several evidentiary considerations which present a
trap for the unwary. These are detailed at length
in United States v. Miscellaneous Jewelry, 667 F.Supp.
232 (D. Md. 1987), which is typical of this type of
proceeding. This is an in rem action proceeding under
admiralty rules. The government only has to meet
a probable cause standard in order to shift the burden
of proof to the claiming party. This probable cause
standard may be met by introducing evidence that would
be entirely inadmissible at trial such as hearsay.
B -12
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JOINT LOCAL FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT RULES
-A ONE YEAR HISTORY-
Honorable Edward H. Johnstone
Chief Judge
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
Paducah, Kentucky
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SELECTED
JOINT LOCAL RULES
FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
OF THE
EASTERN AND WESTERN DISTRICTS
OF
KENTUCKY
AS Ar[NJ)ED - SEP1HtBER 1988
C-l
Pursuant to LR 24(b) of the Joint Local Rules of the Eastern and
Western Districts of Kentucky, the Joint Local Rules are amended as
follows:
1• Ed itorial Change s
a. Delete L.R. 6(b)(2)(D) and L.R. 6(b}(2}(E) as
duplicative of L.R. 6(d) & 6(e).
b. Change lI and ll in L.R. 6(d) to 1I 0r ll so as to read
II No moti on E.!: supporti ng memorandum . . .• 11
c. Add "otherwisell after the words lIunlessll in the first
sentence of L. R. 9(b).
d. At the next printing of the rules, change lI ye llowll to
II pink ll in L.R. 13(b)(2).
e. At the next printing 0 f the rules add II 16 11 a fie r
II Fed. R. Civ. P.II in the heading in the Table of
Contents.
2. Other Changes
a. At the end of L.R. 6(d), add: lI any order imposing
sanctions on an opposing party or attorney shall be
set forth on a separate document that contains neither
a moti on nor an order pertaining to another matter. 1I
b. Add 1I 0r Sanctions into the subtitle of L.R. 14(a) and
add lIor for the imposition of sanctions ll after the word
IIfees ll on the first ine of L.R. 14(a).
c. Add II which may be an attorney of record II to the end
of the second sentence of L.R. 9(c).
d. Change L. R. 8 as follows:
(1) Add to L. R. 8(a) at the beginning:
"Except as herein provided, all discovery material
required to be filed by the federal rules,
including but not Ii mited to all answers to
interrogatories and responses to requests for
production, inspection, or for admissions, shall
be filed with the Clerk of Court subject to the
conditions and limitations provided in this rule."
(2) Strike from L.R. 8(a) (1) the beginning words:
II Except as herein provided • • • II and begin the
sentence with II (1) The following sha II not be
til ed . "
e. Add to the end of loR. 4(c): "Any crimina I trial or
proceeding may be transferred in accordance with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 18.
C-2
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RULE 4
Clerk.
cannot be filed without an order of the Court. it shall be stamped "tendered" by the
(I) Civil Actions.
Pleadings. motions and other papers
As,sIGNMENT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES;
PLACE OF FILING
filing of Pleadings. etc.(a>
(A) An action against a lingle resident
defendant. or multiple resident defendants who reside in
the same jury division, shall be asigned to the jury
division in which the defendant or defendants reside.
(B) An action aaainst multiple resident
defendants who reside in more than one jury division, or
multiple defendants some of whom are resident and
othen DOD-resident in the district, lhall be assianed to
the jury .division in which the claim arose, or, it the
claim did not arise in the district, to the jury division in
which the tint named resident deCendant resides.
(b> Assignment of Actions. Civil or criminal actions shall be assigned to
tendered for filing. The pleadings shall be entered on the docket by the Clerk if filed
in the division where the action is pending. If the pleading is filed in a division
where it is not pending. the Clerk shall accept the filing and forward it to the
in which the action is pending. The official Ciling stamp showing the Court. the date
and location of the office of the Clerk shall be affixed to pleadings which are filed or
particular jury divisions of the Court in accordance with the provisions below. If an
validity of the filing of the action shall not be affected thereby and the case shall be
divisional office where the case is pending Cor entry on the docket. If a pleading
("pleadings") may be filed in any of the divisional offices of the Clerk for the district
improper assignment of a case to a particular jury division is made by the Clerk. the
transferred to the correct jury division.
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(C) An action against only a non-resident
defendant or defendants shall be assigned to the jury
division in which the claim uose or, if the claim did not
uise in the district, to the jury division in which the
first named plaintiff resides.
(D) To assist the Clerk in assigning the action
to the appropriate jury division, a party commencing a
civil action shall include in the complaint, or other
initial pleading, a statement of
(i) the defendant's or defendants' residence,
(ii) the plaintifrs or plaintiffs' residence, or
(iii) the jury division in which the claim arose.
(2) Criminal Actions. If the indictment alleges that the crime
occurred within the district, the action shall be assigned to the division in which the
crime is alleged to have occurred. In cases where it is not alleged that the crime
occurred in the district, or in cases in which it is unclear in which division the alleged
crime occurred, the indictment shall be assigned to the division in which the first
named resident defendant resides. In all other instances, the action shall be assigned
to a division in the discretion of the Clerk.
(3) Removal Cases and 28 U.S.C. 62254 Petitions. A removal or
state habeas corpus petition shall be assigned to the division within the district in
which it is filed that includes the county of the court from which the removal is had
or in which the challenged judgment, conviction or order wu rendered.
(4) Special Residency Roguiremcnts. For purposes of this RULB, the
United States, its agencies or ofCicen when joined in ID official capacity, ,hall not be
deemed a resident of the district. A corporation .hall be deemed to be • resident or
the county in which it has its principal place of busineu within the district. If.
corporation does business' throuahout the district IDd has DO operation which is its
principal place of business, or in the cue or • non-resident corporation which doea
C-4
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not maintain a place of business within the district, an action shall be assigned to the
jury division in which the claim arose.
(c) Transfer. Upon motion of a party or the Court's own motion, any civil
action or proceedinl may, in the discretion of the Court, be transferred from the jury
division in which it is pending to any other division for the convenience of the Court,
parties, witnesses, or in the interest of justice.
(d) Assignment Among Judles. Cases shall be assigned among the various
judges within a district in a manner established by general order of the Court.
(f) Judge Not Available. If it appears that any matter demands immediate
attention and the judge to whom the cause has been assigned is not or will not be
available, the Clerk, upon request, shall determine if another judge is available who
will consent to hear the matter.
C-5
RULE 6
MonON PRACTICE
(a) Motions. All motions shall state precisely the relief requested. Except
for routine motions. such as for extensions of time. each motion shall be accompanied
by a supportina memorandum which complies with the provisions of this aUL&.
Failure to do so may be around. for denyiDI the motion.
C-6
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(I) Motions for Extension of Time in Civil Actions Parties may by
agreed order extend time limits required by the FED. R.. CIV. P. or these aULa, subject
to any deadlines established by the Court. If a request for an extension or time is
opposed, the party seeking the extension shall file a motion setting forth the reasons
why an extension is necessary together with a tendered order granting the motion.
The party opposing the motion shall respond within five (S) days of service of the
motion. setting forth the reasons why the requested extension should not be granted.
(2) Motions for Discovery Order in Civil Actions. Counsel have the
duty to make a good faith effort to resolve any disputes which arise in the course of
discovery. Only if counsel are unable to resolve a discovery dispute, maya motion to
compel discovery or for a protective order, or for sanctions be filed pursuant to Rules
26 and 37, FED. R. CIV. P. The moving party shall attach to the motion a certification
of counsel that counsel have conferred and that they have been unable to resolve their
differences. The certification should detail the attempts of counsel to resolve the
dispute.
(3) Motions in Criminal Cases. Unless otherwise permitted by the
Court, motions and supporting memoranda in criminal cases shaJJ be rUed with the
Clerk and a copy served upon the United States Attorney within eleven (11) days after
arraignment, or if there has been no arraignment when a trial date is set, not later
than eleven (II) days after notice or such setlinl is liven, ualea a different~ is
fixed by order, statute or the rBl). L ca. P.
(b) Dme and filinl Responses and ReoliN.
(I) Civil Actions.
(A) 0Dginl Memorandum. An opposinl memonadum
must be filed within fifteen (IS) days from the date of service of the motion which
may be extended for no more than thirty (30) additional days by written stipulation
C-7
filed with the Court unless the stipulation would extend the time beyond a deadline
established by the Court. Failure to file an opposing memorandum may be grounds
for granting the motion.
(B) Reply Memorandum. A reply memorandum may be
filed within eleven (II) days from the date of service of the opposing memorandum,
which may be extended for no more than five (5) additional days by written
stipulation filed with the Court unless the stipulation would extend the time beyond a
deadline established by the Court. A reply memorandum shall be limited to matters
newly raised in the opposing memorandum.
(2) Criminal Actions.
(A) Opposing Memorandum. An opposing memorandum in a
criminal action must be filed within eleven (11) days from the date of service of the
motion. Failure to file an opposing memorandum may be grounds for granting the
motion.
(B) Reply Memorandum. A reply memorandum may be
filed within eleven (11) days from the date of service of the opposing memorandum.
A reply memorandum shall be limited to matters newly raised in the opposing
memorandum.
(C) Extensions of Time. Extensions of time in criminal
actions will be granted only upon motion and affidavit for good cause shown, and not
by agreement of the parties.
(c) Limitations on Memoranda. Memoranda pertaininl to motions are
limited to (1) a supportinl memorandum, (2) an OPpoSinl memorandum, and (3) a
reply memorandum. Supportinl and opposing memoranda .hall not exceed forty (40)
..
pages and reply memoranda shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages without leave of Court.
Supporting and opposina memoranda which exceed fifteen (15) pales shall contain (I)
C-8
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an introduction. (2) a statement (or counterstatement) of points and authorities, (3) a
statement (or counterstatement) of the case, (4) an argument, and (5) a conclusion.
(d) Copies of Orders. No motion and supportins memorandum or
memorandum in opposition thereto shall be accepted for filing by the Clerk unless
accompanied by a tendered separate proposed order granting the requested relief or
denying the motion, as the case may be.
(e) Hellrings on Motions. A party may request a hearing on a motion by
filing a motion for oral argument which sets forth the reasons why counsel believes
that argument may assist the court in ruling on the motion. If a hearing is not
requested, or if requested but not granted, a motion shall be submitted to the Court
for decision after the reply memorandum is filed, or the time for filing such a
memorandum has expired.
C-9
RULE 8
DISCOVERY PRACTICE
(a) filing Discovery Material.
(I) Documents Not to be Filed. Except as herein provided, the
following shall D.Q1 be filed with the Court unless the Court orders otherwise:
(A) Interrogatories propounded under fED. R. CIV. P. 33;
(B) Requests for Production or Inspection made under FED.
R. elv. P. 34; and
C-IO
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(C) Requests for Admission propounded under FED. R. CIV.
P. 36 lU1lw the time for filing a response thereto has passed, in which event, counsel
may file the original Requests for Admission previously served. No oriainal Requests
for Admission shall be filed pursuant to this provision unless the original Requests for
Admission contain an appropriate proof of service bearing the precise date and
manner of service upon the party requested to admit and the time provided under the
federal rules for responding thereto, including time under FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e), if
applicable. has expired.
(2) Custodian of Documents. The party responsible for service of
the document shall retain the original and become the custodian. The custodian shall
provide access to all parties of record during the pendency of the action.
(3) When Document May Be Filed. If a document not filed
pursuant to Rule 9(a)(I) is to be used at trial, or is necessary to a pretrial or post-trial
motion, or is necessary for appeal purposes. the portion of the document to be used
shall be filed with the Clerk at the commencement of the trial, or at the time of filing
the motion, or at the time of the appeal, if the document's use can be reasonably
anticipated.
(b) Repetition of Question or Request Before Answer. When answering
interrogatories or requests for production or inspection, or for admissions, or in riling
objections thereto, the replying party shall. as a part of his answer or objection and
immediately preceding it set forth the question or the request with respect to which
the answer or objection is given.
C-ll
(c) Limitation on the Number of Interrogatories and Requests to Admit.
Each party may propound a maximum of thirty (30) interrogatories and thirty (30)
requests for admission to another party; for purposes of this RULE, each subpart of an
interrogatory or request shall be counted as a separate interrogatory or request.
Interrogatories requesting the following shall not be included in the maximum allowed:
(I) the name and address of the person answering;
(2) the names and addresses of the witnesses; and,
(3) whether the person answering is willing to supplement his
answers if information subsequently becomes available.
A party may move the Court for permission to propound interrogatories or
requests for admission in excess of thirty (30).
C-12
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RULE 9
BOND REQUIREMENTS
(a) General ReQuirements. In aJJ civil, criminal and bankruptcy actions,
the Clerk may accept as surety upon any bond, required by law or ordered by the
Court, a surety company approved by the United States Department of Treasury, cash
in an amount set by the Court, or an individual personal surety secured by acceptable
real estate as defined in (b) below. A surety company approved by the Department of
the Treasury may have on file with the Clerk, in the division of the Court where the
action is pending, a power of attorney, designating an agent doing business in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, to execute bonds. In lieu of filing the power of
attorney with the Clerk, a copy of the power of attorney must be appended to each
bond executed. The Clerk shaJJ not, however, accept as a penonal surety on any bond
C-13
an attorney, an officer or employee of the Court, or the United States Manhal or any
deputy marshal.
(b) Personal Surety Secured by Real Estate. Unless ordered b.y the Court,
the Clerk shall accept a personal surety if the real estate offered a security is land
located in the Commonwealth of Kentucky with an unencumbered value of at leat
I J0% of the amount of the bond. Real estate owned by corporations or partnenhips is
not acceptable. Property held jointly is acceptable provided all joint tenants execute
the bond.
(I) Procedure for Posting Real Estate Bond. An affidavit of
sureties shall be executed providing the following information:
(A) Name and address of the ownen;
(B) Affiant's statement as to assessed value from the
Property Valuation Administrator's Office or, if not available, an appraisal by a
licensed appraiser.
(C) A listing of all liens and mortgages on the property,
including all but the current year's real estate taxes. On appearance bonds. the
affidavit shall be incorporated by reference in the Justification of Sureties portion of
the Appearance Bond Form.
(2) Execution of Bond aod Deposit of Deed. All parties to the deed
and the bond must execute the bond and take the oath. The deed or certified copy
thereof for each tract .haIl be deposited with the Clerk and a receipt lhall be liven to
the owner. If the bond it not forfeited, the deed will be returned to the property
owner in .penon or by certif'ied mail at the conclusion of the cue.
(3) Lla Pendens Notice and Em. The Clerk shill tne a aotice of
..
iiI I¥rul."1 a,ainst the property in the County Clerk'. orfice or the county In which
the property is located. The required fee for filin, a notice and releue of III I¥"d.ru
C-14
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for each county in which the property is located is required upon execution of the
bond.
(c) Removal Bond. The amount of a bond accompanying a petition for
removal of an action from state court shall be not less than Two Hundred-fifty
($250.00) Dollars. The bond may be secured by a cash deposit. or good and sufficient
surety. A party may move to have the amount of the bond increased.
C-15
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Joint exhibits (IX) shall be identified by numbers and be white;
Plaintifrs exhibits (PX) shall be identified by numbers and be
yellow;
..
Defendant's exhibits (OX) shall be identified by numbers and
be blue;
RULE 13
EXHIBITS
C-16
(3)
The provisions below shall be followed unless otherwise ordered by the Court:
(a) Advance Marking. AH exhibits and material intended to be used
during a civil trial shaH be marked for identification purposes with labels which are
available, upon request, from the Clerk.
(b) Method of Designation. AH exhibits shaH be marked for identification
purposes as follows:
(I)
(2)
r
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(4) Third-party exhibits (TPX) shall be identified by numbers and
be green;
(5) In all proceedings involving multiple plaintiffs or mUltiple
defendants. the identification assigned each exhibit shall contain the surname of the
individual plaintiff or defendant or the corporate name of the plaintiff or defendant.
(c) Uniform Designation. Proposed exhibits. including those appended to
requests for admission. interrogatories and depositions, as well as those to be utilized
during trial, shall be uniformly identified during all phases of the case.
(d) List of Exhibits. At the commencement of a civil trial, each party's
counsel shall tender to the Court a list of all exhibits the party then intends to utilize
at trial; the list shall contain the pre-marked number and a short description of the
exhibit.
(e) CoPY for Jydge. Except upon cause shown or as provided otherwise in
the final pretrial order, a copy of each document or written exhibit tendered or
entered during trial shall be furnished to the judge for his information at the time of
filing with the court reporter or deputy clerk. as the custom of the Court may be.
(f) Disposition of Exhibits. Three (3) months after the entry of a final
order or upon filing of a mandate in a case appealed. the Clerk may direct counsel of
record to retrieve aU exhibits filed by them. which are still remaining in the Clerk's
custody. The Clerk may deliver x-ray negatives, hospital records and medical reports
to the witness through whom they were introduced in evidence. If not claimed within
two (2) weeks after the final disposition of the case, the Clerk may deliver all
contraband filed u exhibits to the appropriate investiaatina aaency for disposition,
and the Clerk may destroy aU other exhibits not claimed within two weeks after the
notice to counsel of record to retrieve all exhibits filed by them.
C-17
RULE 14
TIME FOR FILING PETITIONS FOR ATTORNErS FEES AND COSTS;
VOUCHERS
(a) AttQrney's Fees. A petitiQn fQr attQrney's fees in a civil proceeding
shall be filed within thirty (30) days Qf the entry of final judgment. provided that the
Court. upon written motiQn and for good cause shown. may extend the time. A
petition for attorney's fees shall be denied if it is nQt filed within the period
established by this Rule. unless the petitioner shQWS that special circumstances would
render such a denial unjust.
(b) Bill of Costs. Within thirty (30) days of the entry Qf a Judgment
allowing costs, the prevailing party shall file a bill of costs with the Clerk and serve a
CQPY of the bill Qn each adverse party. If the bill of costs is nQt filed within the
thirty days, CQsts other than those of the Clerk, taxable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1920.
shall be waived. The CQurt may, on motiQn filed within the time prQvided for the
filing of the bill of costs. extend the time for filing.
(c) SubmissiQn Qf vouchers. Unless an exception is granted by the judge.
Criminal Justice Act appointees' vouchers claiming compensation must be submitted
within sixty (60) days after completion of services.
(d) Completion of Services. For purposes of this RULB only. ·completion of
services· is one of the folJowina:
(l) Entry of Judgment and Sentencing. If appealed. issuance of In
order affirming the judgment or denying certiorari.
(2) Complaint. Information or Indictment is dismissed or the Brand
jury returns no biJl.
(3) Counsel ceases to be the attorney of record.
C-18
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TEMPORARY AND INJUCTIVE RELIEF
IN THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
-THE COURT'S PERSPECTIVE-
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r
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TEMPORARY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM
-THE COURT'S PERSPECTlVE-
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II. CRITERIA FOR ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Accord, Friendship Materials, Inc. ~. Michigan Brick, Inc.,
679 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1982); Mason County Medical Association
v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1977).
In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1985).
"Fourf~tors are particur:;;rly important in determining whether a
preliminary injunction is proper: (1) the likelihood of
plaintiff's success on the merits; (2) whether the injunction
will save the plaintiff from irreparable injury; (3) whether
the injunction would harm others; and (4) whether the public
interest would be served by the injunction."
Notice required.
Expires in ten (10) days.
1.
4.
BASIC REQUIREMENTS - RULE 65
A. Temporary Restraining Order
B. Preliminary Injunction
3. Requires certification that efforts had been made
to notify the opposing party.
1. May be granted without written or oral notice under
certain circumstances.
2. Must be shown by affidavit or verified complaint
that irreparable injury will result before counsel can be
heard in opposition.
2. Requirements for issual or denial are set out in
cases listed below.
TEMPORARY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM -
THE COURT'S PERSPECTIVE
I.
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These four considerations are to be balanced, and are not
prerequisites that must be met. As stated in ~ ~ DeLorean
Motor Co., supra at 1229, quoting from Friendship Materials:
[T]his Court approved a test that would
allow a court to grant a preliminary
injunction 'where the plaintiff fails to show
a strong or substantial probability of
ultimate success on the merits of his
claim, but where he at least shows
serious questions going to the merits
and irreparable harm which decidedly
r
D-l
outweighs any potential harm to the
defendant if an injunction is issued.'
In Gaston Drugs, Inc. ~. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 823
F.2d 984, 988 (6th Cir. 1987), the district court only considered
the probability of success on the merits, when it denied the
motion for a preliminary injunction. There, the Sixth Circuit
noted that such a finding would not preclude a court from
exercising its discretion to issue a preliminary injunction,
citing Friendship Materials, but it says there was no abuse of
discretion, as the plaintiffs had failed to show any irreparable
harm that they would suffer that would outweigh the prospective
harm to the defendant if the preliminary injunction were granted.
III. LABOR INJUNCTIONS
(A) The Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes many types of
injunctions in labor disputes.
(B) ~ Markets, Inc. ~. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1969), allows a federal court to enjoin a strike in
breach of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining
agreement, so long as the contract contains a mandatory grievance
adjustment or arbitration procedure. Buffalo Forge Co.-y. United
Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 396 (1976), precludes the
issuance of a;-injunction against a sympathy strike, since the
dispute was not over an arbitrable grievance.
IV. OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS
(A) Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2805
1. Preliminary injunction may be granted if "there
exists sufficiently serious questions going to the merits
to make such questions a fair ground for litigation."
2. Standard for obtaining injunction is not as great
as that required under Civil Rule 65. See Barnes v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 824 F.2d 300, 306 (4th Cir. 1987). ----
(B) Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
I
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2. Standards set out in Civil Rule 65, except that the
time limit for temporary restraining orders issued without
notice shall be seven (7) days vice ten (10) days.
1.
§ 818.
Jurisdiction for injunctions set out in 30 U.S.C.
I
I
(C) Fair Labor Standards Law, 29 U.S.C. § 217
Grants special jurisdiction to the district courts to
restrain the withholding of payments of minimum wages or
overtime compensation due employees.
D-2
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v. LAWS RESTRICTING INJUNCTIONS,
(A) 28 U.S.C. § 2283 precludes a federal court from granting
an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court "except as
expressly authorized by Act by Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments."
(a) Younger y. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (pending
criminal proceeding).
(b) Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (pending
civil proceeding).
(B) State actions.
(1) 28 U.S.C. § 1341 precludes enjoining or restraining
the "assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State."
(2) 28 U.S.C. § 1342 precludes enjoining the operation
or compliance with any order affecting rates chargeable by
a public utility and made by a "State administrative agency
or a rate-making body of the State political subdivision,"
under certain criteria.
D-3
ADDENDUM
COURT RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) Preliminary Injunction:
I
I
I
I
I
( 1 ) Notice.
without
No preliminary injunction shall be issued
notice to the adverse party. I
(b) Temporary Restraining Order; Notice; Hearing; Duration.
A temporary restraining order may be granted without
written or oral notice to the adverse party or that
party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss,
or damage will result to the applicant before the
adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard
in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney
certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any,
which have been made to give the notice and the
reason supporting the claim that notice should not be
required. Every temporary restraining order granted
without notice shall be endorsed with the date and
hour of issuance; shall be filed forthwith in the
clerk's office and entered of record; shall define
the injury and state why it is irreparable and why
the order was granted without notice; and shall
expire by its terms within such time after entry,
not to exceed ten (10) days, as the court fixes,
unless within the time so fixed the order, for good
cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless
the party against whom the order is directed consents
that it may be extended for a longer period. The
reasons for the extension shall be entered of record.
In case a temporary restraining order is granted without
notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be
set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and
takes precedence of all matters except older matters of
the same character; and when the motion comes on for
hearing, the party who obtained the temporary
restraining order shall proceed with the application
for a preliminary injunction and, if the party does
not do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary
restraining order. On two days' notice to the party.
who obtained the temporary restraining order without
notice or on such shorter notice to that party as the
court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and
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move its dissolution or modification and in that event
the court shall proceed to hear and determine such
motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
(c) Security. No restraining order or preliminary
injunction shall issue except upon the giving of
security by the applicant, in such sum as the court
deems proper, for the payment of such costs and
damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party
who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or
restrained. No such security shall be required of the
United States or of an officer or agency thereof.
(d) Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order.
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining
order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance;
shall be specific in terms; shall describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint
or other document, the act or acts sought to be
restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the
action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the
order by personal service or otherwise.
Norris-LaGuardia Act (Title 29, United States Code)
§ 101. Issuance of restraining orders and injunctions;
limitations; public policy
No court of the United States, as defined in this
chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
except in a strict conformity with the provisions of
this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary
to the public policy declared in this chapter.
§ 104. Enumeration of specific acts not subject to
restraining orders or injunctions
No court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary
or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute
(as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or
to remain in any relation of employment;
D-5
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any
labor organization or of any employer
organization, regardless of any such under-
taking or promise as is described in section
103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from,
any person participating or interested in such
labor dispute, any strike or unemployment
benefits or insurance, or other moneys or
things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person
participating or interested in any labor
dispute who is being proceeded against in, or
is prosecuting, any action or suit in any
court of the United States or any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of,
or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling,
or by any other method not involving fraud
or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to
organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an
intention to do any of the acts heretofore
specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or
not to do any of the acts heretofore specified;
and
(i) Advising, urging or otherwise causing or
inducing without fraud or violence the acts
heretofore specified, regardless of any such
undertaking or promise as is described in
section 103 of this title.
§ 107. Issuance of injunctions in labor disputes;
hearing; findings of court; notice to affected persons;
temporary restraining order; undertakings
No court of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of
a labor dispute, as defined in this chapter, except
after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open
court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in
support of the allegations of a complaint made under
D-6
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oath and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered,
and except after findings of fact by the court, to the
effect -
(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened
and will be committed unless restrained or
have been committed and will be continued
unless restrained, but no injunction or
temporary restraining order shall be issued
on account of any threat or unlawful act
excepting against the person or persons,
association, or organization making the
threat or committing the unlawful act or
actually authorizing or ratifying the same
after actual knowledge thereof;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury
to complainant's property will follow;
(c) That as to each item of relief granted
greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will
be inflicted upon defendants by the granting
of relief;
(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy
at law; and
(e) That the public officers charged with the
duty to protect complainant's property are
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal
notice thereof has been given, in such manner as the
court shall direct, to all known persons against whom
relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public
officials of the county and city within which the
unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged
with the duty to protect complainant's property:
Provided, however, That if a complainant shall also
allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall
be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable
injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable,
such a temporary restraining order may be issued upon
testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to
justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon
a hearing after notice. Such a temporary restraining
order shall be effective for no longer than five
days and shall become void at the expiration of said
five days. No temporary restraining order or
temporary injunction shall be issued except on the
condition that complainant shall first file an
undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be
D-7
fixed by the court sufficient to recompense those
enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by
the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order
or injunction, including all reasonable costs (together
with a reasonable attorney's fee) and expense of
defense against the order or against the granting of
any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and
subsequently denied by the court.
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (Title 15, United States Code)
I
I
I
I
I
(a) If a franchisor fails to comply with the require-
ments of section 2802 or 2803 of this title, the
franchisee may maintain a civil action against such
franchisor.
§ 2805. Enforcement provisions
I
I
(b)(l) In any action under subsection (a) of this
section, the court shall grant such equitable relief
as the court determines is necessary to remedy the
effects of any failure to comply with the requirements
of section 2802 or 2803 of this title, including
declaratory judgment, mandatory or prohibitive
injunctive relief, and interim equitable relief.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3), in
any action under subsection (a) of this section, the
court shall grant a preliminary injunction if -
(A) the franchisee shows -
(i) The franchise of which he is a
party has been terminated or the
franchise relationship of which he
is a party has not been renewed, and
(ii) there exists sufficiently
serious questions going to the
merits to make such questions a
fair ground for litigations; and
(B) the court determines that, on balance, the
hardships imposed upon the franchisor by the
issuance of such preliminary relief will be less
than the hardship which would be imposed upon such
franchisee if such preliminary injunctive relief
were not granted.
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APPEAL OF A FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE -- THE BEST APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE PURPOSE OF THE OUTLINE
This outline is designed to provide the average
practitioner with a practical, common sense approach
to criminal appellate practice in the federal courts.
For the criminal practitioner, appellate practice is a
critical phase in the jUdicial process just as
important as the trial proceedings from which it
flows. For the defendants involved, it may represent
their last meaningful opportunity to avoid
imprisonment or significant monetary penalties. This
outline will help attorneys avoid the common pitfalls
and misconceptions about the appellate practice and
properly focus their efforts on presenting the most
effective, persuasive appeal.
B. PROPERLY CONCEPTUALIZING THE CRIMINAL APPEAL
1. Far too often, attorneys, even seasoned attorneys,
fail to view the criminal appeal in the proper
perspective. For these attorneys, the criminal
appeal is something that is only to be considered
after the jury has rendered a verdict against
their client. In their thinking, the appeal is
something separate and distinct from the trial
which proceeds it. Only after they lose a trial
do these attorneys begin to marshall their
resources for the appeal. By compartmentalizing
appeals in this fashion, these attorneys have
already done much to make their work harder on
appeal. consequently, they have decreased the
probability of success in the appellate process.
2. The more experienced criminal attorney realizes
that trial and appeal are not distinct aspects of
the criminal judicial process. Appellate planning
is something that these attorneys begin on day one
when their clients walk in the door. For them the
appellate process is something that flows
naturally out of pretrial and trial proceedings.
Throughout the development of their case they are
spotting potential issues for appeal, developing
these issues by discovery and motions prac~icie,
raising and preserving the issues at trial, and
ultimately presenting the same issues for further
review on appeal.
E-I
3. The remalnlng portions of this section of the
outline are intended to develop this type of mind
set toward federal criminal appellate practice.
Accordingly, this outline is not a discussion of
the substantive criminal law. In considering the
appellate process, the outline focuses more on
structuring and arguing federal criminal appeals.
II. HAVING THE RIGHT TOOLS FOR THE JOB
A. LEGAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT ON CRIMINAL LAW ISSUES
1. Any criminal appellate practitioner, federal or
state, is only as effective as his or her
knowledge of the criminal law. Obviously, if you
don't know what the issues are you can not raise
them on appeal. Therefore, at the very outset of
the appellate process, it is necessary that the
practitioner develop and maintain a thorough
knowledge of all aspects of the federal criminal
practice. Beyond legal training and law school,
there are many common sense things that you can do
to maintain and improve your knowledge of
potential issues for appeal.
2 . REVIEWING THE ADVANCE SHEETS - Although it may
sound too elementary to bear repetition, it is
still sound advice for the criminal practitioner
to review the advance sheets of the Federal
Reporter and Federal Supplement on a routine
basis. Reviewing these materials, alerts the
practitioner to the most current decisions in his
or her cases. It also gives advance warning as to
what individual jUdges in your circuit will do
with a particular issue or fact pattern. In
short, the best policy is to always make time for
the advance sheets.
3 . SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW FILES - Reviewing the
advance sheets, however, is only the starting
point. As the practitioner goes through the
advance sheets, he or she should be identifying
critical cases and saving these cases for ready
access in his or her office files. The best way
to do this is to maintain a substantive criminal
law file system in the office. This filing system
is a substantively designated, alphabetically
organized series of files on specific areas of the
criminal law. Each time an attorney reads a case
or article that involves one of these specific
areas of the substantive criminal law, he or she
simply makes a copy of that case or article and
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includes it in the substantive files under the
appropriate heading. By doing this, the attorney
will have a growing resource base of authority for
future reference on appeal. For example, in my
law office we have extensive substantive files
covering approximately 900 specific issues of the
substantive criminal law. These files are indexed
alphabetically so that I can have immediate access
to any of over 900 different issues arising in the
practice of criminal law. It is simply impossible
to tell you how valuable these substantive files
have proven over the years. When the substantive
files and advance sheets are routinely read and
maintained, the criminal practitioner is armed
with a ready knowledge of the issues that he can
raise and argue at trial and on appeal. As
complex and demanding as the practice of criminal
law has grown over the years, a successful
criminal law practitioner simply cannot afford not
to have substantive criminal law files.
4. OTHER RESOURCES FOR ISSUE DEVELOPMENT - Beyond the
advance sheets and substantive files, there are
several other excellent resource tools that the
criminal practitioner may use for issue
development at trial and on appeal. For example,
the Office of Public Advocacy has developed
extensive expertise in the practice of criminal
appellate law. Its staff routinely publishes a
monthly pUblication, The AdvQcate, that discusses
the substantive criminal law, not only in
Kentucky, but in the Sixth Circuit as well.
In addition to the Office of Public Advocacy,
there is also the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, this group also publishes a
monthly pUblication, The Champion, which is
invaluable to the practicing criminal defense
attorney in terms of issue spotting and issue
development. Reading these two pUblications
religiously can pay large dividends when it comes
time to raising issues on appeal.
Two other excellent resources for issue
development are the annual survey issue of the
Kentucky Law Journal which will review all of the
proceeding year's important cases in both state
and federal criminal law, and the annual review of
Supreme Court criminal law decisions found in the
Georgetown Law Journal. These two pUblications
provide thorough and analytical review of repent
criminal law decisions in the federal courts.' Any
criminal law practitioner would be well served by
E-3
maintaining a separate substantive file on each of
these pUblications.
a. The following pUblications have also proven to
be very helpful in issue development.
i. West's Criminal Law News (West Publ. Co.
1988) (A weekly summary of criminal law
cases reported during the preceding week
by all state and federal courts.)
ii. Criminal Law Reporter (BNA 1988) (A weekly
review of developments in criminal law.
iii. sixth Circuit Reyiew (Appellate Rev. 1988)
(A weekly review of the published opinions
of the sixth Circuit.)
i v . Search & Seizure Bulletin (Quinlan Publ.
Co. 1988); Arrest Law Bulletin (Quinlan
Publ. Co. 1988); Search & Seizure Report
(Clark Boardman Co. 1988)
v. Federal Rules of Evidence News (Callaghan
& Co. 1988)
5. CONCLUSION An experienced attorney prepares
himself fori appeal just as he would prepare his
client's case. In an area as complex as federal
criminal law, the practitioner must routinely
devote a portion of each day to keeping abreast of
the current developments in his area of practice.
The above mentioned resources are simply tools to
be used by the practitioner in accomplishing this
goal. The small amount of effort devoted each day
to maintaining and expanding these resources will
save large amounts of time and anxiety later on in
the appellate process. In short, a knowledgeable
attorney burdened with a otherwise mediocre case
will go much farther in the appellate process than
an uninformed attorney with an otherwise favorable
case.
III. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE CRIMINAL APPEAL
A. The first opportunity to begin developing issues for
appeal is not after the jury has rendered its verdict,
but when a client arrives for his or her first
interview. This is counsel's first chance to spot and
develop potential issues for appellate review.
Accordingly, the experienced attorney needs to focus
his questioning on facts relating to such areas as
E-4
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search and seizure, self-incrimination, arrest without
probable cause and any other potential problem areas
that may generate issues for appellate review. This
first interview, or interviews, is the critical time
to identify and formalize future issues for appeal.
By doing this, the experienced counsel not only
identifies issues but also ensures that he will raise
and preserve them for future review.
1. Throughout the course of the client interviews,
counsel needs to maintain a separate file in the
client's case file devoted solely to issues to
raise at trial on an appeal. This file should
contain all the conceivable issues that defense
counsel wishes to raise and any case law that may
have been discovered on these issues. All too
often, attorneys will simply discard research once
it has served its limited purpose in the pretrial
process. Thoughtlessly discarding this research
has the effect of doubling an attorney's effort on
appeal. By maintaining a separate case file
devoted to these potential appellate issues,
counsel ensures that he will have a ready resource
file for appellate practice.
2. Along these lines, the criminal law practitioner
should also make effort to be as thorough as
possible in his research prior to trial when he or
she raises any of these issues. Just as with the
substantive criminal law files mentioned above,
thorough pretrial research pays large dividends
once the jury has returned a verdict.
B. DISCOVERY
1. After the client interview, pretrial discovery is
the best way of developing and raising issues for
future appellate review. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S • 83
(1963) are both well traveled avenues for issue
spotting and development. Therefore, when an
attorney makes a request pursuant to either of
these authorities, he or she should keep in mind
the issues that he is interested in developing for
appellate review. Focus in on these issues and
use Brady and F.R.Crim.P. 16 to push the
prosecution to provide as much information as
possible on these issues. In that way, discovery
becomes a tool not only for finding out the facts
of your case, but also a useful device for
developing issues to raise and preserve ~or
appellate review. The unthinking attorney; / by
limiting discovery only to factual matters related
E-5
to the circumstances of the charged offense,
deprives himself of one of the most useful and
effortless means of spotting and developing issues
for the later appeal.
C. PRETRIAL HEARINGS
1. The third opportunity that criminal attorneys have
to develop issues on appeal is the pretrial
hearing. At this critical stage of the criminal
proceedings, the practitioner is presented his
first opportunity, beyond written motions, to
fully articulate to the court the basis for
whatever relief the practitioner is requesting.
Accordingly, the practitioner should come to the
hearing prepared to discuss the authority
supporting his motions, including citations to
case authority, federal statutes and any
significant scholarly commentary on the issues
raised in the motions. By being able to
thoroughly discuss his reasoning, the defense
counsel is better able to crystalize his position
for future appellate review. He or she is also
developing a record in the trial court that will
demonstrate to the appellate court that the issues
raised on appeal were seriously argued down below
and were not simply the product of afterthought or
inadvertence.
D. TRIAL AND POST TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Trial and post trial proceedings are the final and
most critical opportunity to develop the issues
one intends to raise on appeal. If counsel has
been thorough in his pretrial preparation, trial
objections should be relatively straight forward
except for unanticipated testimony or bench
rulings. When objecting on issues raised prior to
trial, counsel needs to be sensitive to continuing
the theme of his pretrial objections and making
repeated references to them in the record so that
the appellate court on review can appreciate the
seriousness of the issue and will have no doubts
about its preservation. In effect, what counsel
is doing at trial, through his objections, is
developing a theme for his appeal that can later
be developed to lend coherence and structure to
his brief and argument before the federal
appellate courts. Be sure, in all post trial
motions for new trial, etc., that the same
objections and the ground for them are again
thoroughly restated. By doing thorough research
and carefully saving and organizing it, much of
E-6
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
. ./
E-7
A. INTRODUCTION
B. FOLLOWING THE RULES
that goes into such post trial motions
been already completed. The same
applies to appellate brief writing
the effort
will have
conclusion
below.
1. This portion of the outline discusses briefly the
mechanical aspects of filing and perfecting your
criminal appeal in the federal courts. Because
other speakers at this seminar will be
specifically addressing the do's and don'ts of
appealing to the sixth Circuit, this portion of
the outline is intended merely to briefly draw
attention to several common problems that occur in
the appellate process. While these problems are
mechanical and routine in nature, they are often
times critical to the proper disposition of a
criminal appeal.
a. Remember, the time for filing a notice of
appeal begins to run from ~ 2f. entry Q.f.
jUdgment, not its receipt. Fed.R.App.P. 26(b)
specifically provides that a court of appeals
cannot enlarge the time for filing a notice of
appeal. United States y. Willis, 804 F.2d
961, 963 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986).
1. THE TIME FOR APPEAL - In a criminal case, the
notice of appeal must be filed by the defendant in
district court within ten days of the entry of the
judgment or order appealed from. If a timely
motion for a new trial or arrest of jUdgment is
filed during this ten day period an appeal may be
taken ten days after entry of the order which
denies the motion. For the purposes of
Fed.R.App. P. 4 (b) , a judgment or order is
considered entered within the meaning of this rule
when it is entered on the criminal docket. In
cases of excusable neglect, the district court may
before or after the ten day time period has
expired extend the period for filing a notice of
appeal an additional thirty days. However this
period may not exceed thirty days from the
expiration of the ten day time period otherwise
prescribed by the rule.
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b. Mailing of a notice of appeal does not
constitute filing. The date of receipt of the
notice of appeal in the district court is what
confers jurisdiction. Torras Herreria v. M-V
Timur star, 803 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1986).
c. Neither Rule 6 (c) of the Federal Rules of
civil Procedure, ~ Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure will extend the
time for appeal by three additional days
because the jUdgment was mailed by the
district court clerk. Welsh y. Elevating
Boats. Inc., 698 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir.
1983).
d. COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4(b} IS A MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITE WHICH THIS COURT
CAN NEITHER WAIVE NOR EXTEND. United States
v. Merrifield, 764 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1985).
e. Final judgment in a criminal case means
sentence. The sentence is the jUdgment.
United States v. Bratcher, 833 F.2d 69 (6th
Cir. 1987).
f. A notice of appeal from an order denying a
motion to reduce sentence pursuant to
Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 shall be filed within ten
days from its entry. United States v. willis,
804 F.2d 961, 962 (6th Cir. 1986).
g. A notice of appeal from an order denying a
motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 shall be
filed within ten days from its entry. Unit~d
States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1073-74
(6th Cir. 1987).
h. A notice of appeal filed prematurely during
the pendency of a timely motion for new trial
or arrest of judgment may be sUbject to being
dismissed without prejudice. United States y.
Jones, 669 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1982).
i. Generally, the Sixth Circuit dismisses a
criminal appeal without prejudice when the
notice of appeal has been filed within thirty
days following the expiration of the original
ten day period. This dismissal is without
prejudice to the right of the defendant
involved to file a motion in the district
court to extend, for reasons of excusable
neglect, the time for filing a notice of
appeal. However, if a notice of appeal was
E-8
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filed more than forty days from the entry of
the jUdgment or order, generally, the
dismissal has been with prejudice.. This
policy is the result of Fed.R.App. p. 4(b),
the final sentence which gives the district
court discretion to extend the time for filing
an additional 30 days beyond the 10 day period
when a showing of excusable neglect has been
made.
Fallen v. United states - The only exception
to the strict adherence to the filing
requirements for the notice of appeal has been
the Supreme Court case, Fallen v. United
States, 378 U.S. 139 (1969). In this case the
defendant filed a direct criminal appeal four
days after the time period had run. The court
of appeals dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal the Supreme Court
determined that the defendant had done all
that he could do to file a timely notice of
appeal and remanded the case to the court of
appeals for disposition on the merits. In
remanding, the Supreme Court based its
decision on the fact that Fallen had done
everything that he could to file a timely
appeal, but was prevented by circumstances
beyond his control from meeting the filing
deadline. Specifically, Fallen's attorney
declined to represent him on appeal. Fallen
was then held in medical and hospital
facilities where he was not permitted to have
visitors. When he did feel well enough to
write, he wrote a letter to the district court
seeking a new trial and an appeal. However,
mail pickups at the institution where he was
housed occurred only twice a week and the
otherwise timely letter was not received in
the district court until after the ten day
time limit for filing had run. Although the
sixth Circuit has not applied Fallen to
notices of appeal filed outside the ten day
time limit, other circuits have relied on
Fallen to hold a notice of appeal to be filed
in a timely fashion when it otherwise would
not have been. Uniteg States v. Andrews, 790
F.2d 803, 806-7 (lOth Cir. 1986), ~.
denied, 107 S.ct. 1898 (1987); uniteg States
y. Scott, 672 F.2d 454, 455 (5th Cir. 1982)
(per curiain).
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A) • ~ ~ prisoners - A new exception to-the
filing requirements for the notice of
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appeal was recently carved out by the
united STates Supreme Court in Houston y.
Lack, 56 USLW 4728 (June 24, 1988). In
Hoyston, the Court held that a pro se
prisoner's notice of appeal is filed
within the meaning of Fed.R. App. p.
4(a) (1) when he or she delivers it to
prison authorities for forwarding to the
federal district court.
C. APPEALABILITY OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
1. BAIL - District court orders which grant or deny
bail prior to or after trial are immediately
sUbject to appeal under both the collateral order
exception of Cohen y. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949) and by statute, 18
U. S . C. § 3731 . Matters relating to appeal from
bail decisions of the district court are also
covered by Fed.R.App.P. 9(a)-(b).
2. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT - Where a party's attorney has
been sUbpoenaed, many circuits have allowed an
immediate appeal because of the attorney-client
privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gordon),
722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), ~. denied, 467
U.S. 1246 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Fine), 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Katz), 623 F. 2d 122 (2nd Cir.
1980). It should be noted however that the
attorney-client privilege does not apply when
records regarding attorney's fees have been
subpoenaed. In re Grand Jury Investigation No.
83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976). In all
situations, the extent of the attorney-client
privilege will turn on the particular facts of the
case. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517
F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975). Along the same lines,
the denial of a motion to quash a sUbpoena
directing a witness to appear before a grand jury
is generally not appealable without resisting the
subpoena and being found in contempt. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); CObbledick
y. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). However,
an order that denies a motion to quash a subpoena
directed against a third party movant who claims
that production of the subpoenaed material would
violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination can be immediately appealed
without having the movant first found to be in
E-IO
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contempt. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Katz),
623 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1980).
3. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL - Appeals from rUlings
on motions to disqualify counsel are not
immediately appealable. united states v. Tosh,
733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); Flanagan y. United
States, 465 U. S. 259 (1984); In re Schmidt, 755
F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1985); Kahle v. Oggenheimer and
~, 748 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1984).
4. DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENT - The denial of a motion
to dismiss an indictment is generally not
appealable. United States v. Hollywood Motor Car
Comgany, 458 U.S. 263 (1982); United States v.
Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981). However,
an order denying a motion to dismiss on double
jeopardy grounds is appealable. Abney y. united
States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977). Finally, an order
that denies a pretrial motion to dismiss an
indictment on grounds of denial of a speedy trial
is D.Q.t. a final and appealable decision. United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); United
States y. Bilskey, 664 F.2d 613 (6th Cir. 1981).
Also, an order that denies a motion to dismiss an
indictment on grounds of vindictive prosecution is
not final and appealable. United States y.
Hollywood Motor Car Company, sugra. Similarly,
the dismissal of an indictment without prejudice
is not appealable. Uniteg states v. Bratcher, 833
F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1987). However, the pretrial or
midtrial dismissal of an indictment on the motion
of the defendant is appealable by the government.
uniteg States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978);
Serfass v. Uniteg States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
5. DISQUALIFICATION - An order of a district court
jUdge refusing to disqualify himself is not
reviewable until a final judgment has been
entered. In re City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160
(6th Cir. 1987); Collier v. Picarg, 237 F.2d 234
(6th Cir. 1956). An order denying recusal of a
jUdge also is not reviewable under the Cohen
exception. Uniteg States y. Washington, 573 F.2d
1121 (9th eire 1978). However, an order granting
recusal of a jUdge is immediately appealable.
Kelly y. Metrogolitan County Board of Egucation,
479 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1973).
6. EVIDENCE - An order denying a preindictment motion
to suppress is not appealable by the defendal?-t.
Coury y. uniteg StAtes, 426 F.2d 1354 (6th. eire
1970). Similarly, an order denying pretrial
E-11
motions to suppress evidence is generally not
appealable. Pi Bella v. united states, 369 U.S.
121 (1962) (appealable only if it is not tied to a
criminal prosecution .in ~). Sovereign News
Company v. united States, 690 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.
1982) (appealable if there is no indictment and no
charges have been filed), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
811 (1983). However, a pretrial or preindictment
order that does suppress evidence is a final and
appealable order which may be appealed by the
United states. United states v. Tiktin, 427 F.2d
1027, 1029 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, (1971).
7. JURY - In a criminal case, it is the jUdgment and
commitment order, not the jury verdict, which is
appealable. United states v. Bratcher, 833 F.2d
69 (6th Cir. 1987).
8. NEW TRIAL (Fed.R.Crim.P. 33) - The denial of a
motion for a new trial in a criminal case is
appealable and appeal taken within ten days after
entry of the denial will be consolidated with a
pending appeal taken from the judgment of
conviction. United states v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d
1068 (6th cir. 1987). However, an order denying a
new trial is not appealable where a jUdgment of
conviction has not yet been entered. United
states v. Battista, 418 F.2d 572 (3rd Cir. 1969).
D. PERFECTING THE APPEAL
1. Although dismissal will only routinely result from
the failure to take a timely appeal from a final
and appealable order, counsel for the appellant
should be careful to follow the various appellate
rules, both federal and Sixth Circuit, when
perfecting his appeal. It is beyond the scope of
this outline to fully set out those rules relating
to perfecting an appeal. This topic is more fully
covered in the discussion of do's and don' ts in
appealing to the Sixth Circuit. One very useful
tool, however, to assist practitioners in avoiding
problems in perfecting their appeals is the
Practice Guide published by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. This
publication contains all of the relevant federal
rules governing the appellate process. It also
contains very handy outlines of the appellate
process and which rule governs each step of the
process. If counsel does not have one of these
practice guides already, he or she should
immediately request a copy of one from the clerk's
office of the sixth Circuit. I cannot
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overemphasize how helpful this practice guide has
been to me in my appellate practice.
a. NOTE - The Practitioner's Handbook pUblished
by the Cincinnati is no longer current and is
not recommended for use by the sixth Circuit.
v. BRIEFING AND ARGUING THE APPEAL
A. BRIEFING THE APPEAL
1. Introduction - A persuasively written appellate
brief that carefully and clearly sets out the
errors at trial is the single most important
aspect of the successful criminal appeal. An
excellent oral argument will seldom save a poorly
written appellate brief; but, an excellent brief
can many times survive the effects of a less than
perfect oral argument. Moreover, what is said in
oral argument, regardless of how persuasive, may
soon be forgotten or may even be confused by the
jUdges who hear many criminal appeals each month.
A well-crafted brief, however, is something that
the court may return to again and again to
persuade itself that the proper outcome of the
appeal is reversal of the defendant's conviction.
Therefore, the bulk of an attorney's time should
go into carefully drafting a concise, logical and
persuasive appellate brief. If an attorney does
his homework on his brief, it is much more likely
that he will do well at oral argument as well.
Therefore, the remaining portion of this section
of the outline will discuss in common sense terms
how to organize and draft a persuasive appellate
brief in a federal criminal appeal.
B. SETTING OUT THE FACTS OF YOUR CASE
1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE - Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 28(a)(3) and Sixth Circuit Rule 10
require that the appellant include in his brief a
statement of the case. This statement is the
first opportunity that the appellant will have to
address factually the procedural developments in
his case. All too often, bUSy attorneys simply
limit the statement of the case to a restatement
of the district court docket sheet. When this
happens, the statement of the case unfortunately
dissolves into a mind numbing series of sentences,
each beginning with a date followed by the
procedural development of the case that occurred
on that date. When this happens, the crimJ.nal
appellate advocate has failed to achieve his
E-13
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initial and most important goal, capturing the
attention of the reader. Federal jUdges and their
law clerks are inundated with briefs, both
criminal and civil. Because of their heavy
caseload, each brief inevitably tends to blend
into the preceeding one. Therefore, it is
important, from the very outset, that the
appellate advocate grab the jUdge's and clerk's
attention. Restating the district court docket
sheet will never achieve this goal.
To avoid the problem of a mechanical and boring
statement of the case, the effective criminal
appellate advocate should first focus on the
events that are of key significance in your
appeal. It is not necessary in your statement of
the case to recite every procedural development.
Only the procedural developments relevant to the
issues on appeal need be set out in detail. When
describing these procedural events, counsel should
be careful to focus on the aspects of the case
that support his claims of error. Give the court
enough detail on these critical proceedings so
that you will not have to waste time in the
argument section of your brief setting out the
basic procedural developments critical to the
issue at hand. In this regard, it is completely
appropriate to tell the court in your statement of
the case why this particular procedural
development is important to the resolution of the
appeal. Be careful however not to dwell too long
on the significance of any procedural development
as the argument portion of the brief is the proper
place to expand on the importance of any
significant procedural event.
a. A word of caution to younger or less
experienced federal appellate advocates, over
the years, the federal courts have maintained
a well established sense of decorum and
respect for their fellow brethren on the bench
of the lower federal courts. Accordingly,
there are several basic rules in draftsmanship
that all appellate advocates need to adhere to
when drafting the statement of the case, or
any portion of the brief for that matter.
i. Always avoid referring to federal
district court jUdges and opposing
counsel by name when discussing errors
at trial or in the proceedings. In
other words, it is a breach of unwritten
etiquette to state that "Judge Jones
E-14
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erred in ruling on the evidence."
Whenever possible use the generic terms
"district court" or "United states" when
referring to the trial court or the
prosecution.
ii. It is also prudent to avoid referring to
the district court as a "lower court."
Many federal appellate court jUdges came
from those "lower courts" and deeply
resent it when federal district courts
are referred to as "lower courts." When
necessary refer to the district court as
such or as the "trial court."
iii. Always make sure when you quote the
district court or the prosecution that
you make an immediate reference to the
record specifically indicating the
location the quoted passage. As a
general rule, thorough reference to the
record should be made throughout your
brief. Nothing frustrates federal
jUdges and their law clerks more than
having to search through an extensive
record to verify a statement in a brief
simply because the appellate advocate
has failed to cite to the record. In
fact, the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 28(e) specifically
requires that there be ample reference
to the record in the brief.
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. The statement of the facts portion of a criminal
appellate brief offers appellate counsel two
important opportunities: first, the opportunity
to portray the human aspects of your client; and
second, the opportunity to subtly impress upon the
court the "rightness" of your case and arguments.
a. The general pUblic, and in many instances the
federal appellate courts, have an instinctive
bias against criminal defendants on appeal.
In many instances these defendants have been
convicted of heinous crimes involving violent
conduct. It is only natural that anyone
learning of such conduct would be incensed.
The properly drafted appellate brief seeks to
overcome this natural prejudice by immediat~ly
highlighting the favorable human aspects· of
the defendant.
E-15
i. What the effective criminal appellate
advocate must do is subtly appeal to the
emotions of the reader. This is done by
presenting the facts sincerely and
without exaggeration or hysteria.
ii. structure your statement of the facts so
that each of the major paragraphs begins
with a favorable fact for the defendant.
When describing this fact or facts use
longer sentences that include sufficient
adjective and adverbs to lend color to
the factual development.
iii. Under no circumstances, however, should
the criminal appellate advocate avoid
the "bad facts" that bear against his
client and his client's arguments on
appeal. When faced with bad facts there
are two effective means to deal with
them. First, structure your paragraphs
so that bad facts are disclosed in the
middle of the paragraph and not at the
beginning or the end. Second, when
stating potentially damaging facts, use
very short sentences that contain a
minimum of adjectives or adverbs. In
other words, state the damaging fact as
briefly and abstractly as possible and
then move on to more favorable facts.
Try, if possible, to end a paragraph on
a high point with more favorable facts
that offset the damaging fact.
i v . In certain circumstances, however, the
appellate advocate may wish to stress
the bad facts if their admission is a
ma jor issue on appeal. This situation
normally occurs in the context of the
admission of prior uncharged misconduct
under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). In this
situation, when the admission of prior
bad acts is an issue on appeal, the
appellate advocate needs to state the
prior bad acts as colorfully and as
extensively as possible. Play up the
fact that these bad acts were highly
prejudicial. Spend as much time as
possible detailing each prior bad act.
Set out exactly how the prosecution used
that bad act during the trial and the
timely and repeated objections made to
E-16
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c.
admission of that prior bad act. If the
prior bad acts were uncorroborated or
were remote in time be sure and bring
these aspects out in your statement of
the facts as well.
v. In presenting the human aspects of your
client and his case on appeal, appellate
counsel needs to be cautious to avoid
exaggerating the strengths of his case
on appeal. No case on appeal is perfect
and the most over inflated balloons are
the first to burst. SUbtlety is the
key.
To achieve the second goal of the statement of
the facts, developing the "rightness" of your
case, the appellate advocate should attempt to
subtly, but deliberately, associate his client
and his client's arguments with basic human
notions of fairness and fair play. Most
individuals, jUdges and laymen included, have
a general set of guidelines that they use to
separate what is fair from what is not fair.
This very basic notion of fair play is
something that we all carry with us at both
the conscious and subconscious level. Tapping
into this sense of "rightness" gives the
appellate advocate a decided advantage in
arguing his federal criminal appeal. At a
very minimum, it offsets the natural bias
against criminal defendants on appeal.
i. To develop the factual "rightness" of
the defendant's case, the appellate
advocate should be sensitive to any
facts which tend to arouse sympathy for
his or her client. These facts should
be subtly, but fully, developed through
the use of adjectives and adverbs that
have natural positive connotations. At
the other extreme, any facts which tend
to cast the prosecution or law
enforcement officials in a bad light
should also be developed through the use
of connotative adjectives and adverbs.
In other words, it benefits the
appellate advocate to show the
"wrongness" of his opponent's acts just
as much as it benefits him to show the
"rightness" of his own case.
Conclusion - A properly developed statement· 'of
the facts that highlights the human aspects of
E-17
the defendant and the rightness of his
position on appeal should, by itself, leave
the appellate court with a definite impression
that a serious question on appeal has been
raised. If the statement of the facts
accomplishes this purpose then the appellate
advocate has done his work.
D. ARGUMENT
1. Introduction - The argument section of a criminal
appellate brief is perhaps one of the most
misunderstood portions of the brief. All too
often, new or less experienced attorneys overload
this critical section of the brief with too many
arguments and too many case citations. Courts are
already overwhelmed with burdensome caseloads and
every additional argument that is raised on appeal
inevitably elicits a quiet groan of
dissatisfaction by federal appellate judges and
their clerks. The ultimate goal of any argument
section is to find and logically develop an
acceptable theory to support reversal. This
section of the outline explains step-by-step how
to reach that goal.
2. Selecting the Issues - A common problem with many
attorneys is that they think too little and act
too quickly in plotting out the line of attack or
defense they will take on appeal. The effective
appellate advocate carefully selects issues for
appeal and realizes that most appeals at best only
contain two or three material arguments. It is
these two or three arguments that are used to
build a theme that is reflected throughout the
argument section of the brief.
a. Overloading a brief with too many issues
significantly reduces the defendant's chances
of success on appeal in several respects.
First, as noted above, it angers judges and
law clerks who all too often are forced to
address issues of little or questionable
merit. Second, loading down a brief with too
many issues only dilutes the impact and
effectiveness of the few key issues that may
result in reversal. Third, the more issues an
appellate advocate raises on appeal; the more
detailed his statement of the case and
statement of the facts must be. Accordingly,
more pages of the brief are devoted to these
sections and less pages to fully developing
E-18
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the few critical arguments to their most
favorable extent.
b. In short, the basic rule is that an issue
should not be raised on appeal if after
thorough research, the appellate advocate
decides that this issue standing alone, or in
direct relation to several closely related
similar issues, would not be sufficient to
warrant reversal of the jUdgment of
conviction. Of course, the key ingredient to
making this determination is thorough and
broad ranging research throughout the course
of the criminal proceedings. It is the
advocate's research and not his brief which
should be used to cull the issues for appeal.
3. Presentation of the Issues - After the issues to
be raised on appeal have been selected, the
appellate advocate needs to consider how he or she
will present these issues in the brief. All too
often, when and how an appellate advocate raises
these issues will be just as important as the
substance of the issues themselves. The following
subsections highl ight certain key considerations
critical to the most effective presentation of the
issues on appeal.
a. Lead and close the argument section of the
brief with the strongest issues on appeal.
The jUdges and clerks who examine your brief
will be most receptive and interested at the
outset of their reading. Empirical studies
have repeatedly shown that readers are more
likely to remember the first and last items
they have read. Therefore, the argument
section of the brief should begin with the
appellant's strongest issue. Typically,
questions of first impression or issues that
have divided the federal circuit courts are
good examples of lead issues on appeal. When
drafting these issues, do not hesitate to let
the court know that this question is one of
first impression or one that has divided the
circuits . Such statements immediately raise
the interest level of the reader.
b. Cater your argument to the four most common
concerns of federal appellate court jUdges.
On the whole, appellate court judges in the
state and federal appellate courts share fqur
common fears: 1) the fear of appearing
unscholarly; 2) the fear of creating "bad
E-19
law"; 3) the fear of appearing either too
liberal or too conservative; 4) and the fear
of being reversed on further appellate review.
A carefully drafted argument should sUbtly
touch on each of these four fears to
strengthen the appellant's position.
i. Appearing Unscholarly - Of necessity,
federal appellate courts rely on
appellate briefs as a starting point for
research. The more thorough and
scholarly the appellant's research is,
the more the court will place its trust
in the appellant's scholarship.
Conversely, if the appellant's brief is
obviously the product of hasty and
slipshod research, the court will
immediately suspect any statement the
appellant makes be it factual or legal.
To win the scholarly confidence of the
court, the appellant should make sure
that his brief is well written, that it
contains the latest case cites to the
cases directly on point, that these
cases are cited in the proper citation
form and that any relevant treatise or
law journal articles dealing with the
issue have been considered.
ii. Creating "Bad Law" - In the appellant's
argument, he or she should tactfully
suggest to the court the detrimental
impact that affirmance would have on
future criminal proceedings in the lower
courts. In effect, the appellant should
show the court how affirming the
conviction would work an injustice on
future criminal defendants. The goal of
the appellate advocate in this situation
is simply to show the court that by
reversing the defendant's conviction,
the court will be avoiding the problem
of creating bad law.
iii. Appearing Too Extreme If at all
possible, try and put your client in the
mainstream of current jUdicial thought.
In other words, try to show the court
that reversal of the conviction is
something that most moderate, objective
judges would do.
E-20
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A). If the defendant is forced to
advocate jUdicial change on appeal,
however, he should focus first on
the historical development of the
principal that he intends to change
by his appeal. with each new
paragraph, the appellant should
gradually build to the conclusion
that change of the current law is
inevitable based on the historical
development in this area. To do
this, it is best to proceed slowly
and compartmentalize the arguments
for change.
iv. Being Reversed on Appeal - Another good
tactic to use in structuring your
argument is to show that courts which
have held adversely to your position
have been reversed on further appellate
review. Such arguments typically plant
the seed of doubt in the reader and
further reinforce the "rightness" of the
defendant's suggested disposition.
The Four Most Important Qualities to Set the
Tone of Your Argument - Beyond mere structure,
appellate arguments also have another quality
best referred to as "tone." This quality is a
very difficult quality to define, but it is
just as important as structure to the
effectiveness of the argument section of the
brief. In essence, tone is the product of
four qualities of draftsmanship.
i. Frankness By tactfully and timely
revealing the weaknesses of a
defendant's argument on appeal, the
appellate advocate demonstrates to the
court that he is an honest advocate.
This quality is much appreciated in the
federal courts as it saves the jUdge's
time in sifting the wheat from the
chaff. Appellate jUdges and their staff
will find these weaknesses whether or
not the appellate advocate reveals them
in the brief. It is far better to
knowingly disclose a weakness in your
argument than to have a jUdge confront
you with an unstated one at oral
argument.
E-21
A). Cunningham v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
No. 87-3751 slip op. (Sixth Cir.
entered August 23, 1988) (failure
to truthfully set out facts in
appellate brief suggets bad faith
and may result in contempt
proceedings).
ii. Accuracy By being accurate, the
appellate advocate wins the confidence
of the court. Accuracy is achieved by
being thorough and comprehensive in
stating the law related to each of the
issues raised on appeal.
iii. Detachment - The polished professional
advocate maintains his or her distance
from the facts of any particular case.
This is the same manner in which federal
appellate court jUdges view the cases
before them. It is viewed as a sign of
professional immaturity for an advocate
to be too closely attached to the facts
or issues of his case. Just as a
surgeon would not think of becoming
friends with each and every patient he
treats, an advocate should not associate
himself or herself too closely with each
defendant that is represented on appeal.
iv. Personal Dignity Throughout the
argument, the appellate advocate should
project a sense of courtesy and kindness
toward the prosecution and the district
court. At all cost, avoid overly severe
criticism of your opponent or the trial
court no matter how provoked you may
consider yourself to be. By projecting
a sense of dignity and kindness, the
appellate advocate reveals to the
appellate court his own qualities as a
human being and the sense of "rightness"
he projects about himself or herself.
d. Structuring the Argument - Structure and tone
are Siamese twins insofar as appellate
argument is concerned. It is simply not
enough to have one without the other as
dignity lends nothing to confusion and
precision without humanity is more the stuff
of mathematics than effective appellate
advocacy. The goal of the appellate advocate
E-22
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is to blend both of these qualities together
evenly and sUbtly so that logic and humanity
blend together in persuasion.
i. To aChieve this goal, the effective
appellate advocate subdivides his
arguments into their major proponents.
These proponents, or lesser included
points, should be separated with
alphabetic or numeric divisions. These
divisions signal the court that you are
proceeding to make a new point in your
brief. They also break up the page and
relieve the reader's eyestrain.
Finally, in the headings that accompany
such subdivisions, the effective
advocate has the opportunity to
reemphasize in bold face print the key
point he wishes to make.
ii. Once the argument is divided into its
key elements with alphabetical or
numeric sUbdivisions, the appellate
advocate should concentrate on
structuring the paragraphs included in
the particular section at hand. Each
paragraph should begin with a topic
sentence that states the main point of
the paragraph. These topic sentences
are then expanded by expository
sentences in the body of the paragraph.
At the end of the paragraph ordinarily
there should be a conclusion which
summarizes the material contained in the
topic sentence.
A). One useful device for developing a
logical progression in ordering the
paragraphs in a particular section
of the brief is to begin by simply
jotting down the major points that
are to be argued in the section of
the brief. Put these major points
in a logical order cUlminating in a
strong conclusion. This list of
points is in essence a list of
topic sentences to be used for
developing paragraphs in the brief.
iii. Once you have structured the order of
paragraphs within a particular
sUbsection, the next focus should be.' on
the language used within those
E-23
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paragraphs. Always strive for preC1S1on
in using language. In this regard, it
is much better to use a simple word than
a complex one. Also, words which draw
attention to themselves rather than the
thought that they convey are to be
avoided. As earlier noted, adverbs and
adjectives are useful in creating a mood
or feeling of "rightness," but they
should not be overused since they are
conclusory in nature. If possible, try
to avoid epithets and never use
hyperbole. If a hostile reaction from
the reader is sought use few adjectives
and short sentences that contain "cold"
words. On the other hand, if the writer
seeks to evoke sympathy use smoother,
longer sentences with "warm" words that
carry favorable connotations. A careful
use of words will allow the writer to
create a sense of continuity as well as
a sense of "rightness." To help choose
the perfect word, the writer should keep
at his desk an unabridged dictionary, a
legal thesaurus, a grammar book and a
dictionary of synonyms.
Case citation - New attorneys and many law
students sometimes have the misimpression that
the more cases they cite the stronger their
position will be. In the real world, just the
opposite is true. An endless citation of
cases to support a statement does not impress
jUdges or their law clerks. In most
instances, it simply makes more work for them.
String citing cases also leaves less room for
argument and explanation.
i. As a general rUle, cite only one
authoritative case to support an
undisputed principal of law. When the
issue under discussion is disputed, the
writer may wish to cite two or three
cases in support of his position. Only
when there is a question of first
impression or a decided difference among
the federal circuits should the
appellate advocate cite more than two or
three cases for any proposition.
ii. When citing cases, try to find the most
authoritative courts and respected
judges. Of course, it is always best to
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find decisions from your circuit that
are favorable to your position since you
may find the same jUdge on your panel
that wrote the favorable decision.
iii. Make sure that all cases which are cited
are shepardized carefully. Nothing is
more embarrassing than to have a federal
appellate jUdge inform you at oral
argument that the decision you are
relying on has been overruled or
undercut by subsequent authority that
you have failed to cite in your brief.
iv. When research reveals contrary case
authority , there are two possible ways
to limit the damage. First, such
contrary case law can be directly
attacked either on its facts or legal
principals involved. However, it is
usually better to indirectly undercut
contrary authority by relying on your
theory of the case to undercut the basis
for the contrary decision.
A). It is also important to avoid being
overly critical of contrary
authority. The author of that
decision, regardless of how bad a
decision it may be, may ultimately
sit on the very panel that hears
your case. Along similar lines,
the author of a decision from
another circuit, may have a close
friend sitting on the panel on your
case. Federal jUdges are limited
in number and tend to be a close
knit body. Therefore, it behooves
an appellate advocate to be
cautious in his or her use of
criticism.
4. CONCLUSION - A well drafted appellate brief should
be logically structured, authoritative, and
convincing. If your brief meets these goals, the
reader will finish reading with the general
impression that the issues you have raised merit
serious attention. If your brief has accomplished
this goal you are two-thirds of the way home. The
rest of the journey will be completed at oral
argument.
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VI. EFFECTIVE ORAL ARGUMENT
A. INTRODUCTION - Oral argument is the final phase, the
ultimate culmination of the effective appellate
advocate's efforts. For the advocate who has
carefully prepared from day one, oral argument will be
the final step to victory. Working from a thoroughly
researched, well-drafted brief, the effective
appellate advocate will use oral argument as his final
opportunity to emphasize the strong points of his case
and address any remaining concerns the court may have.
At the opposite extreme, the unorganized and
unprepared appellate advocate will find that oral
argument has become the final coffin nail in his hopes
for reversal on appeal. For this unfortunate
individual, oral argument will pUblicly reveal every
sin of omission. The ineffective advocate will be
forced to explain sloppy arguments, unshepardized or
irrelevant cases, missed or undeveloped issues and
confusing or incomplete factual development. The
unprepared advocate will immediately be put on the
defensive and will be forced to devote his time to
explaining his errors rather than advocating his
client's interest. Indeed, that individual may well
find himself or herself faced with summary disposition
from the bench in open court under Rule 19 of the
Rules of the Sixth Circuit. This section of the
outline shows how to handle both of these situations
in the most efficient manner possible.
B. DO's AND DON'Ts OF ORAL ARGUMENT
1. PREPARATION An effective appellate advocate
should prepare for oral argument like he or she
prepares for trial. A hasty preparation one hour
before the scheduled argument ordinarily will
spell disaster. To achieve the maximum impact
from oral argument, the appellate advocate should
begin several days prior to the scheduled argument
rereading the brief, reviewing the record, and
making a short and simple speaker's outline from
which to argue to the court. This outline should
contain only the key issues and points that the
speaker wishes to make. Most arguments are given
a fifteen minute time limit. There is simply not
enough time to repeat everything that has been
written in your brief. Nor is that an effective
way to handle oral argument. Oral argument, at
its essence, is your chance to accomplish two
primary goals: to give the court the "big
picture" of your case, and to address any
questions that might be raised about the facts or
issues that have been briefed. On the day of oral
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argument, it is best to take with you besides your
brief and argument outline, copies of any key
cases that you intend to rely on and copies of any
important sections of the record or transcript
that are important to your arguments on appeal.
2. KNOWING THE COURT Once you have prepared
yourself for oral argument, it becomes important
to know the jUdges to whom you will be making this
argument. In the sixth Circuit, the clerk's
office does not reveal the identity of the panel
membership prior to the day of oral argument.
However, on the morning of oral argument, the
clerk's office will provide a list of the jUdges
sitting on the panel that will hear your appeal.
Once you know who the jUdges are, you should
immediately look through the case authority that
you intend to rely on to see if any of the members
of your panel have authored or participated in the
decisions that you intend to cite to the court.
If any of the members of your panel have written
the decisions you intend to rely on it would
behoove you to reread that decision so that you
can better grasp the individual jUdge's thinking
process.
3. "GOING FOR THE JUGULAR" The most critical
portion of any oral argument is the first two-to-
five minutes of the argument. It is during this
time that you must immediately address the key
issues that are fundamental to your case.
Statistical studies reveal that listeners are much
less likely to interrupt during the first two-to-
five minutes. During this time, federal appellate
courts need to know three primary items of
information.
a. The first of these items are the questions to
be addressed at oral argument. These
questions should be stated briefly in the
order of importance. If there needs to be
further factual development, counsel should so
inform the court, but should refrain from
developing those facts until he or she
addresses the issue to which they relate.
b. The second key issue the court is interested
in is how the issues for review got before the
appellate court. In other words, federal
appellate courts will not address issues that
have not been preserved or properly raised. for
appellate review. If an issue has not· been
preserved, counsel may as well not waste time
E-27
further arguing the merits. This is
particularly true in habeas corpus proceedings
where waiver and exhaustion doctrines are
critical prerequisites for appellate review of
the merits.
c. Finally, counsel should briefly address the
key facts, and only the key facts, that relate
to the issues he or she is raising on appeal.
Ordinarily, the federal appellate court will
be familiar with the general outlines of the
appeal and the advocate need only fill in any
critical facts on which the issues may turn.
4. ADDRESSING QUESTIONS Unfortunately, most
attorneys in the dark recesses of their souls
dread the thought of questions from the bench
during appellate argument. These attorneys
understandably share a common nightmare that a
well-timed question will totally unravel the
elegant presentation they had planned. In
actuality, there is no reason to fear questions
from the bench if the appeal has been properly
researched and briefed. In fact, to the extent
that questions from the bench indicate that the
jUdges are interested in your case, such questions
are to be looked forward to with anticipation
rather than dread. The remaining portion of this
section, provides practical pointers on how to
address questions at oral argument.
a. First, understand the question before you
attempt to answer it. All too often attorneys
have a preconceived notion of what will be
asked at oral argument and on hearing the
"buzz words" of their anticipated question
will inadvertently answer the question they
had anticipated rather than the one that was
asked.
b. Once you have answered a question do not wait
for the court to comment on your answer. If
the jUdges are interested in further
explanation they will ask you another
question. If you invite commentary by your
silence you are only asking for criticism of
your response while at the same time losing
valuable time in which to raise your
arguments.
c. Never attribute your position or that of your
opponent to any sitting member of the panel.
Focus instead on the actions of the lower
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f. Remember not to be evasive when you answer a
question. If necessary, qualify your response
rather than avoiding a direct answer. In
other words, your response might be, "Yes,
your Honor, I agree, with two important
qualifications .... "
h. When a jUdge interrupts your answer to a
question, even if it is at a critical point in
your answer, stop speaking immediately. When
a jUdge wants the center stage he or she shall
have it. It is not your court, but the
judges' court.
FLEXIBILITY - A good appellate advocate must be
prepared without any notice to depart from his or
her oral argument outline. Judges are notorious
for skipping from one point to another sometimes
with little logical connection. When faced with
an irrelevant question, the appellate advocate
should give a responsive answer that returns
immediately to the theme that he is then argu~ng.
short as possible.
a yes or no answer
The longer your
you will have to
Try to keep your answers as
If a question requires only
say only "yes" or "no."
answers are the less time
raise your arguments.
e.
court rather than the viewpoints of the panel.
Referring personally to specific members of
the panel as support for any proposition of
law will only be viewed as patronizing or
insulting.
d. Don't assume that all questions that are asked
are hostile ones. Some questions are like
lifelines thrown to a drowning person. other
questions are simply neutral questions that do
not indicate any bias on the part of the
court.
g. When asked a question, even if it does not
relate to the particular issue you are then
arguing, try to answer the question
immediately. Do not tell the court that you
will address this question at a later point in
your argument. First, you may not get the
chance to do so. Second, if the court is
interested enough to ask the question, it
wants to know the answer as soon as possible
and not at your convenience.
5.
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6. LOOK UP & SPEAK UP - Far too often, attorneys
stand before the bench with head bowed, reading
their outline as if it were a script. When that
happens, counsel immediately loses eye contact
with the court. This eye contact is critical for
jUdging the responses of the members of the panel
to an argument. Script reading also instantly
bores the court. It has already read your brief
in most instances and does not wish to hear the
same brief read aloud at oral argument.
7. BELIEVE IN YOUR CASE - For oral argument to be
truly effective, counsel must believe in his or
her client and their case. While a certain amount
of objectivity is necessary, the effective federal
appellate advocate must project personally that
sense of rightness when facing the panel. This
goal can be accomplished by speaking naturally and
confidently as if it were assumed that all
reasonable individuals shared the same position as
your client.
8. REBUTTAL - Always reserve some small amount of
time for rebuttal. Usually only two or three
minutes will be needed. This small amount of
time, however, is critical, if only to prevent
your opponent from straying from objectivity.
Once you have reserved a small amount of time for
rebuttal there are three important choices that
are available as to how that rebuttal time may
best be used.
a. Clarification - One of the most common uses of
rebuttal is to clarify statements made by your
opponent. Intentional or inadvertent
misstatements of the record or of the law need
to be clarified by rebuttal. This is perhaps
the most important use for rebuttal and should
not take a great deal of time.
b. The Big Picture - Rebuttal may also be used as
a final opportunity to once again paint for
the court the "big picture" of the appeal. In
a sentence or two, the appellate advocate may
briefly restate the major points that he or
she has attempted to raise during oral
argument.
c. Waiving Rebuttal Sometimes it is an
effective tactical ploy simply to stand up and
say to the court that you are waiving
rebuttal. In effect, this tactical waiver is
simply a way of saying to the court that the
E-30
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VII.
arguments in favor of your position are so
strong that nothing else need be said on the
sUbject. It also spares the court the burden
of having to further listen arguments on
issues that the court more than likely is very
well familiar with already. Waiving rebuttal
is sometimes a very good way to win good will
with the court.
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
1. Many times attorneys openly question the
importance of oral argument. In short, their
logic is that if it wasn't said in your brief, it
won't be said in oral argument. As far as the
unprepared appellate advocate is concerned this
statement is certainly not incorrect. However,
when both sides have thoroughly prepared, oral
argument may be the critical arena in which an
appellate advocate makes or breaks his case. If
there was any doubt about this conclusion the
comments of the federal judges below should remove
them.
a. JUSTICE BLACKMUN - "It is not rare that a
justice says in conference that oral argument
turned me around."
b. JUDGE GOODWIN, 9th Circuit"I see oral
argument as the last clear chance for jUdges
to get answers to the questions that must
haunt conscientious jUdges while they are
reading briefs in complex cases."
c. JUDGE MACKINNON, D.C. Circuit "It [oral
argument] can be very valuable or useless. It
can win a case or lose one."
d. JUDGE BUTZNER, JR., 4th Circuit "In a
significant number of cases it has a decisive
effect on my vote."
e. JUSTICE ROGOSHESKE - "Oral argument puts the
judge on the spot. It heightens the jUdge's
sense of personal responsibility. It tests
his [the judge's] own thinking in a direct
way .... There's no substitute for having oral
argument."
f. JUDGE EDWARDS, 6th Circuit - Think of your
oral argument as your opportunity to be
present at the decisional conference of the
Court, with voice but without vote.
PETITIONING FOR REHEARING
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A. INTRODUCTION - If the unthinkable should happen, and
the appellate court should render an opinion against
your client, there are two avenues for further review.
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 a party
who has been adversely affected by a decision of the
appellate court may petition for rehearing by a
majority of the circuit jUdges who are in regular
service. Counsel may also seek rehearing by petition
for rehearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 40. These two means, Rules 35 and 40, are
the first, and in fact, the only two means by which a
dissatisfied appellant may seek rehearing before the
circuit court. Each particular avenue has its own
advantages and disadvantages.
B. PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC A petition for
rehearing en banc is essentially a suggestion made to
the membership of the panel that the majority of
active circuit court jUdges rehear the issues raised
in the appeal. Petitions for rehearing en banc are
not favored and in almost all situations are denied.
only when consideration by the full court is necessary
to maintain uniformity of the court's decisions or
when the appeal involves a question of exceptional
importance will the court seriously consider a
petition for rehearing en banco Only if a jUdge who
was a member of the panel that rendered the decision
or a regular active jUdge requests a vote on a
petition for rehearing en banc will the petition even
be considered. Absent such a suggestion, the court
will not even vote on whether or not to grant the
petition for rehearing en banc. Ordinarily, only
three or four of such petitions are ever granted
during any single year. Therefore, unless your case
involves a question of first impression that is of
major importance, petitioning pursuant to Rule 35 will
be a waste of time.
C. PETITION FOR REHEARING The much more effective
procedural device is the petition for rehearing under
Rule 40. Under this rule, the dissatisfied party has
fourteen days after the entry of jUdgment in which to
file a petition for rehearing. The petition in its
form is governed by the rules relating to briefs on
appeal. Such petitions are limited to fifteen pages.
1. THE SUCCESSFUL PETITION - In almost all instances,
the successful petition for rehearing will be
short. Very seldom is a federal appellate court
opinion so flawed that it requires fifteen pages
to adequately discuss the problems with the
opinion. At best, there are usually only one or
E-32
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two ma jor points of disagreement. These points
can be amply discussed in five or six pages.
a. A successful petition for rehearing does not
simply restate the arguments and authority in
the brief. The court has already examined the
appellant's brief and had the court wished to
reverse based on that brief it would have. In
essence, there are four main grounds to
support a petition for rehearing.
i. The court has failed to consider or
significantly misinterpreted a key case
authority.
ii. The court has significantly misstated
material facts that are determinative of
the outcome.
iii. The court has failed to address an issue
raised in the appellant's brief or a
pending motion which is critical to the
outcome of the appeal.
i v. The opinion of the court is internally
inconsistent in its reasoning or its
conclusions so much so that the
appellant is left without guidance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Federal criminal appellants, indeed, all criminal
appellants, face difficult hurdles on appeal. The
appellate advocate to be successful must use all of the
tools of this outline to his best advantage if he hopes to
remove or to lower these hurdles. By preparing early and
thoroughly and by raising well-structured and thoughtful
arguments, counsel will have done much to ensure his or
her success on appeal.
. /
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MANAGING CRIMINAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
A TAX LAWYER I S PERSPECTIVE
Laramie L. Leatherman
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald
3300 First National Tower
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Although the title to this unit of today's seminar has
been styled to indicate that "secrets" will be revealed,
experienced practitioners in this audience will recognize
that effective representation of persons exposed to criminal
tax charges will not be based upon the utilization of one or
more "secrets." Instead, proper representation will best be
effected if the attorney has a good grasp of the applicable
law, complete knowledge of the relevant facts, understands
the processes that are utilized by the governmental agencies
in determining whether to proceed with criminal prosecution
and then properly selects the steps to be taken which are
most likely to yield a result most favorable to the client.
This paper will seek to point out the criminal charges
to which a taxpayer may be exposed, the processes utilized
by the government to determine the propriety of such charges,
the decision path utilized by the government in determining
whether or not to prosecute, the processes which an attorney
may utilize most effectively in the investigative and evalua-
tion phases of the process and following indictment.
This paper will not address the criminal trial process.
F-l
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Federal Criminal Statutes Which May Be Applicable.
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Title 26 U.S.C.)
Section 7201*-- Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax
Over Tax
Section 7203 -- Willful failure to File Return,
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Other Documents
istration of Internal Revenue Laws
Taxes
Failure to Obey Summons
Attempts to Interfere With Admin-
Information
Fraudulent Returns, Statements or
Fraud and False Statements
Certificate or Failure to Supply
Section 7215 -- Offenses with Respect to Collected
Section 7210
Section 7206
Section 7212
Section 7207
Supply Information, or Pay Tax
Section 7204 -- Fraudulent Statement 9r Failure
to Make Statement to Employees
Section 7205 -- Fraudulent Withholding Exemption
Section 7202 -- Willful Failure to Collect or Pay
Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, the term
"section" refers to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as currently in effect.
*
18 U.S.C. § 1621
18 U.S.C. § 3571
F-3
Title 18, U.S.C.
18 u. S. C. § 2
18 U.S.C. § 287 --
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Principals
False, Fictitious or
Fraudulent Claims
18 U.S.C. § 1001 -- Statements or Entries
Generally
18 U.S.C. § 1505 -- Obstruction of Proceedings
before Departments, Agencies,
and Committees
18 U.S.C. § 1510 -- Obstruction of Criminal Inves-
tigations
Perjury Generally
Fines
Attached as an Appendix to this paper are copies of the sta-
tutes which are cited above.
The Criminal Tax Investigative Process.
Internal Revenue Service Structure
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is headquar-
tered in the Internal Revenue Building. The head-
quarters is called the National Office. In turn,
there are 7 Regional Offices scattered across the
nation. Kentucky is located in the Central Region
which is headquartered in Cincinnati. Within each
region are a number of distr icts. Each state has
a distr ict and some large populated states have
more than one district. Kentucky has one district
which is headquartered in Louisville.
The National Office is headed by a Commissioner.
Each Regional Office is headed by a Regional Com-
missioner. Each District Office is headed by a
District Director.
Within each of these operating units is a subunit
which is charged with the responsibility of
enforcing the criminal tax laws and other criminal
laws which are applicable to tax related matters.
In the Distr ict Off ices, that uni t is called the
Criminal Investigation Division.
What Triggers A Criminal Investigation?
The IRS is charged with the responsibility of
determining whether persons have properly
accounted for and paid amounts due under the fed-
eral tax laws. Section 6201. To do so, the IRS
is authorized to make such investigations as are
necessary and to issue summonses where appropri-
ate. Sections 7601 and 7602.
Although criminal investigations may be triggered
for numerous reasons, most criminal investigations
F-4
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grow out of an audi t of the taxpayer by an IRS
auditor engaged in a civil investigation of the
taxpayer or another taxpayer. Other triggering
events may be information developed by the IRS
computerized document matching of dividends;
interest or other payment records; information
developed as the result of special enforcement
projects directed toward a particular activity
such as tax shelters; information from other gov-
ernment agencies; information from an informer or
the news media; or information developed through
IRS general intelligence gathering efforts.
Because most criminal cases arise out of a civil
investigation of the particular taxpayer, focus
will be upon the process through which a criminal
investigation develops in that particular context.
A tax examination may be either an office examina-
tion where the taxpayer brings his records to the
agent in the office of the agent, or a field exam-
ination where the taxpayer's records are examined
at the taxpayer's office. Even though an office
examination may seem to be a lower level examina-
tion than a field examination and the office exam-
iners are ordinar ily less sophisticated than the
F-S
F-6
ever, the IRS will argue that such policy viola-
How An Examination Shifts from Civil to Criminal.
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investigations
The IRS has sometimes been
many criminal
IRM 9322.1.
This is a clear violation of IRS policies.
accused of using a civil examination as a cover
for what is an ongoing criminal investigation.
IMPORTANT Any time there is an IRS audit, a tax-
payer and his advisors should review not only
civil but also criminal exposures and plan the
audit contact to the best advantage of the tax-
payer. Considerations will include identification
Cases.
IRS procedures provide that when, during the
course of an examination, an agent "discovers firm
indications of fraud," he will suspend activities
at the earliest possible date without disclosing
to the taxpayer or his representatives the reason
for such suspension. The agent then files through
channels a Referral Report For Potential Fraud
field examiners,
arise out of office examinations.
of the person most appropriate to meet with the
IRS, location of audit, control of audit channels,
method of dealing wi th the agent, and recogni tion
of danger signals.
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tions do not preclude the use of mater ials and
leads developed during the "fronting" period.
Court decisions in this area are not conclusive as
to the merit of that position.
IMPORTANT Whenever circumstances suggest a
"fronting" operation has occurred, the validity of
the action should be challenged immediately.
Creating a series of procedural problems for the
IRS at an early stage may reduce the IRS's inter-
est in pursuing the investigation.
When a referral is made by the Examining Agent to
the Criminal Investigation Division, that unit is
ordinar ily required to determine whether it will
accept the case within 20 days following the
referral.
IMPORTANT If during the course of a civil exami-
nation in which there is cr iminal exposure, the
agent cuts off contact and is non-responsive to
inquiries about the status of the examination,
this is a strong indication that a criminal
referral has been made.
Bow Will You Know That A Criminal Investigation Bas Begun?
A criminal investigation generally begins by the
IRS cr iminal investigator (Special Agent) making
F-7
contact with the taxpayer and seeking to interview
him. When that contact is made, the Special Agent
will be accompanied by another IRS agent. This is
ordinarily the agent who has handled the civil
examination. The Special Agent is supposed to
identify himself by presenting his credentials (on
a small 1.0. card), advise the taxpayer that his
job is to determine whether there have been crim-
inal tax violations and give the taxpayer a
Miranda warning. See, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) and IRM 9384.2. Properly handling
this initial contact by the Special Agent may be
the most important single event in the success or
failure of the criminal investigation.
IMPORTANT The Special Agent will try to "make"
his case through information received from the
taxpayer at the time of the initial contact. If
you are involved before this time, don't let your
client talk to the Special Agent. If your client
has already talked to the Special Agent, make sure
the taxpayer is immediately and thoroughly
debriefed.
A criminal investigation may also be initiated
through other investigative measures and the IRS
F-8
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What Processes Should Be Used to Most Effectively Represent
a Taxpayer, Subject to Criminal Tax Investigation?
may develop a file on your client without talking
to him. Your client may hear of this investiga-
tion from persons contacted by the IRS. Through
interviews of these persons, you will be able to
develop an understanding of the IRS's area of
interest and develop a plan of representation of
your client. Depending upon the circumstances,
you may decide to contact the IRS investigator
before he attempts to contact your client.
By far, the most important act is to recognize
immediately the seriousness of the matter and to
retain counsel that is well versed both in tax and
in criminal matters. Failure to do this may well
cause the taxpayer to suffer harm which would
otherwise be avoided. Unfortunately, at the tax-
payer's request or through a sense of duty or
loyalty, the taxpayer's accountant or general
business lawyer may attempt to represent the tax-
payer in an area in which they are not qualified.
This is a plan for disaster.
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Experienced counsel will recognize
fully evaluate the exposure of the
F-9
the need
taxpayer
to
to
criminal prosecution. This will first of all man-
date the execution of a Power of Attorney on IRS
Form 2848 and require a full development and anal-
ysis of all the facts. You will need to under-
stand the taxpayer's business, the accounting
records and procedures, the preparation of the
returns in question and many similar facts. This
will ordinarily require experienced accounting
assistance. In addition to hiring accounting
assistance, it is often cost effective to hire
outside investigative support. Retired IRS
Special Agents are one source for this important
resource. Selection of that accounting and inves-
tigative assistance and arranging the relationship
so that the attorney-client relationship is fUlly
preserved are important early decisions in the
representation. The preparation of a formal
engagement letter between the attorney and the
accountant and between the attorney and the inves-
tigator is crucial to the retention of the
attorney-client privilege and work product privi-
lege for information disclosed to or determined by
the accountant and the investigator.
Your due diligence in determining all of the rele-
vant facts will include the debriefing of the tax-
F-IO
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payer on all contacts with the IRS, both with
respect to the current investigation, but also
with respect to any prior examination. You will
also need to interview all others who have repre-
sented the taxpayer before the IRS. It is very
important to know as much as possible about all
communications with the IRS. You will also want a
fresh look taken at the taxpayer's tax returns for
the years covered by the current IRS investigation
as well as for all other years not barred by
criminal statute of limitations (ordinarily six
years for tax fraud, Section 6531). As compliance
failures are revealed, you will begin to get a
feel for the overall problems presented and you
should begin to formulate a plan of defense for
potential criminal charges.
The element of willfulness is common to most crim-
inal tax provisions of the Code. "Willfulness"
means a "voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty." Uni ted States v. Bishop, 412
U.S. 346, 360 (1973). Stated another way, in order
to be convicted of criminal tax evasion, you must
know that you are violating the law. Non
"willful" reasons for the compliance failure would
include the following:
F-ll
1) Lack of knowledge of the law.
2) Lack of knowledge with respect to the
error.
3) Reliance on others.
4) Negligence.
5) Law charged with violating is unclear or
invalid.
6) Ignorant or unsophisticated.
7) Mental problems.
As you review these potential defenses against
potential cr iminal charges, you will be reviewing
all of the relevant facts to determine consis-
tency.
IMPORTANT The taxpayer ordinarily will want you
to do a "quick fix" of his problem by immediately
talking to the agent, explaining the situation and
either getting the agent out of the case or making
a "deal." Don't succumb to these pleas for help.
The client must be told in no uncertain terms that
the special agent's job is to put him in jail. He
must be told ordinar ily there is no "quick fix"
for a criminal tax investigation and if you
attempt to give the agent substantive information
without having first performed your "due dili-
F-12
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gence," you will probably do your client irrepar-
able harm. Although the Special Agent will likely
try to scare you into prematurely getting into the
substantive facts that he wants to develop, unless
he faces a statute of limitations problem, you
will be able, within reason, to set your own time-
table for dealing with him.
After having performed the ini tial due diligence,
evaluating the exposures, and developed an initial
plan of defense, you are now ready to meet wi th
the Special Agent. He will want to interview your
client and examine all of the client I s books and
records. Don't be taken in by the "old wives
tale" that unless you cooperate with the Special
Agent, he will throw the book at your client. The
Special Agent's job is to determine whether crim-
inal prosecution is warranted and if there
develops evidence sufficient to persuade him the
case can be successfully prosecuted, he will
recommend prosecution. Being a "nice guy" during
the investigation by cooperating with the Special
Agent will not affect his recommendation. There-
fore, cooperate only if you believe that, substan-
tively, it will favorably affect the recommenda-
tion of the Special Agent.
F-13
IMPORTANT Frequently a taxpayer may want to purge
himself of his "sins" by filing a corrected return
wi th the IRS or by filing returns where none had
been filed before. Counsel may be tempted to com-
ply with the taxpayer's request without having
fully considered the consequences. I am of the
firm belief that one of the worst things a tax-
payer can do after a criminal investigation has
commenced is to prematurely file amended returns.
The act of filing not only gives the IRS a roadmap
to the errors on the original return, and substan-
tially reduces the investigative work that the
Special Agent would ordinarily be required to do
in order to document his case, it also constitutes
an admission of error on the original return and
places into evidence material which might not have
otherwise been available to the government. The
filing of the return may expose the taxpayer to a
second round of fraud charges unless the amended
returns are absolutely cor rect. Furthermore, an
amended return, even if absolutely correct, does
not erase or mitigate the fraud surrounding the
original return. There may be circumstances where
an argument may be made that the taxpayer was
unsophisticated and that items were inadvertently
F-14
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omitted from the return. In these circumstances,
the correction of such omissions may be an exten-
sion of the inadvertent or negligent behavior
argument constituting an element of your plan of
defense.
On the other hand, if a taxpayer comes to you
before any tax investigation (either civil or
criminal) has commenced and tells you that his
returns are wrong and now wants to file corrected
returns or wants to file original returns where
none had been filed, after reviewing all the cir-
cumstances, I would ordinarily recommend that
amended returns or original returns should be
filed. As a practical matter, under those circum-
stances, it is unlikely that a cr iminal prosecu-
tion would be recommended because of the tax-
payer I s voluntary correction of his pr ior error.
The problem with this scenario is that truly
voluntary disclosures are rare. Usually a tax-
payer has pangs of conscience after the investiga-
tion begins, not before.
How Can You Restrict Examination of The Taxpayer's Books and
Records and the Interviewing of The Taxpayer?
Clearly, the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution precludes the taxpayer from being
F-15
forced to give testimony in a criminal tax inves-
tigation. Likewise, his personal records may also
be protected if compelling the production of such
records would require action that is "testimo-
nial." If he did business as a propr ietorship,
the act of producing such records may be pro-
tected. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605
(1984). However, by a grant of statutory immunity
extending only to the act of producing records,
not their content, the taxpayer may be compelled
to produce them. United States v. Doe, supra; 18
u.s.c. § 6001, et seg. It is unclear whether the
same "testimonial" privilege is available if the
records were given by the taxpayer to counsel.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
Keeping these records out of the hands of the IRS
may be critical to a proper defense.
IMPORTANT During the course of the investigation,
you may decide voluntarily to furnish the agent
with certain records. In doing so, you may inad-
vertently waive the taxpayer's Fifth Amendment
privilege, at least with respect to any incrimi-
nating materials contained in such records.
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
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To the extent that the taxpayer's records are made
available to the IRS pursuant to a summons, coun-
sel should arrange a procedure for production and
copying of the documents which will keep the orig-
inal records intact and in the possession of the
taxpayer while availing them to the inspection of
the IRS when necessary.
When the taxpayer has knowledge that the IRS has
summoned third party records, the attorney should
contact the third party and request copies of
documents and other information delivered to the
IRS.
Dealing With IRS Administrative Summonses
The Special Agent has a powerful tool to utilize
in developing his case. Sections 7602-7609 of the
Code give him the author i ty to compel testimony
and production of documents pursuant to the issu-
ance of an administrative summons. An administra-
tive summons is proper if the four tests developed
in United States v. Powell, 379 u.s. 48 (1964) are
met: (1) the investigation will be conducted for
a legitimate purpose; (2) the inquiry may be rele-
vant to that purpose; (3) the information sought
F-17
is not already in the possession of the IRS~ and
(4) the proper administrative steps have been fol-
lowed. A summons may not be used after the case
has been referred to the Department of Justice for
prospective or grand jury action or if the Depart-
ment of Justice has requested from the IRS return
information about the summoned person. Section
7602. The prohibition on use of the summons con-
tinues until the Department of Justice terminates
its action.
If a summons is served on a third-party record-
keeper, the taxpayer must be given a copy within 3
days of the date of service on the recordkeeper
and at least 23 days prior to the date of appear-
ance. The taxpayer has an opportuni ty to inter-
vene and take court action to quash the summons.
If a summons is not complied with, the IRS may
petition for its enforcement in the local federal
district court. Section 7604.
IMPORTANT Frequently, the summons procedures used
by the IRS are defective. Summonses may be
improperly served, be overbroad, not give enough
time prior to the appearance date, etc. Make sure
you review the summons statute carefully and
F-18
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determine whether grounds exist to oppose summons
enforcement. If it fails these tests you may
effectively contest enforcement of the summons in
a 7604 proceeding. However, if your client
intends to assert privileges, by far the better
practice is to assert them at the time of appear-
ance so that such issue is properly presented in
any subsequent enforcment action.
Communication and Representation of Third-Party Witnesses.
An IRS special agent investigation is often quite
wide reaching and will involve contact with many
different wi tnesses and recordkeepers around the
nation. It is very important for the taxpayer t s
counsel to try to take a hand in the interviewing
process and the document production process. In
his initial investigation, counsel may have inter-
viewed many of these persons and have examined
their relevant documents. To the extent he is
aware of IRS contacts with other third-parties, he
should seek to interview the parties prior to the
IRS investigation. Further, he should do a
follow-up interview with each third-party follow-
ing the IRS interview and get copies of all docu-
ments furnished to the IRS.
F-19
If a third-party needs counsel, taxpayer's counsel
may want to act as such. However, he must make
his client and the third party fully aware of the
conflict of interest potential and secure informed
consent. The better rule to follow is to secure
separate counsel for such third-parties.
As a middle ground, counsel may suggest to the
witness that counsel be invited to the questioning
of the wi tness. Al though the Special Agent will
not like this and may argue that such person can-
not be present because such might result in an
unauthorized disclosure of tax return information
under Section 6103, the witness may designate such
person as authorized to receive Section 6103
information and thereby deflect the Special
Agent's argument. Through this means, counsel
will gain even more insight into the thrust of the
Special Agent's investigation.
IMPORTANT Our ing the course of representation of
persons under criminal investigation, counsel must
be most mindful of his own exposure to criminal
sanctions peculiar to tax related work. In par-
ticular, he must be aware of his exposure under
Section 7206 (fraud and false statements); Section
F-20
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7207 (fraudulent returns, statements or other
documents); Section 7212 (attempts to interfere
with administration of internal revenue laws); 18
U.S.C. § 2 (principals), 18 U.S.C. S 1505
(obstruction of proceedings before departments,
agencies, and committees) and 18 U.S.C. § 1510
(obstruction of criminal investigations).
IMPORTANT During the course of the criminal
investigation, you may be contacted by the IRS
requesting that the taxpayer sign IRS Form 872
consenting to an extension of the statute of limi-
tations upon assessment of civil tax deficiencies
for the years under criminal investigation. I can
think of no good reason to agree to such exten-
sion. Do not do so. By not permitting the exten-
sion, the IRS must now make a decision as to
whether the case should be continued as a criminal
investigation or should the IRS protect the
revenue and start the civil tax assessment pro-
cess. Ordinar ily, the IRS will not move forward
on the civil side of the case until the criminal
case is resolved. Accordingly, it is possible for
the IRS to lose both the criminal and civil case
even where the taxpayer clearly understated his
tax liability. Why? Because counsel for the tax-
F-21
payer refused to extend the statute of limitations
and the IRS could not prove civil fraud after the
normal period of limitations has run.
Use of Grand Jury in Criminal Tax Investigations
Although most federal criminal tax investigations
are conducted by an investigative process which
utilizes voluntary compliance by witnesses or the
use of administrative summonses pursuant to Sec-
tion 7602, the Special Agent may bring to bear the
forces of a federal grand jury as an investigative
device. This process requires the collaboration
of the Uni ted States Attorney, through whom evi-
dence is presented to the grand jury, and thus the
investigation becomes a joint effort of the
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of
Justice.
Use of the grand jury process in tax investiga-
tions histor ically was limited to cases involving
"organized crime" which have long been the subject
of joint investigations by the IRS and the
Department of Justice. However, in recent years,
the grand jury is being used to investigate
"routine" criminal investigations, apparently
because the IRS believes the grand jury's broad
F-22
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powers to compel testimony and production of docu-
ments are necessary to an effective investigation.
Currently, the Internal Revenue Manual states the
general rule that the preferred method of conduct-
ing a criminal investigation is through the admin-
istrative process. It provides that a grand jury
may be used when: (1) it is apparent that the
administrative process cannot develop the relevant
facts wi thin a reasonable time; or (2) coordina-
tion of the investigation wi th an ongoing grand
jury investigation would be more efficient; and
(3) the case has significant deterrent potential.
IRM 9267.21(1).
If the IRS wishes to use a grand jury in a tax
investigation, considerable review of the request
is necessary. Ordinar ily, the request for grand
jury investigation is prepared by a Special Agent.
It must then be approved by the Chief of the Crim-
inal Investigation Division, the District Direc-
tor, the Regional Commissioner and the Regional
Counsel and then the request is forwarded to the
Tax Division of the Department of Justice. Once a
grand jury investigation request has been
approved, ordinarily the case is nominally taken
F-23
over by a local United States Attorney and the
Special Agent and other IRS personnel active in
the investigation become agents of the grand jury.
IMPORTANT Notwithstanding the foregoing proce-
dures outlined in the Manual, in Kentucky, grand
juries have been used after much less rigorous
review. In one instance a grand jury was brought
into use when a Special Agent claimed that
obstruction of justice and witness intimidation
was suspected to have occurred dur ing the course
of his criminal tax investigation.
Discussion of the representation of the taxpayer
who is called as a witness in a grand jury inves-
tigation of potential criminal tax violations is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is
clear that diligent counsel will seek to identify
those persons which the grand jury plans to call
as witnesses and will interview these persons
before and after they give testimony.
Criminal Tax Counsel's Objective
Your objective in representing a target of a crim-
inal tax investigation is obvious. You will want
to end the threat of criminal prosecution of your
E'-24
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There are numerous opportuni ties favorably to end
a criminal tax investigation.
Finally, the local United States Attorney may
recommend no prosecution.
His supervisor or the group manager may decide the
case should be dropped.
of
be
Department
should not
The Special Agent may determine that the evidence
is insufficient to warrant a recommendation of
criminal prosecution.
client at the earliest possible time so that your
client can go on about his business without the
concern and distraction from productive activities
posed by such ongoing investigation.
If the Criminal Investigation Division decides to
recommend criminal prosecution, the local District
Counsel of the IRS may disagree.
The Criminal Tax Division of the
Justice may decide that the case
prosecuted.
As you can see from the foregoing list, before
prosecution of a criminal tax case begins, it is
reviewed by an extensive hierarchy wi thin the IRS
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and the Department of Justice. The IRS does not
want to prosecute criminal tax cases unless the
chances for a conviction are very good. Neverthe-
less, in some cases the entire review process is
drastically shortened and counsel may not be able
to obtain the same conference opportunities as are
generally available. Accordingly, throughout the
investigative and review process, counsel should
maintain freguent contact wi th the Special Agent,
learn as much as possible about the agent's theory
of the case and the evidence which he has to sup-
port prosecution and develop a defense theory and
supporting facts which will persuade the agent or
a reviewer that the government's case has prob-
lems. In order to have productive communication
with the Special Agent, counsel must take an
approach which recognizes that the agent wants to
develop a successful prosecution and believes your
client is a crook. I recommend that before you
articulate any defense you spend considerable time
listening to the agent as he develops for you his
theories of the case. If you are patient and give
him an opportunity to talk, I believe you can
learn a great deal from the agent that may be very
helpfUl to you in the long run.
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Make sure that you are aware of where the case is
in the review process. As an investigation pro-
ceeds, it will conclude with a written report pre-
pared by the Special Agent. This report consists
of a narrative of the investigation, and the evi-
dence which supports a recommendation for prosecu-
tion. It will be accompanied by copies of inter-
views wi th prosecution wi tnesses and documentary
evidence. Ordinarily, a copy of this material
will not be furnished to counsel during the
pre-indictment stage of a cr iminal tax investiga-
tion. However, during the conferences with the
reviewing hierarchy, if counsel requests, a sub-
stantial portion of the mater ial may be communi-
cated orally to counsel.
Make sure that you request a conference with each
level of the review process.
When you go to the conference, you should not take
your client with you unless you are absolutely
convinced that his presence will materially
increase the likelihood of a successful effort. I
have never found that circumstance to obtain.
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iBe very careful what you say at the conference.
The IRS takes the position that the conference is
not a "settlement conference" and your statements
at the conference can be used as evidence in the
trial. See, United States v. Dolleris, 408 F.2d
918 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969).
Thus, if you give the IRS information which turns
out to be incorrect, your act of giving this
information may be presented at tr ia1 and prove
damaging to your client. Also, there is always
the problem of making the IRS aware of defects in
their case which they can then correct by futher
work. However, at the conference you may be able
to learn more about the case that will help you to
develop a successful strategy to be employed
either at the administrative level or at trial.
Always take advantage of the conference opportun-
i ty at the Department of Justice. This is ordi-
narily the last chance to get the case stopped.
IMPORTANT To make sure that you are offered a
conference with the Department of Justice, write a
letter to the Assistant Attorney General, Tax
Division, ATTN: Chief Criminal Section in
Washington, D.C., requesting the conference as
F-28
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
soon as the conference is held with District
Counsel. The conference will be held in
Washington, D.C. with a lawyer in the Criminal
Section of the Tax Division. He will have
reviewed the file sent to him by the IRS. Gener-
ally speaking, the Department of Justice conferee
will be testing the case against a standard of
"reasonable probability" of successful prosecu-
tion. The conferee may in fact be the person who
will be responsible for trying the case in the
field. At this point, your approach probably
should be to point out the legal difficulties in
the case from an evidentiary standpoint. If you
can show the conferee that some of his crucial
evidence may be suppressed because of constitu-
tional or statutory constraints, he will be most
interested.
The Department of Justice may recommend: (1) the
case be forwarded to the local United States
Attorney for prosecution; (2) the case be referred
back to the IRS for further investigation; (3) the
case be referred to the local United States
Attorney for a grand jury investigation; or (4)
prosecution be declined.
F-29
If the case is forwarded to the local United
States Attorney for presentation of an indictment
to a grand jury, ordinarily you will be afforded a
pre-indictment conference if you request it. At
this point, the United States Attorney can make a
recommendation not to prosecute but the final
decision rests with the Tax Division of the
Department of Justice. Local consideration
affecting probabili ties of a successful prosecu-
tion will be taken into account by the United
States Attorney in making his recommendation.
Presentation of newly discovered evidence may also
be effective.
* * * * *
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APPENDIX
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(l.R.C.) 26,331
CHAPTER 78-DISCOVERY OF LIABILITY AND
ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE
Subchapter A. Examination and inspection.
Subchapter B. General powers and duties.
Subchapter C. [Supervision of operations of certain manufacturers.] Repealed.
Subchapter D. Possessions.
SUBCHAPTER A-EXAMINATION AND INSPECTION
I
I
I
Sec. 7601. Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects.
Sec. 7602. Examination of books and witnesses.
Sec. 7603. Service of summons.
Sec. 7604. Enforcement of summons.
Sec. 7605. Time and place of examination.
Sec. 7606. Entry of premises for examination of taxable objects.
Sec. 7607. [Additional authority for Bureau of Customs.] Repealed.
Sec. 7608. Authority of internal revenue enforcement officers.
Sec. 7609. Special procedures for third-party summons.
Sec. 7610. Fees and costs for witnesses.
Sec. 7611. Restrictions on church tax inquiries and examinations.
Sec. 7612. Cross references.
I
I
I
Last om~lIdm~IIL-S~c. 7601(0) (jorm~rly Sec. 7602) I 97-248) Sept 4. 1982. Sec. 7602(a) (jorm~rly Sec. 7602)
appears abo~ as am~nded by Sec. 333(a) of Public Law as it read before this amendm~nt is ill P·H C"m"lati~
97·248. Sept 3. 1982. effecti'H! (Sec. 333(b) of P.L Changes.
(b) Purpose May Include Inquiry Into Offenses.-The purposes for which the Secre-
tary may take any action described in paragraph (I). (2). or (3) of subsection (a) include
the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforce-
ment of the internal revenue laws.
SEC. 7601. CANVASS OF DISTRICfS FOR TAXABLE PERSONS AND OB-
JECfS.
(a) General Rule.-The Secretary shall. to the extent he deems it practicable. cause
officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed. from time to time. through
each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who
may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax. and all persons owning or having the care
and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed.
(b) Penalties.-
For penalties applicable to forcible obstruction or hindrance of Treasury officers
or employees in the performance of their duties, see section 7212.
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SEC. 7602. EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND WITNESSES.
(a) Authority to Summon, Etc.-For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of
any return. making a return where none has been made. detennining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or
fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax. or collecting any such lia-
bility. the Secretary is authorized-
(I) To examine any books. papers. records. or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perfonn the act. or any
officer or employee of such person. or any person having possession. custody. or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perfonn the act. or any other person the Secretary may deem
proper. to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and
to produce such books. papers. records. or other data. and to give such testimony.
under oath. as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned. under oath. as may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry.
SEC. 7603. SERVICE OF SUMMONS.
A summons issued under section 6420(e)(2). 642I(f)(2). 6427(j)(2). or 7602 shall be
served by the Secretary. by an attested copy delivered in hand to the person to whom it
is directed. or left at his last and usual place of abode; and the certificate of service
signed by the person serving the summons shall be evidence of the facts it states on the
hearing of an application for the enforcement of the summons. When the summons re-
quires the production of books. papers. records. or other data. it shall be sufficient if
such books. papers. records, or other data are described with reasonable certainty.
26,332 (l.R.C.) Code § 7602(c)
(c) No AdmiDistratiye Summons When There is Justice Department Referral -
(l) Limitation of authority.-No summons may be issued under this title. and the
Secretary may not begin any action under section 7604 to enforce any summons. with
respect to any person if a Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to such
person.
(2) Justice Department referral in effeet.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) In genera1.-A Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to any
person if-
(i) The Secretary has recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury
investigation of. or the criminal prosecution of. such person for any offense con-
nected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws. or
(ii) any request is made under section 6103(h)(3)(B) for the disclosure of any
return or return information (within the meaning of section 6103(b» relating to
such person.
(B) Termination.-A Justice Department referral shall cease to be in effect with
respect to a person when-
(i) the Attorney general notifies the Secretary. in writing. that-
(I) he will not prosecute such person for any offense connected with the
administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws.
(II) he will not authorize a grand jury investigation of such person with
respect to such an offense. or
(III) he will discontinue such a grand jury investigation.
(ii) a final disposition has been made of any criminal proceeding pertaining
to the enforcement of the internal revenue laws which was instituted by the At-
torney General against such person. or
(iii) the Attorney General notifies the Secretary. in writing. that he will not
prosecute such person for any offense connected with the administration or en·
forcement of the internal revenue laws relating to the request described in sub-
paragraph (A)(ii).
(3) Taxable years, etc., treated separately.-For purposes of this subsection. each
taxable period (or. if there is no taxable period. each taxable event) and each tax im-
posed by a separate chapter of this title shall be treated separately.
AddiliDll.-&c. 7602(b}. (c) _ rMldfti by.5"«. 333(a} I 333(b} of P.L 97·248} SepL 4, 1982.
of ~b/jc Low 97·248, SepL 3. 1982. ~fffCtiw! (Sec.
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Last "tMNl~--&c. 760J app«Irs aboW! as
"m~nd«l by Sec. I7OJ(~}(2}(G} of Public Law 99-514.
OcL 22. 1986. I/ffCtiw! (Sec. 1703(It) of P.L 99-514} for
psDIiu IYmo-..J (as tkfm_ ill s«lioII 4Q82 of tM '86
Cotk. as ,,_nd«l by tlris J«lioII) aflu Dtc. 31. 1987.
'T1tis "m~ndm~1It struck OIIt "6427{i}(2)" lInd i_rud
"6427{j}(2)':
PriDr ,,1MItIIMftts.--&c. 760J _ pn"liDuJly
a_nd_ by tlt~ jo/IDwi1lf:
Sec. 91/{d)(2)(G} of 1'IIblic Law 98-369. July 18.
19lU, ~ff«tiw (Sec. 91/{~) of P.L 98-369) Aug. I. 19lU.
Sec. 515(b){/2) of Public Law 97-4,.,. JaIL 6. 1983.
~ff«tiw! (Sec. 515(c) of P.L 97-424} for "nicks $O/d
"fiN JaIL 6. 1983.-
-Sec. 760J /lS » a-,",_ ir ill P·H CumultuJW! CIttI"fU
Sec. 2J2(d}(4}(E) of P.L 96-223. Apr. 2. 1980. ~fffC·
tiw! (Sec. 232fh)(2)(A} of P.L 96-223) JaIL 1. 1979.-
Sec. 5OS(c)(5) of Public Law 95-599. No.. 6. 1978.
~fffCtiw! (Sec. SOS(d) of P.L 95·599) J"IL I. 1979-
Sec. [I)(c}(6} of 1'IIblic Law 94-530. OcL 17, 1976-
~flfCtiW! (Sec. (Ij(d) of P.L 94-530) OcL I, 1976.-
Stc. 207(d}(9} 0/1'IIblic Law 91·258. M"y 21. 1970,
tlfffCtiw! (Stc. 21J(a) of P.L 91·258} July I, 1970,-
Sec. 202(c)(4} of 1'IIblic Law 89-44, JUIl~ 21. 1965.
~flfCtiw! (Sec. 7OJ(Q)(2J, (J) of P.L 89-44) JaIL 1.
1966.-
Stc. 208(d}(4) of Public uw 627, JUIN 29. 1956-
~ff«tiw! (.5"«. 211 Qf P.L 627) Juu 29. 1956.-
Sec. 4(0 of Public Law 466. Apr. 2. 1956.-
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CHAPTER 7S-eRIMES, OTHER OFFENSES, AND
FORFEITURES
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SUBCHAPTER A-eRIMES
Part I. General provisions
Part II. Penalties applicable to certain taxes.
Pert I-Generel Provisions
Subchapter A. Crimes
Subchapter B. Other offenses.
Subchapter C. Forfeitures.
Subchapter D. Miscellaneous penalty and forfeiture provisions.
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Sec. 7201. Attempt to evade or defeat tax.
Sec. 7202. Willful failure to collect or pay over tax.
Sec. 7203. Wtllful failure to file return. supply information. or pay tax.
Sec. 7204. Fraudulent statement or failure to make statement to employees.
Sec. 7205. Fraudulent withholding exemption certificate or failure to supply
information.
Sec. 7206. Fraud and false statements.
Sec. 7207. Fraudulent returns. statements. or other documents.
Sec. 7208. Offenses relating to stamps.
Sec. 7209. Unauthorized use or sale of stamps.
Sec. 7210. Failure to obey summons.
Sec. 7211. False statements to purchasers or lessees relating to tax.
Sec. 7212. Attempts to interfere with administration of internal revenue laws.
Sec. 7213. Unauthorized disclosure of information.
Sec. 7214. Offenses by officers and employees of the United States.
Sec. 7215. Offenses with respect to collected taxes.
Sec. 7216. Disclosure or use of information by preparers of returns.
Sec. 7217. [Ow damages for unauthorized disclosure of returns and return informa-
tion.] Repealed.
SEC. 7201. ATIEMPT TO EVADE OR DEFEAT TAX.
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed
by this title or the payment thereof sbaIJ. in addition to other penalties provided by law.
be guilty of a felony and. upon conviction thereof. shall be fined not more than 5100,000
(5500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both,
together with the costs of prosecution.
Ltut II-U_-sec. 7201 appmn abo"IC 1/1 I 1982. ,ff«n"IC (Sec. 329(,) of P.l- 97·248) for off'ruG
amerulcd by Sec. 329(a) of Public Law 97·248. Sept 3. commincd aft" Sept 3. 1982.
SEC. 7202. WILLFUL FAILURE TO COLLECf OR PAY OVERTAX.
Any person required under this title to collect. account for, and pay over any tax im-
posed by this title who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over
such tax shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, sbaIJ be fined not more than 510,000, or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both. together with the costs of prosecution.
SEC. 7203. WILLFUL FAILURE TO FlLE RETURN, SUPPLY INFORMATION,
OR PAY TAX.
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax. or required by
this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return. keep any re-
cords. or supply any information. who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax.
make such return. keep such records. or supply such information. at the time or times
required by law or regulations. shall. in addition to other penalties provided by law. be
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof. shall be fined not more than
525.000 (5100,000 in the case of a corporation). or imprisoned not more than 1 year. or
0Sec. 720J(a) (formerly Sec. 720j) as JI) arMnded is ill P·R Cumuloti.e ChGnga.
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both. together with the costs of prosecution. In the case of any person with respect to
whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax. this section shall not apply to such per-
son with respect to such failure if there is no addition to tax under section 6654 or 66SS
with respect to such failure.
SEC. 7205. FRAUDULENT WITHHOLDING EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE OR
FAILURE TO SUPPLY INFORMATION.
(a) WithholdiDa on Wages.-Any individual required to supply information to his
employer under section 3402 who willfully supplies false or fraudulent information. or
who willfully fails to supply information thereunder which would require an increase in
the tax to be withheld under section 3402. shall. in addition to any other penalty pro-
vided by law. upon conviction thereof. be fined not more than 51.000. or imprisioned not
more than I year. or both.
Ii.e (Sec. 329(e) of PoL. 97·248) for off- COPIImilled
after Sept 3. 1982.·
Sec. 327 of Public La... 97·248. Sept 3. 1982.·
Sec. 100(e)(j) of Public La... lI().364. JUlie 28. 1968
(qllDlified effecli.e dare rule ill Sec. 100(f). 104 of P.L.
lI().364).·
720J(a) (forrrwrly Sec. 720J) _ prniDtuly arMnded by
Sec. 306(b)(l) of Public La... 97·248. Sept 3, 1982. This
allWlldmelll _ relroacli.ely repealed by Sec. 102 of
Public La... 98-67, AIIg. j, 1983. effecti.e (Sec. 1100a) of
PoL. 98-67) as of close of 6-3~. IU if prior amendment
had IlOl been mtMIe. 0
Sec. nUb) of Public La... 97·34. Aug. 13. 1981. effec·
Ii.e (Sec. nUd) of P.L. 97.34) for acts and failures 10
acl afler Dec. 31. 1981. 0
Sec. 101(e)(j) of Public La... 89-368. Mar. Ij, 1966. 0
LtuI allWlld_-Scc. n03 appears abo.e as
amellded by Sec. 412(b)(9) of Public La... 98-369. July
18. 1984. effecli.e (Sec. 414(0) of PoL. 98-369) /rN lAX·
able years /IegiMiIIg aftu Dec. 31. 1984.
Prior allWlld_lI.-Scc. 7203 _ prniDraly
amended by Ihe followillg:
Sec. 329(b) of Public La... 97·248. Sept 3. 1982. effec.
oSec. n03 as 10 aIIWIlded is ill P·R Cumuloli.e CMllga.
SEC. 7204. FRAUDULENf SfATEMENT OR FAILURE TO MAKE SfATEMENf
TO EMPLOYEES.
In lieu of any other penalty provided by law (exc:cpt the penalty provided by section
6674) any person required under the provisions of section 6OS1 to furnish a statement
who willfully furnishes a false or fraudulent statement or who willfully fails to furnish a
statement in the manner. at the time, and showing the information required under section
6OSI. or regulations prescribed thereunder. shall. for each such offense. upon conviction
thereof. be fined not more than 51.000. or imprisoned not more than I year. or both.
Last -&c. 720'(0) (fomterly Sec. 720j)
appears abo.e IU arMnded by Sec. 1j9(a) of Public La...
98-369. July 18. 1984. effecli.e (Sec. Ij9(b) of P.L.
98-369) for acliolu and fa;]ura 10 acl omming aftu
July 18. 1984.
Prior aIIWIld_lI.-Scc. 720J(a) (forrMrly Sec. 720j)
_ prrtio/l$ly arMnded by lhe jollowing:
Sec. 107(b)(l) of Public La... 98-67, Aug. j. 1983.
effecli.e (Sec. 110(e) of PoL. 98-67) Aug. j, 1983.·
Prior allWlld_l-IaUr mroacti.el, ,.ea1ML-&c.
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SEC. 7206. FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS.
Any person who-
(b) Backup WithholdiDa on Interest and DiYidends.-If any individual willfully ma-
kes-
(I) any false certification or affirmation on any statement required by a payor in
order to meet the due diligence requirements of section 6676(b). or
(2) a false certification under paragraph (I) or (2XC) of section 3406(d).
then such individual shall. in addition to any other penalty provided by law, upon
conviction thereof. be fined not more than 51.000. or imprisoned not more than I
year. or both.
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r
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Last allUfldllNllL-Scc. nOj(b) (fOrrMrly Sec. nOj)
appears abo.e IU GrMndft by Sec. 1j9«(I)(2) of Public
La... 98-369. July 18. 1984. effecti.e (Sec. Ij9(b) of P.L.
98-369) for actions and failura 10 act ajrer July 18.
1984.
AdiIitilm.-Scc. nOj(b) (fOrrMrly Sec. 720j) _
added by Sec. 107(b)(2) of Public La... 98-67, Aug. j.
1983. effecli.e (Sec. 1100e) of P.L. 98-67) Aug. j, 1983.
Repea"'-Formu Sec. 72OJ(b) (fomterly Sec. 720J)
_ repealed by Sec. 102 of Public La... 98-67, Aug. j,
1983, eJfecti.e (Sec. 1100a) of P.L. 98-67) IU of 6-30-83
IU if it had 1101 beell added by Sec. 306(b)(2) of PoL.
97·248. Sept 3. 1982. Sec. 720j(b} IU it read before this
repealer is ill P·R Cumuloli.e ClutIlgG.
r
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a_1UUd by S«. J29(c) of Public Law 97·248. ~pt J. litis arrwtd"'~111 is ill PH Cu",u/QIi.. C1IaIlIU
1982, ~fl«li.. (S«. 329(~) of P.L 97-248) lor 011~1ISa
SEC. 7207. FRAUDULENT RETURNS, STATEMENTS, OR OrnER DOCU-
MENTS.
Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary any list, return, ac-
count, statement. or other document. known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to
any material matter. shall be fined not more than SIO,OOO (S50,000 in the case of a cor-
poration), or imprisoned not more than I year, or both. Any person required pursuant to
subsection (b) of section 6047 or pursuant to subsection (d) or (e) of section 6104 to fur-
nish any information to the Secretary or any other person who willfully furnishes to the
Secretary or such other person any information known by him to be fraudulent or to be
false as to any material matter shall be fined not more than S10,000 (S5O,000 in the case
of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
1·29·88 Procedure and Administration (l.R.C.) 26,197
(l) Declaration under penalties of perjury.-WiUfully makes and subscribes any
return, statement. or other document, which contains or is verified by a written decla-
ration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to
be true and correct as to every material matter; or
(2) Aid or assistance.-Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises
the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under,
the internal revenue laws, of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is
fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is
with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such
return, affidavit, claim, or document; or
(3) Fraudulent bonds, permits, and entries.-Simulates or falsely or fraudulently
executes or signs any bond, permit. entry, or other document required by the provi-
sions of the internal revenue laws, or by any regulation made in pursuance thereof, or
procures the same to be falsely or fraudulently executed, or advises. aids in, or con-
nives at such execution thereof; or
(4) Removal or concealment with intent to defraud.-Removes, deposits, or con-
ceals, or is concerned in removing, depositing, or concealing, any goods or commodi-
ties for or in respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed. or any property upon
which levy is authorized by section 6331, with intent to evade or defeat the assessment
or collection of any tax imposed by this title; or
(5) Compromises and closing agreements.-In connection with any compromise
under section 7122, or offer of such compromise. or in connection with any closing
agreement under section 7121, or offer to enter into any such agreement. willfully-
(A) Concealment of property.-Conceals from any officer or employee of the
United States any property belonging to the estate of a taxpayer or other person
liable in respect of the tax, or
(B) Withholding, falsifying, and destroying records.-Receives, withholds, de-
stroys, multilates, or falsifies any book, document, or record, or makes any false
statement, relating to the estate or financial condition of the taxpayer or other per-
son liable in respect of the tax,
shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
SIOO,OOO (S500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
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isSIIld aftu D«. 31. 1983.·
S«. 329(d) of Public Law 97·248. ~pt J, 1982. ~ff«:·
ri.. (S«. 329(~) of P.L 97·248) for 01J- com",ilud
aftu ~pt J. 1982.·
s«. l(d){j) 01 Public Law 9lS-6OJ. D«. 28, 1980
(qualified ~//«:IiM doll ",Ie /II S«. 2(~) 01 P.L
9lS-6OJ). •
S«. IOl(~)(5) 01 Public Law 91·172. D«. 30. 1969.
~/f«:li.. (5«. 101(k)(1) of P.L 91·172) Jan. 1. 1910.·
S«. 7(m){3) 01 Public La... 87.792. Oct 10. 1962.
~fl«:li.. (S«. 8 of P.L 87·792) for IUGbIe ,." ""rill'
/lillg aft~r D«. 31. 1962.·
§ 7207
• S«. 7207 as so a",~nd«l is ill PH Cumulali.. ChalllU
@) , ... by P"ntic. H.II. Inc.
Ltut ~-s«. 7207 appetI" abo.. as
a",~ndld by S«. 10704(c) of Public Law 1~203, D«.
22. 1987, ~fl«:IiM (S«. 10704(d) of P.L 1~203) for
nlums for YN" bl!rillllillg afll' D«. 31. 1986. IUId, 011
0' aft~r 12·22-87, for appliallioM SIIb",i1ud 10 1_ IRS
a~ 7·1J.87. or 011 or '-f- 7·15-87 1/ OIlS ha.. copy
of applktltitJII 011 7·1J.87. "'",~nd",nrl add«I Mar (~)"
a~~titJII(d)."
PrWr a-u_a.-s«. 7207 was prniously
arrwtdId by 1_ followillg:
S«. 491(d)(Jl) of Public Law 98-369. July 18, 1984.
~fl«li.. (S«. 491(f)(1) of P.L 98-369) for obUgalioM
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SEC. 7208. OFFENSES RELATING TO STAMPS.
Any person who-
(1) CounterfeitiDg.-With intent to defraud, alters, forges, makes. or counterfeits
any stamp, coupon, ticket, book, or other device prescribed under authority of this
title for the collection or payment of any tax imposed by this title, or sells, lends, or
has in his possession any such altered. forged. or counterfeited stamp, coupon. ticket,
book. or other device, or makes, uses, sells. or has in his possession any material in
imitation of the material used in the manufacture of such stamp, coupon, ticket, book,
or other device; or
(2) Mutilation or remoyal.-Fraudulently cuts, tears, or removes from any vellum.
parchment, paper, instrument, writing. package, or article. upon which any tax is im-
posed by this tide.. any adhesive stamp or the impression of any stamp, die, plate. or
other article provided, made, or used in pursuance of this title; or
(3) Use of mutilated, insufficient. or counterfeited stamps.-Fraudulently uses.
joins, fixes, or places to, with. or upon any vellum, parchment, paper, instrument,
writing, package, or article upon which any tax is imposed by this title.
(A) any adhesive stamp, or the impression of any stamp, die, plate.. or other
article. which has been cut, tom. or removed from any other vellum, parchment.
paper. instrument, writing, package, or article, upon which any tax is imposed by
this title; or
(B) any adhesive stamp or the impression of any stamp, die, plate, or other
article of insufficient value; or
(C) any forged or counterfeited stamp, or the impression of any forged or
counterfeited stamp, die, plate, or other article; or
(4) Reuse of stamps.-
(A) Preparation for reuse.-Willfully removes. or alters the cancellation or de-
facing marks of, or otherwise prepares any adhesive stamp, with intent to use, or
cause the same to be used. after it has already been used; or
(B) Trafficking.-Knowingly or willfully buys, sells, offers for sale, or gives
away, any such washed or restored stamp or to any person for use.. or knowingly
uses the same; or
(C) Possession.-Knowingly and without lawful excuse (the burden of proof of
such excuse being on the accused) has in possession any washed, restored, or al-
tered stamp, which has been removed from any vellum. parchment, paper, instru-
ment, writing, package, or article; or
(5) Emptied stamped paekages.-Commits the offense described in section 7271
(relating to disposal and receipt of stamped packages) with intent to defraud the reve-
nue, or to defraud any person;
shall be guilty of a felony and. upon conviction thereof. shall be fined not more than
$10.000. or imprisoned not more than 5 years. or both.
SEC. 7209. UNAUTHORIZED USE OR SALE OF STAMPS.
Any person who buys, sells, offers for sale, uses, transfers, takes or gives in exchange,
or pledges or gives in pledge.. except as authorized in this title or in regulations made
pursuant thereto, any stamp, coupon, ticket, book. or other device prescribed by the Sec-
retary under this title for the collection or payment of any tax imposed by this title..
shall, upon conviction thereof. be fined not more than $1,000. or imprisoned not more
than 6 months, or both.
SEC. 7210. FAILURE TO OBEY SUMMONS.
Any person who. being duly summoned to appear to testify. or to appear and produce
books. accounts. records, memoranda. or other papers, as required under sections
6420(e)(2), 642l(f)(2), 6427(j)(2), 7602, 7603, and 7604(b), neglects to appear or to pro-
duce such books. accounts. records, memoranda, or other papers, shall. upon conviction
thereof, be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than I year, or both.
together with costs of prosecution.
Ltut tllIIMtIMftL-&c. 7210 apf¥tll'S abo~ IU I gasolinll rrmolllld aftll' DIIc. J1. 1987. TIUs amlltlllmlltlt
tlmlllldlld by SIIc. 1703(11)(2)(0) of Public Law 99-514. struck OIIt "6427(i)(2)" and i".,.,1Id "64270)(2)':
Oct 22. 1986. IIff/IICti~ (SIIc. 170J(h) of P.L 99-514) fo,
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IProcedure and Administration (I.R.C.) 26,1997210 ll'IIS ptrfiotuly ,ff«tiw (S«. JOj(d) of P.L 9j·j99) J_ 1. 1979.·
S«. (l](e)(6) of Public Law 94-jJo. Oct. 17. 1976.
'ffcai." (S«. f1](d) of PoL 94-jJO) Oct. 1. 1976.·
S«. 207(d)(9) of Public LAw 91·2JB. May 21. 191n
,ffceti." (S«. 211(0) of P.L 91·2") July 1. 197(l·
S«. 202(e)(4) of Public LAw 19-#. Ju". 21. 196J.
cf/cai." (S«. 701(0)(2). (J) of P.L 19-#) J_ 1.
1966. •
S«. 208(d)(J) of Public Law 627. Ju,., 29. 19j6,
,ffcai." (S«. 211 af P.L 627) Ju". 29. 19j6.·
S«. 4(/1) of Public Law 466. "pr. 2, 19j6.·
SEC. 7211. FALSE STATEMENTS TO PURCHASERS OR LESSEES RELATING
TO TAX.
Whoever in connection with the sale or lease. or offer for sale or lease. of any article.
or for the purpose of making such sale or lease. makes any statement. written or oral-
(I) intended or calculated to lead any person to believe that any part of the price
at which such article is sold or leased. or offered for sale or lease. consists of a tax
imposed under the authority of the United States. or
(2) ascribing a particular part of such price to a tax imposed under the authority
of the United States.
knowing that such statement is false or that the tax is not so great as the portion of such
price ascribed to such tax. shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and. upon conviction thereof.
shall be punished by a fine of not more than 51.000. or by imprisonment for not more
than I year. or both.
PriM ~-&e
II1M1IIUrJ by rM followin,:
S«. 911(d)(2)(G) of Public Law 98-J69. July 18,
1984. 'ff«tiw (S«. 911(,) of P.L 98-J69) ...... 1. 1984.
S«. j15(6)(12) of Public Law 97-424. J_ 6. 1983.
,ffcai." (S«. jlj(e) of PoL 97-424) for IJrlkIa sold
a/rD Jill&. 6. 1983.·
S«. 2J2(d)(4)(E) of Public Law 96-22J. Apr. 2, 191/0,
'ff«tiN (S«. 2J2(/1)(2)(..) of P. L 96-22J) Jill&. 1.
1979.·
S«. JOj(e)(j) of Public Law 9j.j99. Noy. 6. 1978,
SEC. 7212. ATTEMPrS TO INTERFERE WITII ADMINISTRATION OF INTER-
NAL REVENUE LAWS.
(a) Corrupt or Forcible IDterfereaee.-Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of
force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or im·
pede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this
title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threat-
ening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes. or endeavors to obstruct or impede,
the due administration of this title, shall. upon conviction thereof. be fined not more than
55.000. or imprisoned not more than 3 years. or both. except that if the offense is com-
mitted only by threats of force, the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than
53.000. or imprisoned not more than I year. or both. The term "threats of force". as
used in this subsection. means threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the
United States or to a member of his family.
(b) Forcible Rescue of Seized Property.-Any person who forcibly rescues or causes
to be rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title, or shall attempt
or endeavor so to do. shall. excepting in cases otherwise provided for. for every such of-
fense, be fined not more than 5500. or not more than double the value of the property so
rescued. whichever is the greater. or be imprisoned not more than 2 years.
SEC. 7213. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.
(a) Returns and ReturD 1Df0rmation.-
(1) Federal employees and other perso....-It shall be unlawful for any officer or
employee of the United States or any person described in section 6103(n) (or an offi-
cer or employee of any such person). or any former officer or employee, willfully to
disclose to any person. except as authorized in this title. any return or return informa-
tion (as defined in section 6103(b». Any violation of this paragrsph shall be a felony
punishable upon conviction by a fine in any amount not exceeding 55.000. or impris-
onment of not more than 5 years. or both. together with the costs of prosecution. and
if such offense is committed by any officer or employee of the United States. he shall.
in addition to any other punishment. be dismissed from office or discharged from em-
ployment upon conviction of such offense.
1.AJI ~-&c. 721J(0)(1) IIJIIIC1S obDN III I 95-600. Noy. 6, 1978, 'ffcaiN (S«. 701(bb)(B)(.c) of
IIIftfIUial by S«. 701(bb)(l)(C). (bb)(6) of Public Law P.L 9UOO) Jon. 1. 1977.
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LiISI o-"_-Sec. 7214(c) appears obow lIS" Sec. 7214(c) lIS it rwuJ btforr: this omelUi_ is ill P·H
omend«t by Sec. 204(5) of Public lAw 85-859. Sept 2. CumulGtiw Changes.
1958. tffectiw (Sec. 210 of P.L. 85-859) Sept 3. 1958.
SEC. 7215. OFFENSES WITH RESPECT TO COLLECTED TAXES.
(a) Penalty.-Any person who fails to comply with any provision of section 7512(b)
sball. in addition to any other penalties provided by law. be guilty of a misdemeanor.
and. upon conviction thereof. sDaU be fined not more than $5.000. or imprisoned not
more than one year. or both. together with the costs of prosecution.
AddiliDll.-Sec. 7215(0) -.. addtd by Sec. 2 of Public I
lAw 85-321. F,b. 11. 1958.
(1) Exc:eptioo.-This section shall not apply-
(I) to any person. if such person shows that there was reasonable doubt as to (A)
whether the law required collection of tax. or (B) who was required by law to collect
tax. and
(2) to any person. if such person shows that the failure to comply with the provi-
sions of section 7512(b) was due to circumstances beyond his control.
For purposes of paragraph (2). a lack of funds existing immediately after the payment of
wages (whether or not created by the payment of such wages) shall not be considered to
be circumstances beyond the control of a· person.
SEC. 7216. DISCLOSURE OR USE OF INFORMATION BY PREPARERS OF
RETURNS.
(a) Geoeral Rule.-Any person who is engaged in the business of preparing or pro-
viding services in connection with the preparation of. returns of the tax imposed by chap-
ter 1. or any person who for compensation prepares any such return for any other per-
son, and who--
(I) discloses any information furnished to him for. or in connection with. the prep-
aration of any such return. or
(2) uses any such information for any purpose other than to prepare. or assist in
preparing. any such return. shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. and. upon conviction
thereof. sball be fined not more than 51.000. or imprisoned not more than 1 year. or
both. together with the costs of prosecution.
rr:tl'OQCtiwly rr:ptQltd by Sec. 102 of Public lAw 98-67.
Aug. 5. 1983. tfftetiw (Sec. 110(0) of P.L. 98-67) lIS of
clDsr of 6-30-83. lIS if prior omelUimellt had not beell
mDd& Sec. 7215(b) I1S it rwuJ btjorr: this rr:peal of prior
amelldment is ill P·H CumulGtiw C/umga.
Clr.arrga.
AddiliAm.-Sec. 7216(0) lOW addtd by Sec. 316(0) of
Public lAw 98-178. Dec. 10. 1971. tfftetiw (Sec. 316(c)
of P.L. 92·178) Jon. 1. 1972.
AddiliDll.-Sec. 7215(b) lOW addtd by Sec. 2 of Public
lAw 85-321. Feb. 11. 1958.
Prior o-"_-lIuer retroactiwly ,..,ltd.-Sec.
7215fb) was prniDu&ly _1Idtd by Sec. 307(0)(15) of
Public lAw 97-248. Sept. 3. 1982. Tltis om,lUimmt _
26,202 (l.R.C.) Code § 7214(a)
the judgment of the court. The court also shall render judgment against the said officer
or employee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party injured. to be
collected by execution.
(1) Interest of Intemal Reveoue Officer or Employee in Tobaceo or Liquor Proclue-
tion.-Any internal revenue officer or employee interested. directly or indirectly. in the
manufacture of tobacco. snuff. or cigarettes. or in the production. rectification. or redistil-
lation of distilled spirits. shall be dismissed from office; and each such officer or employee
so interested in any such manufacture or production. rectification. or redistillation or pro-
duction of fermented liquors shall be fined not more than $5.000.
(c) Cross Refereuc:es.-
For peulty 00 collecting or disbursing officen trading in pubOe funds or debts or
property, see 18 U.s.C. 1901.
Lost o-"_-Sec. 7216(0) appears allow lIS
omendtd by Sec. 412(b)(10) of Public lAw 98-369. July
18. 1984. ,ffectiw (Sec. 414(0){l) of P.L. 98-369) for
ttWlbIt ,." btgiMing ojru Dec. 31. 1984. Sec. 7216(0)
lIS il rwuJ btjorr: this ameIIdmellt is ill P·H CumulGtiw
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(1) Exc:eptiODS.-
(1) Discloaure.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to a disclosure of information if
such disclosure is made-
(A) pursuant to any other rrovisions of this title, or
(B) pursuant to an order 0 a court.
F-39
18 USC 371
CHAPTER 19. CO~SPIRACY
Se~t1on
37\. Conspiracy to .:ommlt offense or to defraud enited States
§ 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States
If twO or more persons I.:onspire either to commit any offense against the
Cnited States, or to defraud the Cnited States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose. and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the objel.:t of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
510,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If. however, the offense. the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy
shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misde-
meanor.
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § I. 62 Stat. 701.)
HISTORY; A~CILLARYLAWS A~D DIRECTIVES
Prior law and revision:
This section is based on Act Mar. 4, 1909, ch 321. § 37. 35 Stat. 1096;
Mar. 4, 1909, ch 321. § 178a. as added Sept. 27,1944. ch 425,58 Stat.
752 (former 18 e.s.c. §§ 88 and 294).
To reflect the construction placed upon former 18 e.s.c. § 88 by the
courts. the words "or any agency thereoC' were inserted. (See Haas v.
Henkel, 216 US 462. 54 LEd 569. 30 SCR 249. 17 AnnCas 1112,
where court said: "The statute is broad enough in its terms to include
any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing. obstructing. or defeating
the lawful functions of any department of government." Also, see U. S.
v. Walter. 263 es IS. 68 LEd 137, 44 SCR 10, and definitions of
department and agency in 18 USCS § 6.) The punishment provision is
completely rewritten to increase the penalty from 2 years to 5 years
except where the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor. If the
object is a misdemeanor. the maximum imprisonment for a conspiracy
to commit that offense, under the revised section, cannot exceed I year.
The injustice of permitting a felony punishment on ~onviction for
conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is descnbed by the late Hon.
Grover M. Moscowitz. United States district judge for the eastern
district of New York. in an address delivered March 14, 1944, before
the section on Federal Practice of the New York Bar Association,
reported in 3 Federal Rules Decisions, pages 380-392.
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18 USC 1341
CHAPTER 63. MAIL FRAUD
Section
1341. Frauds and swindles
CROSS REFERENCES
Offenses affecting Postal Service. 18 USCS §§ 1691 et seq.
This chapter is referred to in 29 USCS § 1111.
§ 1341. Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudu-
fent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin. obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious anicle, for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to
the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered
by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 763; May 24, 1949, ch 139, § 34, 63
Stat. 94; Aug. 12, 1970, P.L. 91-375, § 6(j)(11), 84 Stat. 778.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECIlVES
Prior law and revision:
This section is based on Act Mar. 4, 1909, ch 321, § 21S, 3S Stat. 1130
(former 18 U.S.C. § 338).
~pyrlght 11 1979 by,~e Lawyer. co-operatlve Publishing Comptlny
rtocheater. N.Y.
Ilopyrtght la not claimed In any mster181s obtained from
,Wclal United State. Government source.. including ttle
.ext of .tatute..
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18 usc 2
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIREcnVES
Prior law and revision:
This section is based on Act Mar. 4. 1909. ch 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152
(former 18 U.S.c. § 550).
§ 2. Principals
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal.
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 684; Oct. 31, 1951, ch 655, § 17b, 65
Stat. 717.)
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Copyright Is not claimed In any materials obtained from
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§ 287. False. fictitious or fraudulent claims
Whoever makes or presents to any person or
officer in the civil. militarv, or naval service of the
l"nited States, or to any department or agency
thereof. any claim upon or against the l"nited
States. or any department or agency thereof. know-
ing such claim to be false. fictitious. or fraudulent.
shall be imprisoned not more than five years and
shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in
this title.
(As amended Oct. 27. 1986. Pub.L. 99-562. § i. 100 Stat.
3169.)
RE"'S'OS NOTES
Based on title 18. C.S.C.. 1940 ed.. § 80 (~ar. 4. 1909
ch. 321. § 35. 35 Stat. 1095: Oct. 23. 1918. ch. 194. 40
Stat. 1015; June 18. 1934. ch. 587. 48 Stat. 996; Apr. 4,
1938, ch. 69, 52 Stat. 1971.
Section 80 of title 18. r.S,c.. 1940 ed.. was divided into
two parts. That portion making it a crime to present
false claims was retained as this section. The part relat-
ing to false statements is now section 1001 of this title.
To clarify meaning of "department" words "agency"
and "or agency" were inserted after it. (See definition.
of "department" and "agency" in section 6 of this title.'
Words "or any corporation in which the Cnited State.
of America is a stockholder" which appeared in. tWO
places were omitted as unnecessary in view of definition
of "agency" in section 6 of this title.
The words "five vears" were substituted for "ten
years" to harmonize the punishment pro\"lsions of compa-
rable sections involving offenses of the gravity of fel~­
nies. but not of such heinous character as to warrant ~
lo-year pUnishment. ,See sections 914. 1001. 1002. 100;>.
1006 of this title.) ,
Reference to persons causing or procuring was om;.~tea
as unnecessary in ,'iew of definition of "principal In
section 2 of thiS title.
Minor change!' In phraseology were made.
rCopyright ~ 1979 by
The Lawyers Co-operatlve Publishing COmpany
rOChester. N.Y.
Copyright Is not claimed In any materials obtained from
official United States Govemment sources. Including the
rext of statuteL
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,18 usc 1001
CROSS REFERE~CES
Department and agency defined. 18 VSCS § 6.
Applicability to Canal Zone, 18 VSCS § 14.
Conspiracy to defraud government in regard to false claims, 18 USCS § 286.
Fraudulent claims. 18 VSCS § 287.
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or
::overs up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or
uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § I, 62 Stat. 749.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Prior law and revision:
This section is based on Act Mar. 4, 1909, ch 321, § 35. 35 Stat. 1095:
Oct. 23, 1918. ch 194, 40 Stat. 1015: June 18, 1934, ch 587, 48 Stat.
996; Apr. 4, 1938, ch 69, 52 Stat. 197 (former 18 U.S.c. § 80).
Former 18 U.s.c. § 80 was divided into two parts.
The provision relating to false claims was incorporated in 18 USCS
§ 287. Reference to persons causing or procuring was omitted as
unnecessary in view of the definition of "principal" in 18 USCS § 2.
The words "or any corporation in which the United States of America
is a stockholder" in were omitted as unnecessary in view of the
definition of "agency" in 18 USCS § 6.
In addition to minor changes of phraseology, the maximum term of
imprisonment was changed from 10 to 5 years to be consistent with
comparable sections. (See note under 18 USCS 287.)
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§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before de·
partments. agencies. and commit-
tees
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or
obstruct compliance, in whole or in part, with any
civil investigative demand duly and properly, made
under the Antitrust Civil Process Act, wdlfully
withholds, misrepresents, removes from any place,
conceals, covers up, destroys, mutilates, alters" or
by other means falsifies any documentary materIal,
answers to written interrogatories, or oral testlmo-
n\". which is the subject of such demand: or at-
t~rnpts to do so or solicits another to do so: or
Whoever corruptly, or b'1,threats or force. or by
anY threatenmg letter or t:ommunication influ-
ences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influ-
ence. obstruct. or impede the due and proper ad-
ministration of the law under which any pending
proceeding is being had before any department or
agency of the Cnited States, or the due and proper
exercise of the power of inquiry under which any
inquiry or investigation is being had by either
House. or ~ny committee of either House or any
joint commIttee of the Congress-
ShaH be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
(As amended Sept. 19, 1962. Pub.L. 87-664. § 61al. 76
Stat. 551; Oct. 15. 1970. Pub.L. 91-452. Title IX. § 903. 84
Stat. 947; Sept. 30. 1976. Pub.L. 94-435. Title I. § 105. 90
Stat. 1389; Oct. 12, 1982, Pub.L. 97-291. § .ltd), 96 Stat.
1253.)
REVISION NOTES
Based on title 18. U.S.C., 1940 ed.• § 241a (Mar. 4. 1909.
ch. 321, § 135a. as added Jan. 13, 1940. ch. 1. 54 Stat. 13;
June 8. 1945. ch. 1i8. § 2. 59 Stat. 234),
Word "agency" was substituted for the words "inde-
pendent establishment. board, commission" in two in-
stances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of
section. ISee definitive section 6 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
EDITORIAL NOTES
References in Text. The Antitrust Civil Process Act.
referred to in text. is classified generally to section 1311
et seq. of Title 15. L'.S.C.A., Commerce and Trade.
18 USC 1505
rtoPYrl9ht ~ 1179 by"",e Lawye,. Co-operatlve publishing Company'qochHter, N.Y.
ft..... opyrlght Is not claimed In any meterlal. obtained from<~fflclal United State. Government aourcn, Including the
o ;el[t of statutes.
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§ 1510. Obstruction of criminal investigations
(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of
bribery to obstruct. delay. or prevent the communi·
cation of information relating to a violation of any
criminal statute of the L'nited States by any person
to a criminal investigator shall be fined not more
than $5.000. or imprisoned not more than five
years. or both.
(b) As used in this section. the term "criminal
investigator" means any individual duly authorized
by a department. agency. or armed force of the
L'nited States to conduct or engage in investiga·
tions of or prosecutions for \'iolations of the crimi·
nal laws of the l'nited States,
(Added Pub.L. 90-123. § Hal. :-lov. 3. 1967. 81 Stat. 362.
and amended Pub.L. 97-291. § 4(e). Oct. 12. 1982. 96 Stat.
1253.)
,
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18 USC 1621
§ 1621. Perjury generally
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person,
in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that
any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or sub-
scribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under pen-
alty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States
Code [28 USCS § 1746], willfully subscribes as true any material matter
which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, be fined not more than S2,()(X) or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is
made within or without the United States.
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 773; Oct. 3, 1964, P. L. 88-619, § 1,
78 Stat. 995; Oct. 18, 1976, P. L. 94-550, § 2, 90 Stat. 2534.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Prior law and revision:
This section is based on Act Mar. 4, 1909, ch 321, § 125, 35 Stat. 1111;
June IS, 1917, ch 30, Title XI, § 19, 40 Stat. 230 (former 18 U.s.c.
§§ 231 and 629).
The words "except as otherwise expressly provided by law" were
insened to avoid conftict with perjury provisions in other titles where
the punishment and application vary. More than 25 additional provi-
sions are in the code. For construction and application of several
sections see Behrle v. U. S., 69 AppDC 304, 100 F(2d) 714, U. S. v.
Hammer, (DC-NY), 299 Fed 1011, aft"d 6 F(2d) 786, Rosenthal v. U.
S., (CCA 8), 248 Fed 684, compare Epstein v. U. S., (CCA 7), 196 Fed
I'f0pyrlght ~ 1179 by
,':!he Lawye,. Co-operatlve Publishing Com~ny
Rochester, N.Y.
~opyright Is not claimed In any materials obtained from
FbttlCl81 United States Government source.. including the
text of statute..
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I§ 3571. Sentence of fine
(a I In general.-A defendant who has been
found guilty of an offense may be sentenced to pay
a fine.
(b) Fines for individuals.-Except as provided
in subsection (e) of this section. an individual who
has been found guilty of an offense may be fined
not more than the greatest of-
m the amount specified in the law setting
forth the offense;
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d)
of this section;
(3) for a felony, not more than $250,000:
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death. not
more than $250.000;
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not
result in death, not more than $100,000;
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does
not result in death. not more than $5,000; or
(i) for an infraction, not more than $5,000.
(c) Fines for organizationl.-Except as provid·
ed in subsection (e) of this section, an organization
that has been found guilty of an offense may be
fined not more than the greatest of-
(1) the amount specified in the law setting
forth the offense;
(2) the applicable amount under subsection (d)
of this section;
(3) for a felony, not more than $500,000;
(4) for a misdemeanor resulting in death, not
more than $500,000;
(5) for a Class A misdemeanor that does not
result in death, not more than $200.000;
(6) for a Class B or C misdemeanor that does
not result in death, not more than $10,000: and
(7) for an infraction, not more than $10,000.
(d) Alternative fine based on gain or 1011.-If
any person derives pecuniary gain from the of-
fense. or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to
a person other than the defendant, the defendant
may be fined not more than the greater of twice
18 USC 3571 I
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the gross gain or twice the llross loss. unless
imposition of a fine under this subsection would
unduly complicate or prolonll the sentencing: pro-
cess.
leI Special rule for lower fine specified in sub-
stanth'e pro~·jsion.-[f a law settin" forth an of·
fense ~pecities no fine or a tine that'is lower than
the fine otherwise applicable under this section and
such law. by specIfic reference. exempts the of·
fense from the applicability of the fine otherwise
applicable under this section. the defendant may
not be fined more than the amount specified in the
law setting forth the offense.
f.-\dded Pub.L. ~~-·r;':J. Title II. § ~l:!(alf~). Oct. 12. 1984.
98 Stat. 1~!l.:;. and amended Pub.L. lOU-l~5. § 6. Dec. 11.
198i. 101 Stat. 1280.)
EOITORJ..\L ~OTES
Effective Dale. Section effective on the first da~' of
first calendar month beginning thirty six months after
Oct. 1~. 1984. applicable only to offenses committed after
taking effect of sections 211 to 2:39 of Pub.L. 98-4i3. and
except as otherwise pro\'ided for therein. see section 235
of Pub.L. 98-4i3. as amended. set out as a note under
section 3551 of this title.
e",,, yright ~ 1979 by'Ie L.IIwyera Co-operative Publishing Com.,.nyoche.ter, N.Y.
"..F.'."pyrlght Ia not claimed In any meterl81S obtained fromJC.1clS1 United State. Govemment source.. indudlng the
text of statute••
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THE PRESS'S SIDE OF THE STORY-
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW
Melissa Forsythe
Anchor, WHAS Television News
Louisville, Kentucky
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Copyright 1988
Gregory L. Monge
REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT
-HOW AND WHEN?-
Gregory L. Monge
Van Antwerp, Monge, Jones &Edwards
Ashland, Kentucky
SECTION H
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
.~
, ,I,,
1 r
I, r
Ir
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT
-HOW AND WHEN?-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. WHEN - TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL
II. HOW - TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL
III. WHEN - PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
IV. SOME POINTS TO REMEMBER
V. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 28 USC 1441-1452
VI. RESEARCH REFERENCES TO SPECIFIC REMOVAL AND
JURISDICTIONAL SUBJECTS
SAMPLE REMOVAL DOCUMENTS
CIVIL COVER SHEET
AFFIDAVIT OF FILING
BOND
PETITION FOR REMOVAL
NOTICE OF FILING
SECTION H
H-1
H-4
H-5
H-5
H-6
H-13
H-15
H-16
H-17
H-19
H-21
H-26
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
r'
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
,;
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
I. WHEN - TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL.
A. The Federal Court must have jurisdiction.
Removal is proper if and only if the Federal Court
would have had jurisdiction over the action.
1. Diversity.
a. It must exist when the complaint is filed
and must still exist at the time the
petition is filed.
Kellam v. Keith, 144 US 568 (1892), 36 L.Ed.
544
b. If the plaintiff has fraudulently joined a
non-diverse party, diversity will not be
destroyed. The proof however must be clear.
Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 US
92, 66 L. Ed 144 (1921)
c. I f there is no basis for the liability of
the resident defendant then joinder
fraudulent.
Miami Pipe Line Co. v. Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. (10th Cir. 1967) 384 F.2d 21.
d. What about corporations?
It is considered a citizen of both its place
of incorporation and its principal place of
business. ALSO, if the corporation has its
principal place of business in the forum
state, diversity is absent no matter that
the plaintiff maybe a citizen of another
state.
Patch v. Wabash R. Co. (1907) 207 U.S. 277,
52 L.Ed. 204.
Martin v. Snyder, 148 U.S. 663, 37 L.Ed. 602
(1893) .
e. Jurisdictional amount.
$10,000 exclusive of interest and cost.
H-1
H-2
The action must be removed from a state court.
2. Federal Question.
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The name doesn't necessarily answer
question. If it is judicial in nature
it is a court. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92
10, 23 L • Ed • 524 (1876).
a.
Simply put, this means that the defendant has
been subjected to some type of jUdicial order.
a. Must comply with the time requirement of 30
days. For example, if your petition says
process served "on or about" you may be
remanded.
NOTE: The fact that a state statute incorporates
a federal standard does not mean for removal
purposes that a complaint under the state statute
arises under Federal law. Gatlin v. Countryside
Industries, Inc. (DND Tex. 1983). 564 F.Supp.
1490.
c. But once it is a judicial forum such as on
appeal of an administrative determination,
Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U. S. 403, 25 L. Ed. 206 (1879).
b. If it's a non-judicial proceeding it may not
be removed. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S.
467, 34 L. Ed • 196 (189 0) •
a. If the action is one founded on or ar~s~ng
under the Federal Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States, it is removable
without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties.
b. In the case of several defendants who are
served at different times, if the first
served lets the 30 days go by, the other
defendants cannot remove. See Balestrieri
v. Bell Asbestos Mines Ltd., 544 F. SUppa
528 (1982 E.D.Pa).
1. What is a state court?
2. In which it was brought.
3. When in terms of time can you remove.
B.
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c. The time cannot be extended by a court or
agreement.
NO WAY !
NO HOW !
NO TIME !
See: Dutton v. Moody, 104 F.Supp. 838;
Pilgrim v. Aetna, 234 F. 958;
Sunbeam v. Brazin, D.Ky. 138 F.Supp.
713 (1956).
d. Time is not jurisdictional per se.
Meaning that an untimely filing is subject
to a motion to remand. Rexford v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339,
57 L. Ed . 864 (1913).
So, if you are plaintiff and want remand,
don't wait or you may waive your right. See
Martin Adm'r v. B & 0 R.R., 151 U.S. 673, 38
L. Ed. 311 (1894).
e. Service of pleading starts time running.
Just a note on service on a statutory agent
appointed under "long arm" statutes.
Generally the courts hold time runs from
when defendant receives the pleading, not
from service on the statutory agent. See,
Durr Dru Co. v. American Suret Co., 126
F.Supp. 815 1954 D.Ala.); but compare,
Youngson v. Lush, 96 F. Supp. (D .Neb. 1951).
When a non-removable case becomes removable.
A case not removable when commenced may become
removable. Great N.R. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S.
276, 62 L.Ed. 713 (1918). This occurs if, after
the initial non-removability status, something
changes. You then have 30 days from the receipt
through service or otherwise of the document by
which you determine it is removable to remove.
Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 83 L.Ed. 334
(1939).
What makes this occur? Some of these:
- Amended Complaint shows diversity
- Amount in controversy goes over $10,000
- Plaintiff dismisses case against resident
joint defendant
- Federal question emerges
H-3
H-4
a. Cash
2. Verification.
B. Bond.
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A short and plain statement
sufficient to draw conclusions
Railroad v. Cockrell, 232 U.s.
544 (1914).
It is not fatal and can be cured if not done.
Owatonna v. Chicago RI, 298 F.Supp. 919 (D.Minn.
1969)~ Henlopen Hotel Corp. v. Aetna Inc., 213
F.Supp. 320 (D.Del. 1963).
Allege the citizenship of all the defendants and
all the plaintiffs. Allege that the diversity
existed at time of filing suit and at time of
filing petition.
If amount in controversy is not apparent you can
show it by direct allegations in the petition.
This may be done by you as the attorney.
Alexander v. Cox (5th Cir. 1965), 348 F.2d 894.
b. Signature of principal not needed. Public
Grain v. Western Union, 16 F. 289 (1883).
Must file copy of the petition with the state
court. It is upon this filing that you effect
removal. This is how you inform the state court
of no jurisdiction. Upon filing, the
jurisdiction of the state court is complete and
automatic. Anything else done by the state is
void. Howes v. Childers, (E.D.Ky. 1977), 426
F. Supp. 358.
1. Allegations.
2. LR 9(c) prescribes $250.
1. It is a prerequisite and condition precedent but
it is a formal procedural requirement that
plaintiff may waive.
3. Form and sufficiency.
A. The Petition.
HOW - TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL.II.
III. WHEN - PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
A. Jury pool - 6 v. 12.
B. Ability of court.
C. Docket of court.
D. Delay or expediency.
E. Court's view of settlement and the jUdge's rule.
F. Convenience.
G. Cost.
H. Jury awards.
IV. SOME POINTS TO REMEMBER.
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c. If defective, it may be cured by amendment.
National Quick Silver Corp. v. World Ins.
Co., 139 F.2d 1 (1943) (8th Cir.).
d. Must be filed within time of removal, i.e.,
30 days.
Notice.
1. Must give notice to all adverse parties promptly
after filing a petition for removal.
2. Filing with state court.
The time of removal does not extend time to plead or
respond, i.e. 20 v. 3cr.--
Always read the statute.
Remove to proper division. See LR 2.
LR 2 and 9.
H-5
V.
REMOVAL OF ACTIONS - HOW AND WHEN
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK.
28 USC 1441 - 1452
A. § 1441. Actions Removable Generally.
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or
right arising under the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States shall be removable
without regard to the citizenship or residence of
the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or
cause of action, which would be removable if sued
upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
nonremovable claims or causes of action, the
entire case may be removed and the district court
may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against
a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of
this title may be removed by the foreign state to
the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending. Upon removal the action
shall be tried by the court without jury. Where
removal is based upon this subsection, the time
limitations of section 1446 (b) of this chapter
may be enlarged at any time for cause shown.
(e) The court to which such civil action is removed
is not precluded from hearing and determining any
claim in such civil action because the State
court from which such civil action is removed did
not have jurisdiction over that claim.
H-6
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§ 1442. Federal Officers Sued or Prosecuted.
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced
in a State court against any of the following
persons may be removed by them to the district
court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place wherein it is
pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any
agency thereof, or person acting under him,
for any act under color of such office or on
account of any right, title or authority
claimed under any Act of Congress for the
apprehension or punishment of criminals or
the collection of the revenue.
(2) A property holder whose titIe is derived
from any such officer, where such action or
prosecution affects the validity of any law
of the United States.
(3) Any officer of the courts of the United
States, for any Act under color of office or
in the performance of his duties;
(4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for
any act in the discharge of his official
duty under an order of such House.
(b) A personal action commenced in any State court by
an alien against any citizen of a State who is,
or at the time the alleged action accrued was, a
civil officer of the United States and is a
nonresident of such State, wherein jurisdiction
is obtained by the State court by personal
service of process, may be removed by the
defendant to the district court of the United
States for the district and division in which the
defendant was served with process.
§ l442a. Members of the Armed Forces Sued or
Prosecuted.
A civil or criminal prosecution in a court of a State
of the United States against a member of the armed
forces of the United States on account of an act done
under color of his office or status, or in respect to
which he claims any right, title, or authority under a
law of the United States respecting the armed forces
thereof, or under the law of war, may at any time
before the trial or final hearing thereof be removed
for trial into the district court of the United States
for the district where it is pending in the manner
H-7
D.
E.
F.
prescribed by law, and it shall thereupon be entered
on the docket of the district court, which shall
proceed as if the cause had been originally commenced
therein and shall have full power to hear and
determine the cause.
§ 1443. Civil Rights Cases.
Any of the following civil actions or criminal
prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be
removed by the defendant to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing
the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot
enforce in the courts of such State a right under
any law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens of the United States, or of all persons
within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from
any law providing for equal rights, or for
refusing to do any act on the ground that it
would be inconsistent with such law.
§ 1444. Foreclosure Action Against United States.
Any action brought under section 2410 of this title
[28 USCS § 2410] against the United States in any
State court may be removed by the United States to the
district court of the United States for the district
and division in which the action is pending.
§ 1445. Nonremovable Actions.
(a) A civil action in any State court against a
railroad or i ts receivers or trustees, arJ.sJ.ng
under sections 51-60 of Title 45 [45 USCS §§ 51
et seq.], may not be removed to any district
court of the United States.
(b) A civil action in any State court against a
common carrier or its receivers or trustees to
recover damages for delay, loss, or injury of
shipments, arising under section 11707 of Title
49 [49 USCS § 11707], may not be removed to any
district court of the United States unless the
matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs.
(c) A civil action in any State court arising under
the workmen's compensation laws of such State may
not be removed to any district court of the
United States.
H-8
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G. § 1446. Procedure for Removal.
(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any
civil action or criminal prosecution from a State
court shall file in the district court of the
United States for the district and division
within which such action is pending a verified
petition containing a short and plain statement
of the facts which entitle him or them to removal
together with a copy of all process, pleadings
and orders served upon him or them in such
action.
(b) The petition for removal of a civil action or
proceeding shall be filed within thirty days
after the receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon
which such action or proceeding is based, or
within thirty days after the service of summons
upon the defendant if such initial pleading has
then been filed in court and is not required to
be served on the defendant, whichever period is
shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, a petition for removal may be filed
within thirty days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or
other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has
become removable.
(c) (1) A petition for removal of a criminal
prosecution shall be filed not later than thirty
days after the arraignment in the State court, or
at any time before trial, whichever is earlier,
except that for good cause shown in the United
States district court may enter an order granting
the petitioner leave to file the petition at a
later time.
(2) A petition for removal of a criminal
prosecution shall include all grounds for such
removal. A failure to state grounds which exist
at the time of the filing of the petition shall
constitute a waiver of such grounds, and a second
petition may be filed only on grounds not
existing at the time of the original petition.
For good cause shown, the United States district
court may grant relief from the limitations of
this paragraph.
1I-9
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(3) The filing of a petition or removal of a
criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State
court in which such prosecution is pending from
proceeding further, except that a jUdgment of
conviction shall not be entered unless the
petition is first denied.
(4) The United States district court to which
such petition is directed shall examine the
petition promptly. If it clearly appears on the
face of the petition and any exhibits annexed
thereto that the petition for removal should not
be granted, the court shall make an order for its
summary dismissal.
(5) If the United States district court does not
order" the summary dismissal of such petition, it
shall order an evidentiary hearing to be held
promptly and after such hearing shall make such
disposition of the petition as justice shall
require. If the United States district court
determines that such petition shall be granted,
it shall so notify the State court in which
prosecution is pending, which shall proceed no
further.
(d) Each petition for removal of a civil action or
proceeding, except a petition in behalf of the
United States, shall be accompanied by a bond
with good and sufficient surety conditioned that
the defendant or defendants will pay all costs
and disbursements incurred by reason of the
removal proceedings should it be determined that
the case was not removable or was improperly
removed.
(e) Promptly after the filing of such petition and
bond the defendant or defendants shall give
written notice thereof to all adverse parties and
shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk
of such State court, which shall effect the
removal and the State court shall proceed no
further unless and until the case is remanded.
(f) If the defendant or defendants are in actual
custody on process issued by the State court, the
district court shall issue its writ of habeas
corpus, and the marshal shall thereupon take such
defendant or defendants into his custody and
deliver a copy of the writ to the clerk of such
State court.
§ 1447. Procedure After Removal Generally.
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(a) In any case removed from a State court, the
district court may issue all necessary orders and
process to bring before it all proper parties
whether served by process issued by the State
court or otherwise.
(b) It may require the petitioner to file with its
clerk copies of all records and proceedings in
such State court or may cause the same to be
brought before it by writ of certiorari issued to
such State court.
(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the case was removed improvidently and
without jurisdiction, the district court shall
remand the case, and may order the payment of
just costs. A certified copy of the order of
remand shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk
of the State court. The State court may
thereupon proceed with such case.
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal
or otherwise, except that an order remanding a
case to the State court from which it was removed
pursuant to section 1443, of this title [28 USCS
§ 1443] shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.
§ 1448. Process After Removal.
In all cases removed from any State court to any
district court of the United States in which anyone
or more of the defendants has not been served with
process or in which the service has not been perfected
prior to removal, or in which process served proves to
be defective, such process or service may be completed
or new process issued in the same manner as in cases
originally filed in such district court.
This section shall not deprive any defendant upon whom
process is served after removal of his right to move
to remand the case.
§ 1449. State Court Record Supplied.
Where a party is entitled to copies of the records and
proceedings in any suitor prosecution in a State
court, to be used in any district court of the United
States, and the clerk of such State court, upon
demand, and the payment or tender of the legal fees,
fails to deliver certified copies, the district court
may, on affidavit reciting such facts, direct such
record to be supplied by affidavit or otherwise.
H-ll
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Thereupon such proceedings, trial, and judgment may be
had in such district court, and all such process
awarded, as if certified copies had been filed in the
district court.
§ 1450. Attachment or Sequestration; Securities.
Whenever any action is removed from a State court to a
district court of the United States, any attachment or
sequestration of the goods or estate of the defendant
in such action in the State court shall hold the goods
or estate to answer the final jUdgment or decree in
the same manner as they would have been held to answer
final jUdgment or decree had it been rendered by the
State court.
All bonds, undertakings, or security given by either
party in such action prior to its removal shall remain
valid and effectual notwithstanding such removal.
All injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in
such action prior to its removal shall remain in full
force and effect until dissolved or modified by the
district court.
§ 1451. Definitions.
For purpose of this chapter
(l) The term "State court" includes the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia.
(2) The term "State" includes the District of
Columbia.
H-12
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VI. RESEARCH REFERENCES TO SPECIFIC REMOVAL AND JURISDICTIONAL
SUBJECTS.
1. "EFFECT, ON JURISDICTION OF STATE COURT, OF 28 USC §
1446(e), RELATING TO REMOVAL OF CIVIL CASE TO FEDERAL
COURT" •
38 ALR Fed. 824
2. "WHAT IS A 'STATE COURT' FOR PURPOSES OF 28 USC §
1441(a) PROVIDING FOR REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTIONS
GENERALLY"?
48 ALR Fed. 738
3. WHAT IS "A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT CLAIM OR CAUSE OF
ACTION" WITHIN 28 USC § 1441 (c) WHICH PERMITS
NONRESIDENT CO-DEFENDANT TO REMOVE CASE FROM STATE TO
FEDERAL COURT.
58 ALR Fed. 458
4. OPPOSING INJUNCTION OR RESTRAINING ORDER IN STATE
COURT ACTION AS WAIVER OF RIGHT TO REMOVE ACTION TO
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT UNDER 28 USC § 1441.
58 ALR Fed. 732
5. RIGHT OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT TO REMOVAL OF ACTION
FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT UNDER 28 USC § 1441.
8 ALR Fed. 708
6. "WHEN PERIOD FOR FILING PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF CIVIL
ACTION FROM STATE COURT TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
BEGINS TO RUN UNDER 28 USC § 1446(b)."
16 ALR Fed. 287
7. WHAT CONSTITUTES ANCILLARY, INCIDENTAL, OR AUXILIARY
CAUSE OF ACTION, SO AS TO PRECLUDE ITS REMOVAL FROM
STATE TO FEDERAL COURT.
18 ALR Fed. 126
8. "WHAT CONSTITUTES 'INITIAL PLEADING' FOR PURPOSES OF
COMPUTING TIME FOR REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION FROM STATE
TO FEDERAL COURT UNDER 28 USC § 1446(b)".
15 ALR Fed. 733
9. CIVIL ACTIONS REMOVABLE FROM STATE COURT TO FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT UNDER 28 USC § 1443.
28 ALR Fed. 488
10. DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP OF UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATIONS FOR FEDERAL DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
PURPOSES IN ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST SUCH ASSOCIATIONS.
14 ALR Fed. 849
H-13
11.
12.
DETERMINATION OF CORPORATION'S PRINCIPAL PLACE OF
BUSINESS FOR PURPOSES OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION UNDER
28 USC § 1332(e).
6 ALR Fed. 436
"REMOVAL OF ACTIONS", 29 Fed.Proe., L.Ed § 69:1-137.
H-14
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I ~
I r~I r,
Ir
m
iIr
! r
I r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
SAMPLE REMOVAL DOCUMENTS
H-15
The JS4A c:;vil ~r sheet and the information contained herein nelfher reDlaee nor .uDOlement the fili"l) a"d .
law. except .5 PfoYloed bY loca' rules of court. ThiS form. aporO¥ed bY the JudICIal CcmtereflCe of the United S,a: __
Clerk 01 Coun for the pur~ of initialing the civil oockel sneet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE
JS44C
(Rev. 12/841 CIVIL COVER SHEET
I
I
Ic
DEFENDANTS
INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL LABORATORIES,
P. O. Box 24027
Nashville, TN 37202Lawrence County, Ohio
(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAtNTIFF _
(EXCEPT IN u.s. PLAINTIFF CASES)
I (a) PLAINTIFFS
CHARLES DELAWDER
ICOUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT _
(IN u.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES. USE THE LOCATION OF THE I
TRACT OF LAND fNVOLVED •
-------t--------:----
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
06 06
05 ~r.
PTF DEF
oA oA
01HER STATUTEt
Incorporated or Princlpa' Place
ot f!U$inessln This Slate
Incorporated and Principal Place
01 BusinesSin Anolner Siale
Forei;n Nation
BANKRUPTCY
PTF DEF
01 01
ATTORNEYS (IF KNOWN)
(For Oi\08fllUy c:.ases Only)
CHlzen 01 This Siale
Hon. Gregory L. Monge
VanAntwerp, Monge, Jones & Edwards
P. O. Box 1111
Ashland, KY 41105-1111 I
Ill. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES "U'cu" " INOOOUOX
alleqed tort by Defendant aaainst Plaint~f
and
~CE"" x INOOOE80'''''l'l')
1441, et seq.
1332, et seq.
petition of an
IN ONE BOX ONLY)
TORT~
o 3 FeGeral o-sllon
(U.s. Government Nol • Pany)
)~. D."erslty
('ndlcate Ci\lzenShip 01
Pan,es In Item 1II)
o 2 U.s. GoYemmenl
DefenDanl
28 u.s.c. Section
28 U.S.C. Section
This is a removal
V. NATURE OF SUIT (PLACE AN >:
COIITRACi I
o 1 u.s. Government
Plalnllll
Clllzen 01 Another Siale KX 0 2
Ctllzen or Subjecl ot a 0 3 0 3
Forelpn Counlry
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0330._••0E_' ..........."""", 0660 ,,--,_, 810_B151_o.co
..-., ~"I" ..-..........h §B20c.o-....... IlSD_~_ .....152 -.eo Dot_ell 83410 ...- 069001.... 830 ......., b_
-'-'"
3A!>__
l'EIlSONAl PROpERTY MO,._ B891_.0-Ibel __l
........., lA80f, SOCIAL SECURln 1SS2_._0153-., ... '-, 8350 _ .. - 837001.... _
-
.. \f........~. 35!>_...._ 37"""ht..~ 0710f____ r-~ BllUt » .... -8'60__...... -...~ 38001.... __' """ 862 _ \olOOOlIlZa ePo\~__19001_'-_ £:s&OOI__ _0.- 0720~ 863 DoWCNllOIGIl """19!> .......... _ ~.. ~ .....,. 038S __.0.- _.- 863 __", oen_..
..,....... ~..,...'" 0730~\I'"Il. 864 SSID '0.. l<Yl .......tIW'''CI
ilEAL I'RO!'fl!TY I CIVil Rllitm I PRISONE/! mmolls
_l
86!> R$.ND:ltO' 0.00_.. _
--
r-, lIP
-~210"- roo-o-_ ~''',,~ 0510__ ....._ 07"0_...- FEDflIt.t lAX sum _E_'22C1_ .11.1:2_ ..... ...' BII701... --...........230_ .....__ "~AiW • • 2IlUSC~ 0190 01.... '-- 67 _,__, 0.50,"-__•'.01.......- .4~ ......"" §530_.. e-- u.......... .-. ~USC~ ......, ....-.'AS,...__, oan-e.- ~(j ..._1.0I_ 0791 E_.~.-. oB7S~e-- 019001_.........,.0290 "'01__-,
..... . 550e-...".... _.- 12 usc >ott
-
(c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS. AND TELEPHONE NUMBER)
Hon. Phillip Bruce Leslie
McBrayer, McGinnis & Leslie
P. O. Box 347
Greenup, KY 41144-0347
(PIJ,CE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY)VI. ORIGIN
o10Yipin.!
PrOCeecling
?;~_edfrom
SI.le Court
03 RemanDed hom
ADDeliale Coun
0.11 ReinSlaled Dr
ReoDened
Transterled from
Os .nother oiSlfic:t
(speclly)
06 MultioiSlriet
Utipation
APPe.1 '0 DiSlriCI I
01 Juope 1rom
Maprslr.t.
Juopment
VII. REQUESTED IN CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT: 0 UNDER FAe.p. 23 IDEMAND S
C1Iec:k YES only II r1e"",no.t1 in _PIa"':: I
JURY DEMAND: :>:I: YES 0 NO
I
VIIL RELATED CASE(S) lSee instruclions):
IF ANY ...~
~..one
DA.TE
JUOGE .-. DOCKET NUMBER.-. II
ISIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF R~RO
__F_e_b_r_u_a_r_y_l_8_,_1_9_~6 .%f vJ1!"1
Gregory 1... Hpnget J
"..,~n !C:T6~C: n'''TDI~ "'n"..~
H-16
B-17
with the Clerk of the Greenup Circuit Court in Greenup, Kentucky, a
PLAINTIFF,
DEFENDANT.
AFFIDAVIT OF FILING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
ASHLAND DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-37
VS:
N
My
BY:-=--r--.IcI-=-";'-~---~--------Gr ory L. Monge
1416 Winchester Avenue
P. O. Box 1111
Ashland, KY 41105-1111
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
CHARLES DELAWDER,
Gregory L. Monge, being duly sworn, deposes and states that
he is one of the attorneys for the Petitioner (Defendant) in the
above-styled action: that on the 19th day of February, 1986, he filed
copy of the Petitioner's (Defendant's) Petition for Removal, together
INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL
LABORATORIES,
wi th a copy of the Bond and a copy of the original Sununons and
Complaint.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY )
(
COUNTY OF BOYD )
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Gregory L. Monge this~ day of February, 1986.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF FILING
has been served on the parties hereto by
mailing a copy of same, postage prepaid, to:
of February, 1986.
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EFENDANT
This I--l..~_
Hon. Phillip Bruce Leslie
McBrayer, McGinnis & Leslie
P. O. Box 347
Greenup, KY 41105-0347
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
r
r
r
r
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
ASHLAND DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 86- _
CHARLES DELAWDER, PLAINTIFF,
firmly and bound unto Charles Delawder in the penal sum of TWO
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That International Clinical Laboratories, Inc., is held
r
r
r
I
VS:
INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL
LABORATORIES,
BON D
DEFENDANT.
r HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($250.00) for the payment whereof well and
truly to be made unto the said Charles Delawder, binds itself, its
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
successors and assigns, jointly and severally, by these presents,
Yet upon these conditions:
That said International Clinical Laboratories, Inc., a
corporation, has filed a Petition for Removal of the cause now
pending in the Greenup Circuit Court to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Ashland Division, wherein
Charles Delawder is Plaintiff and International Clinical Laboratories
is Defendant.
Now if the Defendant, International Clinical Laboratories,
a corporation, will pay all the costs and disbursements incurred by
reason of the removal proceedings should it be determined that the
above case is not removable or improperly removed, then this
obligation shall be null and void. Otherwise it shall remain in full
force and effect and $250.00 in cash is tendered herewith to the
Clerk as bond herein.
H-19
,WITNESS the hand of the corporation by and through its duly
authorized Attorney-In-Fact.
J
INTERNATIONAL
LABORAT R S,
"
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
ASHLAND DIVISION _..-:r
CIVIL ACTION NO. 86- _':''''
CHARLES DELAWDER, PLAINTIFF,
PETITION FOR REMOVAL
DEFENDANT.
r
r
VS:
INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL
LABORATORIES,
Comes now the Petitioner, International Clinical
r
Laboratories, Inc., the only Defendant in the above-styled action,
and states as follows:
1. That on or about the 20th day of January, 1986,
being International Clinical Laboratories (International Clinical
Laboratories, Inc.).
Charles Delawder filed an action in Greenup Circuit Court, Greenup
r County, Kentucky, within the Eastern District of Kentucky, Ashland
Division, being Civil Action No. 86-CI-30, with the named Defendant
r
r
That the Plaintiff herein, Charles Delawder, is a3.
Building, Louisville, Kentucky.rI
2. That on or about January 23, 1986, service of summons
r was made on Defendant, International Clinical Laboratories, by
serving its process agent, C T Corporation System, Kentucky Home Life
r
citizen and resident of the C~ty of Ironton, the State of Ohio who
r alleges that he was damaged by the Defendant within Greenup County,
Kentucky, same being within the Eastern District of Kentucky, Ashland
r
r
Division.
4 .
Laboratories,
That
Inc. ,
the
was
Defendant,
a corporation
International Clinical
and is a corporation
\r incorporated under the laws of the State of Tennessee, with its
'principal place of business in the State of Tennessee and was not and
r
r
is not a citizen or resident of the State of Kentucky wherein this
H-21
action was brought, nor does it have its principal place of business
in the State of Kentucky, nor did it have its principal place of
business in the State of Kentucky at the time of the filing of this
action and is and was a citizen and resident of the State of
Tennessee with its principal place of business being located therein.
5. That the Petitioner further states that this action is
removable under 28 U.S.C. §1446(b) inasmuch as there- is complete
diversity of the parties herein as required by 28 U.S.C.- §1332.
6. That the Petitioner further states that this action
was, has been and is now of a civil nature; that the amount in
controversy between the Plaintiff and the Defendant herein exceeds,
exclusive of interest and costs, based upon demand by the Plaintiff,
the sum or value of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) and the
Title 28, U.S.C. §1441 in that it is a civil action wherein the
matter and controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000.00
exclusive of interest and costs and is between citizens of different
states.
..l
J
J
7. That the said ac~ion is one in which the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Ashland
Division, would have original jurisdiction under the provisions of
Title 28 U.S.C. §1332 in that said action is of (1) a civil nature,
(2) exceeds $10,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs, and (3) is a
controversy between citizens of different states.
8. That this Petition is being filed by the Petitioner
within thirty (30) days after receipt by this Petitioner of a copy of
H-22
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the Summons and Complaint, from which it was first ascertained that
the case is one which has become removable, pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§1446(b) and that the time for filing this Petition under Title 28
U.S.C. §1446 has not expired.
9. That the Petitioner files and presents herewith its
cash bond in the penal sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($250.00)
conditioned as required by the Acts of Congress on that. behalf duly
made and provided, that Petitioner will pay all costs and
disbursements incurred by reason of this removal proceeding should it
be determined that this case is not removable or is improperly
removed.
10. That promptly after the filing of this Petition and
~ond, written notice of filing of this Petition and the accompanying
Bond will be given by this Defendant to all adverse parties as
required by law and a true and correct copy of this Petition will be
filed with the Clerk of the Greenup Circuit Court of Greenup County,
Kentucky, as provided by Title 28, U.S.C. §1446. Copy of said notice
and certification of notice and filing will be annexed hereto.
11. That the Petitioner files herewith and by reference
makes a part hereof a true and correct copy of all processes,
- pleadings, and other documents which have been served upon it and a
true and correct copy of all the pleadings which have been filed in
this action according to its best information and belief.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner prays that the said Petition for
Removal and Bond be accepted by this Court and that this cause of
action be removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, Ashland Division.
H-23
Respectfully submitted,
JONES & EDWARDS
BY : .."...-....,I-4----,~,..,....f-~-_...;.-;:;.t:.--_-__
GrecgGry . Mo'nge
1416 Winchester Avenu
P. O. Box 1I11 .
Ashland, KY 41105-1111
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/PETITIONER
A F F I D A V I T
The Affiant, Gregory L. Monge, states that he is an
attorney for the Defendant, International Clinical Laboratories,
Inc., a corporation, and that the Defendant, International Clinical
Laboratories, Inc., is a Tennessee corporation with its principal
place of business in the State of Tennessee and that the Defendant,
International Clinical Laboratories, Inc., does not maintain its
principal place of business in Greenup County, Kentucky, or in any
other county in the Commonwealth. of Kentucky and that he has read the
allegations contained in the foregoing Petition for Removal and they
are true and correct as he verily b::~~~~~
COMMONh~ALTH OF KENTUCKY )
(
COUNTY OF BOYD )
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Gregory L. Monge, this
day of February, 1986.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR REMOVAL
and AFFIDAVIT has been served on the parties
hereto by mailing a copy of same, postage
prepaid, to:
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r·
Hon. Phillip Bruce Leslie
McBrayer, McGinnis & Leslie
P. O. Box 347
Greenup, KY 41144-0347
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
This 1~ day
OF C
1986.
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CHARLES DELAWDER,
VS:
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO. 86-CI-30
NOTICE OF FILING
PLAINTIFF,
j
-
J
J
INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL
LABORATORIES, DEFENDANT. 1J
The Greenup Circuit Court and the Plaintiff herein will
please take notice that on the I? day of February, 1986, the
undersigned filed a Petition for Removal to the United States J
District. Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Ashland
Division, together with true and correct copies of all pleadings ...
heretofore filed in the Greenup Circuit Court, Civil Action No.
86-CI-30.
EDWARDS
"~I<:'
----
...
.
I hereby certify that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF FILING
has been served on the parties hereto by
mailing a copy of same, postage prepaid, to:
Hon. Phillip Bruce Leslie
McBrayer, McGinnis & Leslie
P. O. Box 347
Greenup, KY 41105-0347
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
IIIIIi
This of February, 1986.
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OBSERVATIONS ON APPELLATE PRACTICE
Leonard Green, Clerk
u.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Counsel needs to keep in mind that to successfully
practice before any court, and to be able to identify and
avoid the pitfalls which await, he or she must be fully
conversant with the applicable rules and guidelines.
Just as you would not undertake a lengthy automobile
trip without consulting a roadmap throughout, you should
consult the following guides throughout your journey
through the appellate process:
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP)
Rules of the Sixth Circuit
Internal Operating Procedures of the Sixth
Circuit (lOP)
(These are collected in the Sixth Circuit
Practice Guide put out on a periodic basis
by, and available from, the Office of the
Clerk.)
The Clerk's office is always available to discuss
with counsel any unusual problems or circum-
stances arising in connection with any appeal.
I. JURISDICTION
Where the court of appeals becomes aware, whether by
motion or sua sponte, that it has not been properly vested
with jurisdiction, it cannot overlook such a failing and
must dismiss the case.
A court of appeals has a duty to consider sua
sponte whether appellate jurisdiction has been
properly invoked; F.W. Kerr Chemical Co. v.
Crandall Assoc., Inc., 815 F.2d 426, 428 (6th
Cir. 1987); Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084,
1085 (6th Cir. 1984).
I-I
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon federal
courts by consent, and the appellate court
cannot decide the merits of a case if it lacks
jurisdiction; Hinsdale v. Farmers National
Bank and Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1987).
A. Requirement of finality of the district court decision
sought to be appealed; 28 U.S.C. 1291
1. "Finality" defined; see, e.g., Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 u.s. 368,
373 (1981); Youghiogeny & Ohio Coal Co. v.
Baker, 815 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1987)
2. Finality required as of the date the notice
of appeal is filed; Gillis v. Secretary, HHS,
759 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1985)
B. Special considerations with regard to appeals from
final decisions of u.S. Magistrates; 28 U.S.C. 636; FRAP 73
1. Generally the appeal is to the district
co~rt; 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(3); FRAP 3.1
2. A petition to appeal the decision of the
district court to the court of appeals will be
granted only in cases involving important and
substantial questions of law; 28 U.S.C. 636(c)
(5); FRAP 5.1; Sixth Circuit Rule 29; Penland
v. Warren County Jail, 759 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.
1985) (en banc)
C. Mootness; cases may become moot pending appeal if the
requested relief has been granted, or if no live contro-
versy remains; Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 u.S.
92 (1979).
1. Moot issues will not be decided by the court;
Ahmed v. University of Toledo; 822 F.2d 26 (6th
Cir. 1987)
2. Upon determining that the appeal is moot, the
case is remanded to the district court so that it
may vacate its decision; Great Western Sugar Co.,
supra.
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D. Review of non-final orders of district courts is allowed
in particular circumstances.
1. Orders granting, denying, or modifying in-
junctions; 28 U.S.C. l292(a)
2. Certification pursuant to FRAP 54(b); cer-
tificate must issue prior to the filing of the
notice of appeal, Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott
& Co., 568 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1978)
3. Grant by court of appeals of permission to
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. l292(b), FRAP 5(a)
4. Collateral order doctrine; Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541 (1949)
E. Timeliness of Notice of Appeal; FRAP 4
1. Time for filing notice runs from date of entry
of judgment, not receipt. FRAP 26(b) specifically
prohibits the court of appeals from enlarging the
time for filing a notice of appeal. u.s. v. Willis,
804 F.2d 961, 963 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); Center for
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 781 F.2d 935, 938-39
(D.C. Cir. 1986)
2. Compliance with the timeliness requirement of
Rule 4(a) is a mandatory and jurisdictional pre-
requisite which the court of appeals can neither
waive nor extend; Browder v. Director, Department
of Corrections, 434 u.s. 257 (1978)
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
You cannot successfully prosecute or defend against an
appeal unless you understand the scope of the review required
of the appellate court:
- de novo
- clearly erroneous
- abuse of discretion
1-3
III. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
A. Because the court of appeals' review is necessarily
based on the record developed during the district court
proceedings, counsel must see to it that the record does in
fact contain all of the pleadings, exhibits, and other
documents whose filing is reflected on the district court's
docket sheet.
1. If it doesn't, a motion to supplement the record
can be brought before the district court in the first
instance, even though jurisdiction has been transferred
to the court of appeals; FRAP 10(e)
B. Where the record on appeal is to include transcript
of trial proceedings, that transcript must be ordered and
appropriate financial arrangements made within 10 days of
the filing of the notice of appeal FRAP 10(b), sixth Circuit
Rule 13.
1. Each district has its own coordinator of court
reporters, as does the court of appeals, to whom
counsel can look for help or direction with regard
to transcript problems
C. Exhibits
IV. MOTIONS PRACTICE (See generally lOP 19)
A. Motions to dismiss should be limited to juris-
dictional grounds; motions to affirm are disallowed; Sixth
Circuit Rule 8
B. Emergency motions; the court has mechanisms in
place to ensure that time-sensitive and other urgent matters
can be resolved by a judge or panel in a timely fashion.
Advance notice to the clerk's office of impending emergency
activity is helpful, as is service of motion papers on
opposing counsel by the fastest possible method
1. Argument on motions is most unlikely, so the
movant has the additional burden of presenting to
the court papers which are complete and persuasive
1-4
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
•I
~
r
r
,..
,
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
r
,..
I
r
V. THE BRIEF AND JOINT APPENDIX
A. These are governed generally by Sixth Circuit
Rules 10 and 11
B. Clerk's office will issue briefing schedule giving
counsel dates certain for filing of these papers, as well
as any special direction which might be appropriate in the
circumstances
1. Pay close attention to the deadlines; the court
requires strict adherence to them, and will extend
deadlines only where there has been a showing of
exceptional need
2. Likewise, counsel should pay close attention
to the page limitations and other requirements of
FRAP 28
a. Requests for variation from the pre-
scribed mode, e.g., the joinder of several
c:cmmon parties in a brief to exceed the
page limits, should be presented to the
court as early as possible
C. Sixth Circuit Rule 11 (joint appendix) requires
counsel's careful attention
D. The court has directed that improper or untimely
briefs or joint appendices not be accepted for filing
VI . ORAL ARGUMENT
A. The court currently schedules 1400-1450 cases per
year for oral argument, reflecting its continuing commitment
to oral argument as an integral part of the appellate process
B. Each sitting day sees five cases scheduled for
argument to a panel with each side in each case generally
allotted 15 minutes
C. By the time a case comes on for argument the court
has read and considered the briefs and reviewed the record;
it is fully conversant with the case, and is looking for
counsel to concentrate at argument on those issues central
to its decision of the matter
D. See sixth Circuit Rule 19 concerning decisions
from the bench
1-5
VII. POST-JUDGMENT CONCERNS
A. Issuance of the mandate, FRAP 4l{a), and stay of
mandate pending application for certiorari, FRAP 4l{b);
see lOP 15
B. Petitions for rehearing, with or without a
suggestion for rehearing en banc, are not a prerequisite
for seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court
VIII. CRIMINAL APPEALS
A. Sixth Circuit Rule 12 reflects the court's interest
in maintaining continuity of representation in criminal
appeals
B. lOP 32 explains the court's policy regarding the
handling of sentence guideline appeals
1-6
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SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
Honorable Thomas D. Lambros
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DB SUMMARY JURY TRIAL:
AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OP RESOLVING DISPUTES
BY
JUDGE THOMAS D. LAMBROS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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I. OVERVIEW
\
The evidentiary and procedural rules governing
summary jury trial are few and flexible. Nevertheless,
to achieve the goal of facilitating settlement, the
summary jury trial is conducted in open court with
appropriate formalities, and clients and other key
decision makers with settlement authority are required
to attend. The lawyers are expected to have their case
in a state of trial readiness and to present to the jury
the best possible summation of their claims. The
procedure is normally concluded in a half-day and rarely
lasts longer than a full day. This article will
discuss, in a general way, the types of cases which are
good candidates for summary jury tr ial, how such cases
should be managed before, during, and after the
procedure, and how the process should be used to
precipitate equitable settlements.
II. CASE SELECTION CRITERIA
The summary jury trial is intended primarily for
cases that will not settle using more traditional
methods. This should be most obvious to the judge in
the matter when he or she has conducted one or more pre-
trial conferences and finds that the parties are failing
to reach a settlement of the case for any of the
following reasons:
J - 1
1. There is a substantial difference of opinion
among the lawyers as to the jury's evaluation of
unliquidated damages such as Rpain and suffering: R .J
2. There is an irreconcilable difference of
opinion over the jury's expected perception of the
application of the facts to such hard-to-define legal
concepts as Rreasonableness· and ·ordinary care;R
j
.J
3. One or more of the parties (or their
counsel) appears to have an unrealistic view of the
mer its of the case when confronted wi th a reasonable
presentation of the arguments being made by the
opponent;
•J
4. One or more of the parties is reluctant to J
reach any settlement agreement because of their desire
to have a Rday in court· and to have the case evaluated
only expected to require a day or two to try, there is
by an impartial jury.
The decision to use summary jury trial rarely
turns on the substantive legal aspects of a case, but
rather depends upon the dynamics of the controversy.
Summary jury tr ial has been used in a wide range of
cases from relatively simple negligence and contract
actions to complex mass tort and antitrust cases. Many
lawyers and some judges might shy away from assigning a
complex case to su~nary jury trial; it is, however, the
complex case that is most suitable for this alternative
method of dispute resolution. Obviously, if a case is
J
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li ttle advantage in conducting a summary jury tr ial --
the litigants and the court might as well simply try the
case. Although there may be some grounds to suggest
that a highly technical case is difficult for a jury to
resolve, those factors apply as much to a standard trial
as they do to the summary jury process. At least in the
summary jury process the jurors will have the entire
fact situation presented to them in a period of time
during which they can fo~us their full attention on the
case, rather than spread it out over weeks or months
when key facts can be forgotten. This has been borne
out in actual summary jury trial situations where
complex ant i trust cases have been effectively presented
(and resolved) through the summary jury trial process.
Thus, the court should generally assume that the longer
the trial, the greater the potential value of the
summary jury proceeding.
The psychological effect of "court coom combat"
is important with regard to litigants who are either too
stubborn to see their opponent' s point of view, or who
feel that settlement would be an admission of weakness
and would prefer to have their "day in court". Any
trial, however long or short, exacts some sacrifice or
penalty from the litigants in the form of financial
costs and emotional stress. Some li tigants have the
ability to handle that stress, others do not. The
J - 3
Isummary jury trial provides a forum in which the
litigant can get a taste of the trial ahead and thereby
more logically evaluate its position.
Effective pre-trial conferencing is the best
method for determining the sui tabi li ty of a case for
summary jury trial. The give and take between the
parties at such a conference provides the judge with the
soundest basis for assessing whether summary jury trial
is in order. Ideally, after discussing the possibili ty
of a summary jury trial during the pre-trial conference,
the parties will decide that use of summary jury trial
is in their best interest. Such acceptance is desirable
because it heightens the chances that the parties will
accept the result of the summary jury trial and settle
their case.
It is to be anticipated that certain parties will
not readily consent to the use of summary jury trial.
Whenever a judge initiates a procedure with which
attorneys are unfamiliar, objections from counsel are to
be expected. When proposing the use of summary jury
trial, a judge should, of course, be receptive to any
objections counsel may raise and should determine
whether the objections are well taken in light of the
circumstances of the case. However, if these objections
are without merit the judge should not hesitate to
direct the parties to proceed to summary jury trial.
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The bench and bar now recognize that the
settlement process generally and alternative methods of
dispute resolution specifically are integral components
of the litigation process. In 1984 the Judicial
Conference of the United States expressed this
perspecti ve by adopting a resolution favor ing the
experimental use of summary jury trial in potentially
lengthy civil jury trial cases. The importance of the
settlement process and the use of alternative methods of
dispute resolution including 'summary jury trial has also
been noted by Chief Justice Burger in his 1983 and 1984
Year End Reports on the Judiciary and by federal and
state judges throughout the United States.
Beyond the force of public and professional
acceptance, a judge may find authority for directing
parties to participate in summary jury trial in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as similar
rules in effect in state courts. Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure addresses pretrial conferences,
as well as other case management devices, and
contemplates the use of alternative methods of dispute
resolution. Under Rule 16 (b) (5) a district court may
adopt a local rule specifically authorizing a judge to
order parties to participate in summary jury trials.
Even in the absence of such a local rule, an individual
judge may find authority for assigning a case to SJT
J - 5
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ei ther in the broad pretr ial management provisions of J
Rule 16 or in the mandate of Rule 1 that the rules be
applied -to secure the just, speedy. and inexpensive
determination of every case.- Finally, an individual
jUdge may draw on his or her inherent authority to
•
manage the docket. The settlement process has become a J
core element of the judicial process. Federal and state
judges are vested both explicitly and implicitly with
the power to manage their dockets with a view toward
achieving settlements through the use of alternatives
such as summary jury trial.
III. THE FINAL PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
The decision regarding whether a case should be
sent to summary jury trial is normally made at the final
pre-trial conference. After the assignment decision is
J
,
J
J
J
J
made, the judge determines whether the house-keeping
~
details of a summary jury trial can be disposed of J
during that pre-trial conference or whether the case
requires one additional pre-trial conference so that it
may be placed in a state of complete readiness for J
conference preceding the summary jury trial. The jud9~
should determine that discovery has been bubstantially
All motions relating to the mer its of the
summary jury trial.
Certain matters must
completed.
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case should be resolved so that parties understand
exactly how they will have to present their case at
trial, and can shape their summary jury trial
presentation to parallel most closely the presentation
they expect to make at the time of trial.
The judge should also take time at the pre-tr; ~·a1
conference to set the limits for evidentiary
presentation at the summary jury trial proceeding. The
judge should hear objections to the use of certain
evidence and consider motions in limine. In general,
the conference should be used by the judge to elicit
problem areas concerning the materials that may be
presented or opinions that may be expressed. The judge
should not hesitate to make rulings on these motions and
to inform counsel as to what lines of summarization will
be permitted and what areas will be excluded. As a
result of such conferencing, the actual presentations by
counsel during the summary jury trial are likely to flow
without interruption.
Additionally, the judge and counsel should engage
in a dialogue on summary jury trial technique. For
those attorneys who are new to the procedure, it is
worthwhile for the judge to explain the process in some
detail and to view examples of techniques that attorneys
have previously used effectively. It may be useful to
distribute a written explanation of the process as a
J - 7
means of introducing the attorneys and their clients to
the procedure.
The conference before the summary jury trial also
provides an opportunity for intensive traditional,
settlement negotiations. The imminence of a summary
jury trial brings to bear on the parties the same type
of concerns experienced just prior to civil jury trial.
The judge should remind the parties that their
settlement positions will be unalterably affected by the
advisory jury's verdict because their demands will
thereafter always be contrasted to the ultimate
evaluation of the jury.
IV. FINAL PREPARATION
The day of the summary jury trial begins with the
arrival of prospective jurors at the jury commissioner's
office. If another judge is commencing a jury trial on
the same day, the jurors who are called for that
proceeding but not actually empanelled may be used in
the summary jury trial. To expedite selection of the
summary jury, the jury commissioner provides the
prospective jurors with a questionnaire that normally
elicits the following information:
1. Juror's name and occupation,
2. Juror's marital status,
3. Juror's spouse's name and occupation,
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6. Juror's prejudicial attitudes peculiar to
the case at hand.
Aft~r the juror profile forms have been completed,
copies are made and distr ibuted to the presiding
r
r
r
r
r
4.
s.
Names and ages of juror's children;
Juror's prior knowledge of the parties,
counsel, or facts of the case; and
quickly with their challenges.
In certain cases involving complex issues or
numerous parties, a more developed inquiry is made of
prospective jurors give the judge and counsel an
introduction to the panel and prepare them to proceed
easilyis
asbestos-related
who
The responses of the
involving
Shortcake,"
Examples of these cases are the
litigation
"Strawberry
tort
judicial officer and counsel.
the potential jurors.
mass
diseases, antitrust and patent litigation, and other
cases of national public interest. One such example is
a copyright infringement claim involving the fictional
character
r
r
r
r
r
r
r,
immediately for cause those jurors who otherwise would
have to appear on the day of the summary jury trial and
efficient to formulate and provide a comprehensive juror
profile questionnaire to the potential jurors well in
advance of the date of the su~nary jury trial. When the
questionnaires have been completed, they are made
available to counsel to enable them to elirninatp.
r
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r
r
r
recognized by millions. In these cases it is far more
r
then be excused. Such advanced exercise of challenges
r J - 9
for cause translates into several additional
efficiencies including: reducing government costs
associated wi th jury selection; facili tating selection
of a well-qualified and impartial jury; and helping
counsel to be well prepared for peremptory challenges.
The sum total of these economies is an expedited jury
selection process that is in keeping with the
abbreviated nature of summary jury trial.
While the potential jurors are completing their
questionnaires, the presiding judicial officer meets
with counsel. This meeting gives the court and the
parties an opportunity to review the case in an
environment that is very similar to that existing just
prior to a regular civil jury trial. The same factors
that often cause settlement of cases immediately prior
to a regular trial will often produce a settlement prior
to the summary jury trial proceeding.
In order for the meeting to be of benefit, it is
important for counsel to have their cases in a state of
complete trial readiness. Each party should be required
to file a trial memorandum, proposed voir dire
questions, and proposed jury. instructions. If an
extensive presentation is anticipated, the court may
also require the parties to submit exhibit lists and
lists of witnesses whose testimony will be summarized
J - 10
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during the proceeding. During this meeting, counsel are
required to present all procedural and evidentiary
questions which foreseeably will arise during the course
of the summary jury tr ial. Resolution of these
questions during this meeting minimizes the need for
objections during the actual summary jury trial and thus
contributes to the flowing character of the proceeding.
Although some may object that the preparation for
summary jury tr ial approaches that kind of preparation
necessary for the tr ial itself, it must be remembered
that the summary jury trial process is only intended for
cases that have not been settled through other, more
tradi tional, means. The li tigants should be reminded
that the preparation time and expense for the summary
jury tr ial is not "wasted" as it is the same type of
preparation necessary to prepare for tr ial. It should
be explained to the parties that they benefit
economically from the proceeding in two ways: first, if
the matter settles, they avoid the substantial expense
of paying their attorney (and expert witnesses) to
appear at a lengthy trial proceeding; second, they save
whatever economic and emotional loss they would suffer
from having to attend the full trial proceeding. The
court should also explain the substantial saving of time
and costs to the jUdicial system as a whole.
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v. SUMMARY JURY TRIAL FORMAT
The format of a summary jury trial is very
similar to that of a traditional civil jury trial. A
judge or mag istrate presides over the court, which is
formally brought to order. Attendance of the parties
with complete settlement authority is required.
It is best if the jUdge who will try the case
conducts the summary jury trial since he or she has the
greatest understanding of the issues presented by the
case, the strengths and weaknesses of each party's
position, and will be conducting the post-proceeding
settlement discussions. In such discussions, the jUdge
may well want to engage the parties in an open and frank
discussion of the evidence that was summarized during
the summary jury trial. This can best be achieved if
the judge can draw upon the knowledge he or she gleaned
from presiding over the summary jury trial. The outcome
of a subsequent trial probably will not be affected by
the participation of the judge who presided over the
summary jury trial; the jury, of course, remains the
ultimate trier of fact. Indeed, the quality of a
subsequent binding trial may be improved because,
through participating in the SJT, the judge wi 11 have
become familiar with the evidentiary issues posed by the
case.
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As an alternative, the jUdge may decide to assign
a summary jury trial to a magistrate or another
qualified judicial officer, thereby freeing the judge to
conduct traditional trials. This procedure can also be
very effective, but i. t is important that the judge and
the magistrate communicate in detail about the case
prior to the time that the magistrate assumes
responsibility for the proceeding. The magistrate
should have an intimate understanding of the settlement
posi tions of the parties and the nature of the case he
is about to hear. If a magistrate actually conducts the
summary jury tr ial, it is recommended that he or she
participate with the judge in the post-summary jury
trial proceedings.
The judge opens the summary jury trial with a few
introductory remarks in \lthich he or she introduces the
tri~l participants and explains briefly what the case is
about. The judge then explains the summary jury trial
procedure to the jury. The judge normally states that
the lawyers have reviewed all of the relevant materials
and interviewed all of the witnesses and now have been
asked to condense all of the evidence and present it to
the jury in a narrative form. They are also told that
the attorneys will be permitted to sUlDlnarize both the
• evidence and legal arguments in support of their
respective positions.
J - 13
The prospective jurors are advised that at the
conclusion of the case they will be instructed on the
applicable law and the use of the verdict form. They
are further instructed to consider the case just as
seriously as they would if the case were presented to
them in the conventional manner and that their verdict
must be a true verdict based on the evidence. They are
further told that the proceeding will be completed in a
single day and that their verdict will aid and assist
the parties in resolving their dispute. ~othing more is
said about the non-binding nature of the summary jury
trial; nothing more need be said. Although the jurors
are not misled to believe that the proceeding is
equivalent to a binding jury trial, the nonbinding
character of the proceeding is not emphasized. By
adopting this balance the judge can candidly explain the
procedure without minimizing the juror~'
responsibilities.
Following the judge's introduction of the case to
the prospective jurors, the judge conducts a brief voir
dire generally posing questions to the jury
collectively. This process is expedited through the use
of the completed juror profile forms. The judge may
make additional inquiries of the jury based on voir dire
questions proposed by the attorneys. Counsel are
normally permitted to exercise challenges for cause as
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broken down so that plaintiff devotes approximately 45
minutes to its case in chief, followed by the defense
well as peremptory challenges, although the number of
challenges should be limited, and counsel should be
trial process, form should not be allowed to overcome
substance. The judge must be especially sensitive to a
The total
This period is usuallyeach for the presentations.
their respective rebuttal and surrebuttal.
being given a similar period for its main presentation.
A 15 minute period may then be given to the parties for
encouraged to accept the jurors as they find them, since
prolonged voir di re will defeat the goal of conducting
the summary jury trial efficiently.
Jury selection is followed by the presentations
of counsel. Although the goal of expedited presentation
is always kept in mind, the length and format of the
proceeding may be adjusted to accommodate the particular
needs of the case. Counsel are usually given one hour
time of the proceeding may be extended if the case
involves particularly complex issues or more than two
parties. It is recommended that each side give the jury
a three-to-five minute overview of its case before the
formal presentations. This will give the jury a "fix"
on the whole case, obviating the need to wait a full
hour before learning about the defense.
As with all other aspects of the sum,nary jury
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necessarily extend beyond technical questions of whether
the summary by counsel of the evidence is accurate, to
questions such as whether the jury is being given a
fairly accurate sense of the weight of the evidence. .J
common-sense notion of fairness. This concept must J
For example, if plaintiff can support a crucial fact in
his case only through the rather questionable testimony
of one witness, while the defendant can present five
independent wi tnesses to confirm the opposi te, counsel
for the plaintiff should not be able to speak of that
J
J
I.
J
fact as proof beyond refutation. Lawyers should also be
reminded by the court of Disciplinary Rule 7-106
regarding trial conduct, in particular that portion of !
..
the disciplinary rule that forbids a lawyer from
asserting his or her personal knowledge of the facts in J
issue or his or her personal opinion as to the justness
of a cause or the credibility of a witness. It is true
that the effectiveness of the trial attorney as an
I
..Ii
advocate will have a marked effect upon the results of
the summary jury proceeding; this is no less true, J
however, at the time of trial and is a factor that each
party should be weighing in evaluating the settlement
value of the case.
:1
J
In making their presentations to the jury,
counsel are limited to representations based on evidence J
that would be admissible at trial. Although counsel are
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permi tted to mingle representations of fact wi th legal
arguments, considerations of responsibility and
restraint must be observed. Counsel may only make
factual representations supportable by reference to
discovery mater ials. These mater ials include
depositions, stipulations, signed statements of
witnesses, and answers to interrogatories or requests
for admissions. Additionally, an attorney may make
representations based on his assurance that he has
personally spoken wi th a wi tness and is repeating what
that wi tness sta ted. Discovery mater ials may be read
aloud but not at undue length. Counsel may submit these
mdterials in full to the jury for consideration during
deliberations. Each juror is provided a note pad and is
permitted to take notes.
Physical evidence, including documents, may be
exhibi ted dur ing a presentation and submi tted for the
jury's examination during deliberations. These exhibits
may be marked for identification, but are returned to
the appropriate party at the end of the proceeding.
By virtue of the nature of the summary jury
trial, objections during the proceeding are not
encouraged. However, in the event counsel overstep the
bounds of propriety as to a material aspect of the case,
an objection will be received and, if well taken, will
be sustained and the jury instructed appropriately.
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At the conclusion of the summary jury trial
presentations, the jury is given an abbreviated charge
dealing primarily with the applicable substantive law
and, to a lesser extent, with such boilerplate concepts
as burden of proof and credibility. The jury is
normally given a verdict form containing specific
interrogatories, a general inquiry as to liability, and
an inquiry as to the plaintiff's damages. The jurors
are encouraged to return a unanimous verdict and are
gi ven ample time to reach such a consensus. However,
if, after diligent effort, they are unable to return an
unanimous verdict, each juror should be given a verdict
form and should be instructed to return a separate
verdict. These separate views will be of value to the
lawyers in exploring settlement.
Once the jury has been excused to deliberate, the
court may engage the parties in settlement negotiations.
These negotiations have a special sense of urgency in
that they are conducted in the shadow of an imminent
verdict. The negotiations are informed by the
perspective gained through observation of the summary
jury trial.
When the jurors complete their deliberations, the
court receives their unanimous verdict or individual
verdicts. At this time, the jUdge, counsel, the
parties, and the jurors engage in a dialogue unique to
J - 18
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VI. THE FLEXIBLE NATURE OF
SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
broad range of questions ranging from the general reason
for the decis ion to their perceptions of each party's
presentation. Counsel may also inquire of the jurors
both as to their perspecti ve on the mer i ts of the case
and their responses to the style of the attorneys'
presentations. This dialogue affords an opportuni ty to
gain an in-depth understanding of the strengths and
weaknesses of the parties' respecti ve posi tions. The
dialogue may serve as a springboard for meaningful
settlement negotiations.
Summary jury trial is designed to accommodate the
needs and styles of its var ious users. Judges and
lawyers should not hesi tate to modify the procedure as
they see fit to meet the demands of the cases before
them. The following alternatives are presented only by
way of example:
1. The judge may permi t certai n key wi tnesses
to testify in an abbreviated form, especially when a
case turns upon the credibility of a witness's testimony
on one or two key facts.
2. The summary jury trial might be converted
into a ·summary bench trial" conducted in front of a
jUdge other than the one assigned to the case who serves
r
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summary jury trial. The court may ask the jurors a
r J - 19
as an independent sounding board for the posi tions of
the party.
3. The parties may agree to conduct the summary
jury trial at a very early stage of the proceedings,
especially when most of the facts are not in dispute and
the only real issue hindering settlement is the jury
question of the amount of damages to be awarded. To
facilitate an early sU~Dary jury trial, each side should
embark on an agreeable accelerated and condensed
discovery format wi th a view to placing the ca~e in a
posture for a SJT wi thin 60 to 90 days after fi ling.
Naturally, this will require voluntary production ot
documents and cooperation among counsel in the
scheduling of adversarial witness interviews rather than
the taking of lengthy and costly conventional
depositions.
4. A litigant may use a videotape presentation
as an effe-::ti ve means of summar i zi ng a c.:lse and
affording the jury a view of the actual witnesses and
evidence involved. In a case before Judge Lee R. West
of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, an attorney prepared a video tape
for viewing by a summary jury in lieu of a live
presentation. The film provided an overview of all
aspects of the plaintiff's case in a personal injury
action. It included an animated reconstruction of the
J - 20
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accident scene, pictures showing the plaintiff's
injuries and their effect on his everyday life, and
pictures of each of the plaintiff's lay and expert
witnesses with summarizations of their probable
testimony dubbed in by plaintiff's lawyer.
S. Agreement to a binding result, or a binding
result within a certain range; i.e., establishing a
high-low range within which the case shall settle.
6. Judge Richard A. Enslen of the United States
District Court in Western Michigan, Judge Lee R. West of
the United States District Court in Western Oklahoma and
I have exchanged views and have cooperatively adapted
the concept of SJT. .Each of us has developed a var iety
of techniques to conform to the advocacy patterns ot our
respective districts. Several other federal and state
judges also have used the process successfully, each
contributing a procedural nuance applicable to the
particular requirements of a case.
VII. THE POST-SUMMARY JURY TRIAL CONFERENCE
In some cases settlement is achieved dur ing or
immediately after the summary jury trial. Usually,
however, several days to a month may be required for the
parties to assess and evaluate the summary jury trial
verdict. In such cases, post-summary jury trial
conferencing should be conducted among the judge and
J - 21
lawyers up to the time for trial. This will keep
set tlement a top pr ior i ty item and prevent the summary
jury trial experience from becoming stale. It is
important that trial not be scheduled too closely upon
the heels of the summary jury trial proceeding so as to
cut short this process of assessment and negotiation.
At the post-summary jury trial conference, the
subje:tive evaluations of the attorneys are no longer
the primary focus of the discussions. Rather, the court
should focus the parties upon the reality of the summary
jury trial verdict and the perception of the cases
indicated by the advisory jurors. It need hardly be
said that the court can very effectively focus the
parties' attention upon the probability that another
jury would render a verdict similar to that of the
advisory jury if the case were to go to trial.
If settlement is not achieved during the post-
summary jury tr ial conference, the case is pr09rdlnmed
for a civil jury tr ial. The jury tc ial is normally
scheduled to occur wi thin one month after the summary
jury trial but may be continued if meaningful settlement
negotiations are ongoing.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Summary jury trial is intended to foster
settlements by providing li tigants wi th a forecast of
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rprovide a tool for advancing our tradi tional system by
relieving it of the unnecessary costs and burdens
trial is cO"lsLc;tent with the traditional objective of
the American adversary system of providing individuals
with a fair, equitable, and inexpensive means of
involved in using civil jury trials
r
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r
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civil jury trial verdicts.
resolving thei r dispu tes.
The use of summary jury
Summary jury trial may even
to resolve
stated,
approach was supported by the Judicial Conference of the
United States in 1984 when it resolved,
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger echoed this viewpoint in
his 1984 Year-End Report of the Judiciary, when he
The Judicial Conference endorses the experimental
use of summary jury trials as a potentially
effective means of promoting the fair and
equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil
cases.
far
new
Summary jury trials •• are becoming
increasingly useful as judges acrr,)ss the country
adapt these approaches to achieve their goals.
In the summary jury trial, attorneys present
abbreviated arguments to jurors who render an
informal verdict that guides settlement of the
cases. Judge Thomas Lambros (N .D. Ohio), who
developed a workable summary jury trial
procedure, reports that virtually all of more
than 100 suits handled through this method have
been concluded without the need of a tull trial.
The Judicial Conference in 1984 end~rsed the
experimental use of summary jury trials "as a
potentially effective means of promoting the fair
and equitable settlement of potentially lengthy
civil jury cases.· • • • These judicial pioneer!::»
controversies that can be settled justly through
less expensi ve and time-consuming procedures. This
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
J - 23
should be commended for their innovated programs.
We need more of them to deal with the future.
Th is ar ticle is intended to assist judges,
lawyers, and Ii tigants in implementing the summary jury
tr ial procedure. It is hoped that summary jury trial J
will aid these individuals in resolving disputes and in
some measure reduce the burdens on the adversary system.
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HANDBOOK AND RULES
OF THE COURT
FOR SUMMARY JURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
BY
THOMAS D. LAMBROS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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HANDBOOK AND RULES
OF '!'BE COURT
POR SUMMARY JURY TRIAL PROCBEDINGS
IN'l'RODUC'l'ION
There is a certain class of cases in which the only
bar to settlement among parties is the difference in
opinion of how a jury will perceive evidence adduced at
The third important element of pretrial hearings is
arriving at settlements. This possibility should be
explored in every instance. While the pretr ialjudge may not, and should not, exert pressure to
induce litigants to settle their cases, he can
properly perform the function of a mediatQr or
conciliator, and thereby in many instances assist in
leading the parties to an agreement. [Report of the
Cornrni ttee on Pretr ial Procedure to the Judicial
Conference for the District of Columbia. 4
F.R.Serv., L.R. 47, p. 1015.]
r
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r trial. These cases involve issues, like that of "the
these cases, settlement negotiations must often involve
reasonable man" in negligence litigation, where no amount
of jur isprudential ref inement and clar ification of the
More often than not, however, this compar ison of
past trial experience is in vain, and even an agreement
on the facts and summary judgment on the issue of
liability results only in a slightly shorter trial on the
Inapplicable law can aid in resolution of the case.
an analysis of similar jury trials within the experience
of counsel and the tr ial judge as to the findings of
liability and damage. In this way, parties grope toward
some notion of a likely award figure upon which to base
and begin their negotiations.
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issue of damages. For many years I felt frustration over
the need for trial in such cases where both sides wished
to avoid litigation, were willing to consider reasonable
settlement, and would negotiate in good faith if only
some sense of the lay perception of the case could be
J
J
1
J
attained. I suspected in this regard, counsels' legal
training was a disadvantage because knowledge of the law
precluded an ability to see a case as would a jury.
In this type of case, I afford counsel the
opportuni ty to sound a lay jury on its perception of
liability and damage without affecting the parties'
rights to a full trial on the merits and without a large
J
investment of time or money. The Summary Jury Tr ial
provides a "no-risk" method by which counsel obtain the
perception of six jurors on the merits of their case in
the course of a half-day proceeding, thereby giving
parties a reliable basis upon which to build a just and
acceptable settlement.
This proceeding does not affect the parties' rights
to a full trial de novo on the merits. If one or both
parties feel the result of the jurors' deliberations is
grossly inequitable, the right to proceed to a full trial
is in no way prejudiced. Numerous attorneys have readily
recognized the value of the proceeding as a predictive
tool and have utilized it to obtain just results for
their clients at minimum expense.
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II. BRIEP DESCRIPTION OP THE PROCEEDING.
Stated most simply, a Summary Jury Trial consists of
counsels' presentations of their views of the case to a
jury and the jury's subsequent decision based on the
presentations. It is an amalgam of opening and closing
arguments with an overview of the expected trial proofs.
No testimony is taken from sworn witnesses. Counsel may
restate the anticipated testimony of trial witnesses and
are free to adduce exhibits for the jury. Because of the
non-binding nature of the proceedings, evidentiary and
procedural rules are few and flexible. Tactical
maneuvering is kept to a minimum.
The Summary Jury Trial proceeding itself is normally
concluded in a half day, and will rarely last longer than
a full day. The proceeding is presided over by either
the judge or a magistrate upon assignment by the judge.
In order for any real benefit to be derived from the
procedure, it is essential that counsel have their case
in a sta te of tr ial readiness when called for Summary
Jury Trial. Therefore, a pretrial conference is normally
held ,shortly beforehand, particularly in those cases
assigned to a magistrate. In all cases, unless excused
by order of court, counsel are expected to submit
requests for jury instructions and a memorandum of law on
any novel issues presented by the case no later than
three working days before the trial date.
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motion to excuse such attendance.
alternates being unnecessary.
will work a hardship, leave must be sought by way of
At the Summary Jury Trial attendance by the client
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If appearance
If a plaintiff ·sandbags" the
or a client representative is expected.
4. names and ages of juror's children.
5. previous knowledge of the juror of any parties,
counselor the nature of the case.
6. any prejudicial attitudes of the juror to the
nature of the action.
A jury venire of a sufficient number to provide a
jury of six is called. Counsel are provided with a short
profile of each juror that states
1. juror's name and occupation.
2. juror's marital status.
3. juror's spouse's name and occupation.
The judge or magistrate interrogates the full panel.
Counsel are permitted to exercise challenges - in a two-
party action two apiece, wi th adjustment in case of
multiple plaintiffs or defendants. The first six jurors
seated after the challenges constitutes the panel,
Counsel are usually given one hour each for their
presentations, although adjustments that may extend the
total beyond two hours are made in multiple-party cases.
Plaintiffs are permi tted to reserve a limi ted time for
rebuttal, and it is expected that such time will be used
for true rebuttal.
defendant by holding back on a critical element of the
case, the defendant can be granted response time.
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In making their statements to the jury, counsel are
limited to representations as to evidence that would be
admissible at trial. While counsel are permitted to
mingle representations of fact with legal argument,
considerations of responsibili ty and restraint must be
observed. Counsel may only present factual
representations supportable by reference to discovery
materials, including depositions, stipulations, signed
statements of wi tnesses, or other documents, or by a
professional representation that counsel personally
spoke with the witness and is repeating what the witness
stated. Statements, reports, and depositions may be read
from, but not at undue length.
Physical evidence, including documents, may be
exhibited during a presentation and submitted for the
jury's consideration during deliberations. Such
exhibits are not marked, and at the end of the hearing
are returned to the party tendering them.
By virtue of the nature of Summary Jury Trial,
objections are not encouraged. However, in the event
counsel overstep the bounds of propriety as to a material
aspect of the case, an objection will be received and, if
well-taken, the jury admonished.
At the conclusion of the presentations the jury is
given an abbreviated charge, and retires for its
deliberat·ions. The jury is encouraged to return a
unanimous verdict, and given ample time to reach such an
J - 31
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generally not recorded.
attendance of a court
agreement. If, however, the jurors are unable to reach a
consensus, they are asked to return a special verdict,
anonymously listing individual perceptions of liability
and damages. The special verd!ct has proved invaluable
in affording counsel insights as to lay perceptions of
the case and in suggesting an equitable basis for
settlement.
A Summary Jury Tr ial is
Counsel may arrange for the
reporter if they wish.
If the action is not resolved by counsel at or
immediately following the proceeding, a pretrial is held
shortly thereafter to discuss settlement. It is
anticipated that cases not disposed of through Summary
Jury Trial will be called for trial on the merits within
30 to 60 days of the summary hearing.
This outline of procedures is reflected in an order
transmitted herewith, which controls this action for
purposes of all Summary Jury Trial proceedings.
I I I • BASIS OF THE PROCEDURE.
Remembering that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are to be construed "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,"
Fed. R. eiv. P. 1, this procedure is within a district
court' s pretr ial powers under Rule 16 (6) and inherent
power to control its docket. Furthermore, the proposed
amendments to Rule 16 focus on the widespread feeling
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r(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of
Admittedly, that Rule provides for an advisory jury only
• •
the advisory jury.
that modification of the existing rule is necessary to
encourage pretr ia1 management that meets the needs of
modern litigation. Proposed Rule l6(c) (7) provides that
-the participants at any pretrial conference under this
rule may consider and take action with respect to •
extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute. - The
Advisory Committee Notes, which elaborate on this
concept, state in pertinent part:
Since it obviously eases crowded court dockets and
results in savings to the litigants and the judicial
system, settlement should be facilitated at as early
a stage of the litigation as possible. Although it
is not the purpose of Rule 16[c] (7) to impose
settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants, it
is believed that providing a neutral forum for
discussing the subject might foster it. See Moore's
Federal Practice ,16.17: 6 Wright' Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil ,1522 (1969). For
instance, a judge to whom a case has been assigned
may arrange, on his own motion or at a party's
request, to have settlement conferences handled by
another member of the court or by a magistrate.
The concept of the Summary Jury Trial is also
analogous to Rule 39 (c)
r
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peculiar expertise in a situation where that expertise is
vi tal but not provided for by present civil procedure
practice.
purpose behind the Rule, however, is to give the court
and the parties the· opportuni ty to utili ze a jury's
particular expertise and perceptions when a case demands
those special abilities. In the summary trial, the court
is similarly calling upon jurors to provide their
The clearin cases not tr iable as of right by jury.r
I
r
r
r
r
r
In this District, specific provision has been made
for the Summary Jury Trial in Local Civil Rule 17.02,
adopted January 12, 1983. That rule provides:
The Judge may, in his or her discretion, set any
appropriate civil cases tor Summary Jury Trial or
other alternative method of dispute resolution, as
he or she may choose.
Such a rule is consistent with Rule 83, Fed. R. Civ. P.,
which provides in pertinent part, II In all cases not
provided for by rule, the distr ict courts may regulate
their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules."
As now embodied in Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civi 1 Procedure, the pretr ial device remains an open-
ended tool for processing cases that gives the Court wide
discretion. As the Seventh Circuit explained in O'Malley
v. Chrysler Corp., 160 F.2d 35, at 36:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 34-36,
28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, provide not
only for discovery but for pretr ial conference.
(Rule 16.) Under these rules we think the Court has
the wide discretion and power to advance the cause
and simplify the procedure before the cause is
presented to the jury. The District Court had the
power to issue such orders as.in the exercise of its
sound discretion would advance and simplify the
cause before trial •••• [T]he order made in the
instant case was such an order. It was only a step
in the orderly procedure of the case. The District
Court was exercising its pretrial powers. It would,
in our opinion, have had the power to make the order
it made irrespective of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
O'Malley has been repeatedly confirmed by later courts,
~, ~, Tracor, Inc. v. Premco Instruments, Inc.,
395 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1968) ~ Buffington v. Wood, 351
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F.2d 292 (3rd eire 1965), and the only real limitation
placed on a court's power under Rule 16 appears to be
when the court's action would adversely prejudice a
par ty' s pos it ion or would compel counsel to adopt one
line of tr ia1 strategy over another. See, Identisea1
Corporation of Wisconsin v. Positive Identification
Systems, Inc., 560 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1977). Neither of
these two latter considerations is present in the Summary
Jury Trial procedure.
Use of the Summary Jury Trial procedure is vitally
important in certain cases because it provides one bit of
information vi tal to a proper "sifting of issues and
evidence ••• with the view of simplifying, shortening
and possibly avoiding a trial," 3 Moore's Federal
Practice '16.02, -- a lay perception of the value of the
claimed damages. Time and again, amicable settlement
discussion have been frustrated merely because counsel
and the judge had no way of determining a proper figure
upon which to build discussions. Often in such a case, a
plaintiff will recover in settlement agreement an amount
based on the abili ty of his counsel at forceful and
cunning horse-trading: more often, parties are forced to
expend thousands of dollars toward a lengthy trial that
might have been avoided ·by a simple three-hour Summary
Jury Trial procedure. I have found that the Summary Jury
Trial has aided in achieving more just settlements and in
easing the docket load of the federal courts.
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IV. CORCLOSION
As with every innovative procedure, the Summary Jury
J
J
Trial's success and acceptance or failure and rejection
depend largely upon the coop~ration of the Bar. If
counsel use this new tool to expedite cases and aid in
settlement, it can be an important step in the
J
J
jurisprudential evolution of the courts. If the
procedure is manipulated by unscrupulous counsel to delay
justice and frustrate the court, it will not achieve its
this procedure.
purpose. I ask your help in implementing and refining
~a~~~
United States District Judge
J
J
J
DATED: March, 1983
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
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IN RE: )
)
RULES OF PROCEDURE )
FOR SUMMARY JURY TRIAL )
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE )
(As Amended January )
1983) )
ORDER
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LAMBROS, DISTRICT JUDGE
1. This order is entered pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 17.02.
2. This action is designated as one for summary jury trial
proceedings to be conducted by the Court or a Magistrate of this
District upon assignment from the Court. If assigned to a
Magistrate, the Magistrate is authorized to exercise the same
authority which the Court may exercise.
3. The action shall be in trial readiness when called for
summary jury tr ial, wi th an expectation of tr ial on the mer i ts
within 30-60 days thereafter if not otherwise disposed of.
4. This action shall be heard before a six-member jury.
Counsel will be permitted two challenges apiece to the venire, and
will be assisted in the exercise of such challenges by a brief voir
dire examination to be conducted by the presiding judicial officer
and by juror profile forms. There will be no alternate jurors.
S. Unless excused by order of court, no later than three
working days before the date set for hearing counsel shall submit
proposed jury instructions and briefs on any novel issues of law
presented.
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6. Unless excused by order of court, clients or client
representatives shall be in attendance at the summary jury trial.
7. All evidence shall be presented through the attorneys
for the parties. The attorneys may summarize and comment on the
evidence and may summar ize or quote directly from depositions,
interrogatories, requests for admissions, documentary evidence and
sworn statements of potential witnesses. However, no witness'
testimony may be referred to unless the reference is based upon one
of the products of the various discovery procedures, or upon a
written, sworn statement of the witness, or upon sworn affidavit of
counsel that the witness would be called at trial and will not sign
an affidavit, and that counsel has been told the substance of the
witness' proposed testimony by the witness.
8. Pr ior to tr ial counsel shall confer with regard to
physical exhibits, including documents and reports, and reach such
agreement as is possible as to the use of such exhibits.
9. Objections will be received if in the course of a
presentation counsel goes beyond the limits of propriety in
presenting statements as to evidence or argument thereon.
10. After counsels' presenstations the jury will be given an
abbreviated charge on the applicable law.
11. The jury may return either a consensus verdict or a
special verdict consisting of an anonymous statement of each
juror's findings on liabili ty and/or damages (each known as the
jury's advisory opinion). The jury will be encouraged to return a
consensus verdict.
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12. Unless specifically ordered by the Court, the
proceedings will not be recorded. Counsel may, if so desired,
arrange for a court reporter.
13. Counsel may stipulate that a consensus verdict by the
jury will be deemed a final determination on the merits and that
judgment be entered thereon by the Court, or may stipulate to any
other use of the verdict that will aid in the resolution of the
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
case.
14. These rules shall be construed to secure the
speedy and inexpensive conclusion of the summary jury
procedure.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Thomas D. Lambros
United States District Judge
DATED:
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trial
Rule 17.02 Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution
The JUdge may, in his or h~ discretion, set any appropriate civil ease tor
Summary Jury Trial or other alternative method of dispute resolution, as he or
she may choose.
•••
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GENERAL ORDER
No. 62
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DMSION
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
Rule 17.01 Pretrial Conferences
Local Civil Rule 17 is hereby amended to read as follows:
•••••
IN THE MATTER OF
AMENDMENT TO
LOCAL CIVIL RULE 17
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JUROR PROFILE FORM
TO THE JUROR
You have been selected to take part in a "summaryjury trial." Briefly, it is a summarized presentation
of a case upon which you will be expected to decide the
issues within one day.
To assist the court in empaneling a summary jury,
you are requested to answer the following questions. Your
responses to these questions and such additional questions
which may be asked of you by the Court will be helpful
in the selection of an impartial summary jury.
QUESTIONS: (Please Print)
1. Name. _
2. Occupation and place of employment. (If retired,
add your former occupation and place of employment.)
3•.Are you married or single? _
4. Your spouse's name? _
S. Spouse's occupation and place of employment.
(If retired, add the former occupation and place of employment.)
6. Your children's names and ages?
This case involves:
J - 41
The parties in this case are:
J
J
f
..J
plaintiff(s) Defendant(s)
J
J
The attorneys appearing today will be: J
7. Do you know any of the parties or their counsel?If so, specifically state who. _
For Plaintiff(s) For Defendant(s)
J
J
J
8. Are you in any way personally connected with
the facts of this case or do you have personal knowledge
of thi s case? I f so, s tate how. _
9. Is there anything you can think of that would
bias your opinion so that you would be unable to give a
fair and just consideration to the merits of this case?I f so, state wha t • _
Your signature
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JURORS' ADVISORY OPINION
Case No.
not liable.
liable, in the amount of
not liable.
not liable.
liable, in the amount of
liable, in the amount of
not liable.
liable, in the amount of
not liable.
liable, in the amount of
not liable.
liable, in the amount of
We, the Jury, find defendant
WE, THE JURY, HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONSENSUS:
liable, but not able to reach a unanimous
decision as to the amount.
We, the Jury, being unable to reach a unanimous
decision, submit our anonymous, individual findings as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
s.
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6.
J
not liable. J
---
___ liable, in the amount of ------- J
-=- J
Foreperson
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JURORS' ADVISORY OPINION
WE, THE JURY, HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONSENSUS:
The issue of liability having already been determined
in favor of plaintiff(s) against defendant(s), we, the
Jury~ find that defendant(s) is/are liable in the amount
of $
We, the Jury, being unable to arrive at a unanimous
decision on the amount of liability, make the following
anonymous, individual finding:
1. Defendant is liable in the amount of $
2. Defendant is liable in the amount of $
3. Defendant is liable in the amount of $
4. Defendant is liable in the amount of $
5. Defendant is liable in the amount of $
6. Defendant is liable in the amount of $
Foreperson
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Case No. C 76-102 Y
JUROR'S ADVISORY OPINION
IF YOU HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REACH A UNANIMOUS DECISION,
PLEASE SUBMIT YOUR INDIVIDUAL FINDINGS BELOW:
Do you the jury find that plaintiff Elmer Morris'
age made a difference in the defendant's decision to terminate
him?
----------
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If you have answered "Yes" to the above question,
was the defendant's decision made in willful
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act?
Do you find that plaintiff Elmer Morris' age
made a difference in the defendant's decision
to terminate him?
If you have answered "Yes" to the above question,
was the defendant's decision made in willful
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act?
If you answered "Yes" to either of the above
questions, what is the amount of compensation
due plaintiff Elmer Morris?
Do you find that plaintiff Elmer Morris' age
made a difference in the defendant's decision
to terminate him?
------
If you answered "Yes" to either of the above
questions, what is the amount of compensation
due plaintiff Elmer Morris?
Do you find that plaintiff Elmer Morris' age
made a difference in the defendant's decision
to terminate him?
If you have answered "Yes" to the above question,
was the defendant's decision made in willful violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?
If you have answered "Yes" to either of the above
questions, what is the amount of compensation due plaintiff
Elmer Morris?
Juror 1.
Juror 2.
Juror 3.
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Juror 4.
Juror S.
Juror 6.
If you have answered ·Yes· to the above question,
was the defendant's decision made in willful
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act? .
If you answered ·Yes· to either of the above
questions, what is the amount of compensation
due plaintiff Elmer Morris? _
Do you find that plaintiff Elmer Morris' age
made a difference in the defendant's decision
to terminate him?
------
If you have answered ·Yes· to the above question,
was the defendant's decision made in willful
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act?
If you answered ·Yes· to either of the above
questions, what is the amount of compensation
due plaintiff Elmer Morris?
Do you find that plaintiff Elmer Morris' age
made a difference in the defendant's decision
to terminate him?
If you have answered ·Yes· to the above question,
was the defendant's decision made in willful
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act?
If you answered "Yes" to either of the above
questions, what is the amount of compensation
due plaintiff Elmer Morris?
Do you find that plaintiff Elmer Morris' age
made a difference in the defendant's decision
to terminate him?
If you have answered "Yes" to the above question,
was the defendant's decision made in willful
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act?
If you answered "Yes" to either of the above
questions, what is the amount.of compensation
due plaintiff Elmer Morris?
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WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
Do you find the following defendants liable on the plaintiff's
claim of conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act?
Do you find the defendant, Du Pont, liable on the plaintiff's
claims of actual monopolization and/or attempt to monopolize under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act? YES ( ) NO ( )
J
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Foreman/Forewoman
CIV-72-483-W
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)
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ADVISORY OPINION
Date
Defendants
Plaintiff,
DAIFLON, INC.,
vs.
ALLIED CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
et al.,
YES NO
Allied Chemical Corporation ( ) ( )
E. I. Ou Pont de Nemours & Company ( ) ( )
Union Carbide Corporation ( ) (
Pennwalt Corporation ( ) ( )
Racon Incorporated ( ) )
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation ( ) ( )
In the event you find two or more defendants liable on the
plaintiff's claim of conspiracy under Section 1 or in the event you
find the defendant, Du Pont, liable on one or both of the plain-
tiff's claims under Section 2, damages are fixed in the amount of$-------
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SUMMARY JURY TRIAL DE~lONSTRATION
Presiding -- Honorable Thomas D. Lambros
Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio
Federal Courthouse
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
Presenting -- Stanley M. Chesley
Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley, Co., L.P.A.
1513 Central Trust Tower
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
For the Plaintiff
and
Charles S. Cassis
Brown, Todd & Heyburn
1600 Citizens Plaza
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
For the Defendant
I. Introduction to Case - Judge Lambros
Description of Accident:
Mrs. Cassavaw was driving southbound on U.S. l7A.
Approaching in the northbound lane was a school bus followed
by a tractor trailer being driven by Mr. Simmons. Simmons
was preparing to pass the school bus to catch up with another
tractor trailer with which he was apparently traveling in
tandem. The bus driver activated his stop sign and flashing
lights to prevent the truck driver from passing. Mrs. Cassavaw
noted the commotion ahead, applied her brakes and cut to the
right. After going to the right, she apparently overcompensated
and steered into the northbound lane where she collided with the
tractor trailer. Mrs. Cassavaw died at the scene of the accident.
The plaintiff contends that a manufacturing defect in
the braking system caused the decedent to swerve after she had
applied her brakes. Defendant contends that the brakes on
Mrs. Cassavaw's Plymouth Reliant K were not defective, and
that the accident was not caused by any manufacturing defect.
II. Plaintiff's Opening Statement - Mr. Chesley
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III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
Defendant's Opening Statement - Mr. Cassis
Presentation of Plaintiff's Proof and Argument
Presentation of Defendant's Proof and Argument
Instructions to the Jury
Jury Deliberations
Jury Decision
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